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ABSTRACT
The explanation of the emergence of untaught behaviour has been a topic of 
considerable interest in behaviour analysis. The experiments in this thesis were 
designed to examine some of the processes underlying these emergent relations. In 
doing this, two different paradigms were examined - stimulus equivalence and 
transitive inference.
The experiments leading to a formal definition of equivalence relations are reported, 
and the demonstration of cognitive abilities with both humans and non-humans 
described. The explanations proposed for the basis of stimulus equivalence are 
discussed. Data from five experiments are then presented. Experiment 1 considered 
the role o f naming in stimulus equivalence and Experiment 2 contrasted this 
performance with the establishment of transitive inference, both experiments being 
carried out with adults with learning disabilities as subjects. The results from these 
experiments suggested that while naming behaviour may help to establish emergent 
relations, it may not be the basis of stimulus equivalence, and that it may be possible 
to account for performance on both stimulus equivalence and transitive inference 
tests in terms of reinforcement contingencies. While subjects who display stimulus 
equivalence are likely to also display transitive inferences, the reverse relation may 
not be true.
Experiments 3 and 4 examined the effects of a disruption of the baseline relations on 
performance on transitive inference and stimulus equivalence tasks. These 
experiments were both carried out with normally able adults, adults with learning 
disabilities, and normally developing young children. Experiment 5 was a replication 
of Experiment 4 with a tighter methodology and a larger number of subjects with 
learning disabilities. It is suggested that the results obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 
can be explained by the development of contextual control of the equivalence 
relations.
The results from these experiments suggested that the transitive inference and 
stimulus equivalence paradigms may respectively be concrete and abstract examples 
of more general emergent relations. These paradigms may also prove to be veiy 
useful teaching tools for helping to establish emergent relations.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
It is not necessary to learn or be taught everything we know. One o f the most 
important featur es of human behaviour is the ability to make inferences from 
previous knowledge, and to integrate new information into well established 
networks of knowledge. However, it is not clear how these "emergent untaught 
behaviours" are derived. It may be possible to gain some insight into processes 
such as learning by examining how these relations are established and maintained.
Stimulus Equivalence
One paradigm which has proved of great utility in examining these emergent 
relations has been that of stimulus equivalence. This paradigm, which emerged 
from research by Murray Sidman and his co-workers in the 1970's and early 1980's, 
provided a framework for examining these relations. Stimulus Equivalence is 
defined by the emergence of new relations following the establishment of certain 
conditional discriminations. Sidman based the behavioural paradigm of stimulus 
equivalence on the mathematical definition of an equivalence relation. The 
mathematical equivalence relation requires the demonstration of the properties of 
reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. Sidman and his co-workers proposed 
behaviouial tests for each of these properties. For example, the reflexivity relation 
requires the demonstration of generalised identity matching, i.e. given a sample 
stimulus, A, the subject must be able to match it to an identical comparison 
stimulus A, without reinforcement or direct training. For the demonstration of the 
property of symmetry, directly training the subject to select stimulus B when given 
sample stimulus A, will then result in the subject selecting stimulus A when given 
sample stimulus B, without direct training or reinforcement, if the original relation 
established between A and B is a relation of equivalence.
A formal definition and behavioural test for each property was set out in a paper by 
Sidman and Tailby (1982). This framework provided a way of describing the 
relations established between stimuli, and a consistent criterion for determining 
whether the relations established in any experiment were truly emergent 
equivalence relations. As the tests for each property were behavioural, they allowed 
for comparisons between different subject populations; normally able adults, 
subjects with learning disabilities, normally developing young children, and also 
non-human subjects. Thus Sidman's definition of stimulus equivalence provided a
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way to compare emergent relations with different groups of subjects, established 
under different conditions.
Symbolic Behaviour
Another reason for interest in the behaviours described by stimulus equivalence is 
that, not only are these behaviours emergent, but they describe "symbolic" 
relations. The relations established between stimuli in equivalence are not based on 
formal physical characteristics of the stimuli, but instead are often purely arbitrary. 
For instance, stimulus equivalence describes the relations between the printed word 
TWO, the spoken word "TWO" and the numeral 2. These stimuli represent the 
same concept, but the relations between the stimuli are all arbitrary. There are no 
physical characteristics that link them, but relations such as these appear to be 
some of the most durable, and earliest established in normally developing young 
children. Thus equivalence relations provide a way to examine the emergence of 
symbolic relations; relations which allow us to tell the time, represent concepts by 
writing and diagrams, allow us to read maps, and in particular seem relevant to the 
development of language.
The main point of this thesis then, is to try and look at how relations such as these 
are established, and to get some idea of the conditions necessary for these emergent 
relations to be derived. The aim however is not to try and provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the stimulus equivalence paradigm, (which is too big a task for a 
single thesis in any case) but rather to try and examine how some of the major 
research questions apply to performance by a particular group of subjects; adults 
with learning disabilities.
Adults with Learning Disabilities
There were several reasons for studying equivalence class formation with subjects 
with learning disabilities. Adults with learning disabilities may well have difficulty 
acquiring the baseline conditional relations and subsequently deriving equivalence 
relations, thus making them suitable subjects with which to study how the relations 
are established. In comparison to normally able adults, these subjects are likely to 
have simpler behavioural histories and less sophisticated language repertoires, 
which may make it easier to see which conditions are necessary for the 
establishment of equivalence relations. Normally developing young children are 
also likely to have simple behavioural and language repertoires than normally able
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adults, but as Saunders and Spradlin (1990) have pointed out, in some ways adults 
with learning disabilities may make more suitable subjects than young children as 
any eventual demonstration o f equivalence relations is unlikely to be due to 
developmental changes, or training experiences outside the laboratory.
However, there is another reason for studying the development of equivalence 
relations with subjects with learning disabilities, "because they are of interest and 
concern in their own right - they need all the help that is available" (Sidman, 1994, 
p.533). Research into stimulus equivalence has shown that emergent relations such 
as these are likely to be a powerful natural learning tool. If  subjects with learning 
disabilities have specific problems with deriving these relations, then 
understanding the conditions necessary for derived performance may help develop 
a powerful teaching tool for use with these subjects. A study by Sidman, Kirk & 
Willson-Morris (1985) had established three six-member equivalence classes; by 
dhectly teaching 15 conditional discriminations they were able to demonstrate the 
emergence of 60 new untaught relations. This demonstrates the potential power of 
the stimulus equivalence paradigm. While subjects with learning disabilities may 
have difficulty demonstrating these relation spontaneously, finding ways to support 
the emergence of these relations could prove very important. This potential has 
been clear almost from the beginning of research on equivalence. One of the 
earliest experiments, Sidman (1971), demonstrated the emergence of 40 new 
relations following direct training on 40 other relations, with an adolescent subject 
with severe learning disabilities. As Sidman stated, there was now "the prospect of 
using the technique not only with normally bright children but with people who 
needed special help to overcome their impaired learning abilities" (Sidman, 1994, 
p.35).
Transitive Inference
Stimulus equivalence is very much rooted in behaviour analysis, and this thesis 
mainly examines emergent untaught behaviour from a behaviour analytic 
perspective. However, behaviour analysis is not the only branch of psychology to 
have described the emergence of untaught relations. The paradigm of transitive 
inference has been well established in cognitive and developmental psychology for 
some time (e.g. Burt, 1919, Piaget, 1928). Transitive inference also requires the 
derivation of new, unreinforced relations on the basis of explicitly established 
premises. For instance, given the relational information that stimulus A is larger 
than stimulus B, and that stimulus B is larger than stimulus C, it is possible to infer
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the transitive relation that stimulus A is larger than stimulus C; a transitive 
inference. Research into transitive inference in the areas of cognitive and 
developmental psychology provided another description of emergent relations, but 
established using different procedures. Thus, it seemed possible that studying the 
conditions necessary for the derivation of transitive inference relations would make 
a useful comparison to studying the conditions necessary for stimulus equivalence.
Comparison between Stimulus Equivalence and Transitive Inference
Given this potentially useful comparison, it seemed particularly significant that it 
was possible to demonstrate relations of transitive inference with non-human 
subjects, while it proved particularly difficult to demonstrate equivalence relations 
with these subjects. If  it was possible to establish why this difference occurred it 
might indicate the basis for the relations in each paradigm. Thus, several of the 
experiments in this thesis contrasted performance by the same subjects on both 
stimulus equivalence and transitive inference. Other experiments contrasted 
performance by different groups of subjects on the same equivalence/inference 
tasks.
The main aim of the research in this thesis then, was to examine aspects of the 
emergence of these untauglit relations, and consider some of the conditions which 
appear to be necessary for these relations to be derived. For instance, two aspects 
which were considered were, the role of naming behaviour in the development of 
stimulus equivalence, and the extent to which it is necessary that the baseline 
stimulus relations form a linear series for the derivation of transitive inference.
The Format of the Thesis
Chapter 2 of the thesis describes some of the early experiments that led to interest 
in derived relations such as those found in stimulus equivalence. This describes the 
initial discovery that traming certain relations could result in the derivation of new 
relations, the development of this paradigm, and the formal description of relations 
of stimulus equivalence as defined by Sidman and Tailby (1982) and Sidman, 
Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby and Carrigan (1982).
The next two chapters describe the investigation of the paradigms of stimulus 
equivalence and transitive inference with first non-human, and then human 
subjects. Chapter 3 describes this investigation with non-human subjects, and also
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gives a historical overview of the development of the investigation of cognitive 
ability with these subjects. Chapter 4 then considers the performance of human 
subjects on the same paradigms of stimulus equivalence and transitive inference. 
This chapter also describes some experiments on the development of sequence 
relations, a topic which seems to connect findings from both equivalence and 
inference research.
Chapter 5 then examines some of the theories put forward to account for the 
derivation of equivalence relations. This describes the naming account of 
equivalence proposed by Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and Horne and Lowe (in 
press); Murray Sidman’s explanation of stimulus equivalence as a fundamental 
stimulus function; and Steven Hayes’ relational frame account of stimulus 
equivalence.
Chapters 6 to 10 describe the experiments carried out investigating different 
aspects of stimulus equivalence and transitive inference. These include studies with 
adults with learning disabilities alone, and also studies comparing performance by 
normally able adults, adults with learning disabilities, and normally developing 
young children on the same task. An assessment was also made of the performance 
of the adults with learning disabilities on a number of independent measures (such 
as the British Picture Vocabulary Scale), and their performance on these tasks was 
compared to their performance on the tests of stimulus equivalence and transitive 
inference.
Chapter 11 provides a general discussion of the results obtained in these different 
experiments.
Thr oughout the thesis, the figures and tables for each chapter appear together, 
following the text, at the end of each chapter.
CHAPTER 2 
The Early Equivalence Experiments: 1971-1982
The formal stimulus equivalence paradigm as defined by Sidman and Tailby (1982) 
developed from work carried out in the 1970's. It arose from a need to explain the 
results of conditional discrimination training with adolescents with learning 
disabilities. It was found that this training led to the emergence of more stimulus- 
stimulus relations than had been established by direct training.
The early papers on these findings discussed the results in terms of cross-modal 
transfer. For example, a subject might be able to relate auditory words to pictures, 
hi the experiment that subject would then be taught to relate auditory words to 
visual words. These two auditoiy-visual equivalences then led to the development 
of purely visual word-picture equivalences, although these relations had never 
been directly taught.
Tlie basic methodology and finding were described by Sidman (1971), who 
considered the skills involved in reading in terms of auditory-visual equivalences.
The Basic Findings: Sidman (1971)
Readmg was considered as a type of stimulus - response relation in which the 
controlling stimuli are visual words. Within that general type of stimulus-response 
relation several sub-categories were identified, e.g.:
Oral-reading - if a child is shown the visual word boy and the subject then says 
"boy'\ this shows that the child can read the word orally.
Auditory-receptive reading - in this case if the word "boy” is said, then the subject 
should be able to select the word boy from several other printed words. 
Reading-comprehension - similarly, if  the subject is shown the printed word boy 
and is then able to select a picture o f a boy fr om several other pictures, this 
indicates that the subject understood the word.
The subject in this experiment was an adolescent boy with severe learning 
disabilities. Prior to training the subject showed good auditory comprehension and 
picture naming (given spoken names the subject was able to select appropriate 
pictures, colours or numbers; when shown pictures the subject could name them, 
but not the corresponding printed words). The subject showed little or no reading 
comprehension or oral reading (could not match the visual names to the 
appropriate pictures and could not name the printed words).
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During the experiment, the subject was taught to match spoken words to printed 
words (auditory-receptive reading). Tests then evaluated the effects of this direct 
teaching on performance on reading comprehension and word naming (see Fig. 
2:1). Following this training the subject was able to match printed word samples to 
picture comparisons and vice-versa, and was also able to name the printed words. 
Previously the subject had not demonstrated any of these equivalences (Fig.2:1 
Equivalences IQ, IV or VI.)
These results were discussed in terms of the cross-over from auditory-visual 
equivalences to purely visual equivalences, or cross-modal transfer.
Development of the Paradigm
A series of papers through the 1970's replicated and extended these findings and 
attempted to quantify and describe further the processes involved.
Sidman and Cresson (19731
Sidman and Cresson (1973) considered the possibility that "some retarded children 
who have not achieved the transfer from auditory to visual comprehension have the 
capability of doing so, but have simply not been taught effectively" (Sidman & 
Cresson, 1973, p.516). This paper replicated Sidman (1971) with additional control 
procedures and with two children who had more severe learning disabilities than 
the original subject. The subjects were first taught identity matching and auditory 
comprehension. They were then taught to match dictated words to printed words. 
This resulted in the emergence of reading comprehension in the same manner as 
was found in Sidman (1971) (see Fig.2:1).
Both Sidman (1971) and Sidman and Cresson (1973) demonstrated mediated 
transfer, using match-to-sample procedures with subjects with learning disabilities. 
These papers were concerned with, and considered their results in terms of, the 
principles of teaching elementary reading. A study by Sidman, Cresson and 
Willson-Morris (1974) directly examined the nature of the emergent relations 
between the stimuli.
Sidman. Cresson and Willson-Morris (1974J
hi the original findings both sets of visual stimuli were related to the same set of 
auditory dictated stimuli. The emergent ability to match printed words to pictures 
might have been mediated by the dictated words - "receptive" mediation (see left 
half of Fig. 2:2). However, another possible explanation might have been
Chapter 2: The Early Equivalence Experiments 8
"expressive" mediation. Prior to training the subjects could name the pictures but 
not the printed words. After learning the cross-modal matching tasks the subjects 
were then able to name the printed words. The emergent relations between the 
pictures and the printed words might therefore have been mediated by the spoken 
words (see right half of Fig. 2:2). The purpose of this experiment was to determine 
if the pre-requisites for the emergence of B-C and C-B were B-A and C-A or B-D 
and C-D (see Fig. 2:2).
hi this experiment the authors tried to eliminate the possibility of expressive 
mediation so as to assess the possibility of receptive naming. To do this, the 
training relations established were different to those used in Sidman (1971) and 
Sidman and Cresson (1973). To prevent any direct association between printed 
words and auditory names, the subject was taught B-A and C-B and tested for the 
emergence of C-A (auditory names and visual names) and C-D (visual names and 
spoken names).
The data obtained from this procedure suggested that oral naming was not 
necessary to mediate the emergence of visual-auditory matching. Both subjects 
showed the emergence of the C-A relations between auditory words and visual 
words but without the emergence of C-D naming. Sidman et al in fact suggested 
that oral naming (C-D) might have been produced by the emergence of C-A rather 
than mediating the emergence of that relation. However the actual basis for the 
transfer between stimuli was by no means clear and Sidman et al suggested that it 
was wisest to limit the term mediation to a procedural sense, i.e. that if  an 
association was established between two stimuli and it was not possible to identify 
the processes intervening, then mediation refers to the observation that the 
association was brought about by prior learning involving elements other than 
these two stimuli.
This experiment by Sidman et al (1974) was an attempt to examine how the 
emergent relations actually come about. It was an attempt to examine what 
conditions were necessary for this "transfer" itself rather than considering the 
results in terms of their relation to reading and how reading behaviour develops.
Other researchers, particularly Spradlin and others, also considered the issue of the 
development of new relations as shown in Sidman (1971) and tried to analyse the 
conditions necessary for this.
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Spradlin. Cotter and Baxlev T19731
Spradlin, Cotter and Baxley (1973) stated that "responding appropriately to new 
situations on the basis of what has been learned in prior situations is characteristic 
of human behavior"(p.556), and that this responding "is especially characteristic of 
complex behaviors involved in language, reading and reasoning" (p.556).
One problem however is how to account for the "transfer" which is necessary for 
the new behaviour to emerge and this is often discussed in terms of "concepts". 
Spradlin et al suggested that it was helpful to consider concepts in terms of 
stimulus classes such as those defined by Goldiamond (1962). In Goldiamond's 
definition a stimulus class is a set of stimuli which control similar responses and 
this definition does not require similar physical characteristics among the members 
of the stimulus class. Spradlin et al suggested that stimulus classes such as these 
would provide a mechanism for the transfer in human behaviour and that the term 
"stimulus class" was likely to create less confusion than the term "concept". 
However, Spradlin et al also noted that other mechanisms might account for 
transfer. For instance, Jenkins and Palermo's (1964) response equivalence 
paradigm was applicable to Sidman's (1971) finding (see Fig. 2:3). Spradlin et al 
(1973) conducted a series of experiments examining the necessary pre-conditions 
for the emergence of untaught relations.
The aim of experiment 1 was to investigate if a conditional discrimination could be 
established without direct training. Two stimuli, A and B, were conditioned to 
control a common response stimulus C. One of these stimuli. A, was then 
conditioned to control a new response stimulus D. Probes were then given to see if 
the second conditional stimulus B also controlled the new response D. The subjects 
were first given pre-training on the relation A-B. Training then established the 
relations A-C, B-C and A-D. Probes were then given to assess if  the B-D 
conditional discrimination would be established without direct training. All three 
subjects with learning disabilities responded appropriately on the B-D probes. For 
two of the subjects the contingencies for the A-C, B-C and A-D training pairs were 
then reversed. Both subjects reversed their responses for both the training trials and 
the probe trials, thus ruling out the possibility that extra-experimental factors might 
have been responsible for the apparent transfer demonstrated.
Experiment 1 had shown that a conditional discrimination could be developed 
without direct training. Experiment 2 was very similar to experiment 1 but was 
designed to examine if the A-B pre-training given in experiment 1 was necessary
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for transfer to occur. Three different subjects with learning disabilities were taught 
the relations A-C, B-C and A-D and performance was then assessed on the test 
relation B-D. All three subjects showed a very high proportion o f criterion 
responses on the B-D probes. Again, when the contingencies for the training 
relations were reversed, all three subjects reversed their responses to both the 
training pairs and the test probes. This experiment suggested that the A-B pre­
training given in experiment 1 was not necessary to obtain transfer. Conditioning a 
common choice response to two conditional stimuli was sufficient to establish 
similar controlling properties; so that when a new choice response was conditioned 
to one conditional stimulus the second stimulus also controlled that response.
Experiment 3 investigated the possibility that while A-B training was not necessary 
to obtain transfer, this training combined with A-D training might be sufficient for 
B-D transfer to occur. Again, the subjects were three adolescents with learning 
disabilities. The subjects were given A-B pre-training to 95% or above, accuracy. 
The subjects were then given A-D trainmg to a similarly high criterion. This time, 
on the B-D probes only two of the three subjects showed transfer. When the 
contingencies on the A-D relations were changed, the subjects showed reversal 
only on the training pairs, not on the probe trials. These results were not 
conclusive, but as Spradlin et al noted, the procedures in experiment 3 were not 
ideal for obtaining stable transfer as the A-B slides were never presented after pre­
training and this may have adversely affected performance on the probe trials.
Spradlin et al (1973) had conducted a series of experiments trying to replicate the 
findings of Sidman (1971) and investigate some of the conditions necessary for 
transfer to occur. Spradlin et al also considered how transfer of this type might be 
important for leamhig in general and how failure to exhibit this transfer may be a 
critical aspect of learning disability.
Dixon and Spradlin (1976)
Dixon and Spradlin (1976) continued this investigation of transfer using stimulus 
classes. Sidman (1971) had established stimulus equivalence by training the subject 
to select two different visual stimuli (a picture and a printed word) in response to 
the same auditory sample stimulus. Following this training the subjects were able 
to match the two visual stimuli to each other. Similarly, Spradlin et al (1973) 
established functional equivalence of two different visual stimuli, but using a 
slightly different procedure. Two visual sample stimuli were conditionally related 
to one visual comparison stimulus. One of the sample stimuli was then
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conditionally related to a new comparison stimulus. Without further training, the 
second sample stimulus was also found to control responding to the new 
comparison stimulus.
In an unpublished study Dixon and Spradlin had tried to extend this paradigm by 
training subjects to select four different visual choice stimuli for each of two visual 
sample stimuli. The subjects were then taught to conditionally relate each of the 
samples in response to an auditory stimulus. However, there was no transfer of 
control from the visual samples to the auditory samples for each class of visual 
choice stimuli. Dixon and Spradlin (1976) described a series of experiments to 
examine the conditions necessary for transfer to occur using this paradigm. The 
overall aim was to determine if a visual class would be established if every member 
of a set of stimuli was to seiwe as both sample and comparison stimulus for every 
other member of the set and, if subjects were trained to select some members of the 
set in response to an auditory stimulus would they then select all members of the 
set in response to that stimulus. This was tested in experiment 1. The subjects in all 
experiments were adolescents with learning disabilities. The visual stimuli were 
eight abstract symbols divided into two sets, and the auditory stimuli were two 
nonsense syllables.
In experiment 1 the subjects were trained to classify the eight visual stimuli into 
two classes using a series of match-to-sample tasks in which each stimulus was 
presented as both a sample and a comparison stimulus for other members of that 
class. After the visual discrimination training the subjects were given auditory 
discrimination training. In the auditory training the subjects were taught to match 
one of the visual stimuli from each class to one of the nonsense syllables. The 
subjects were then given auditory probes to see if they selected the visual stimulus 
that was in the same class as the visual stimulus that was correct in the auditory 
training task.
All six subjects reached criterion on the visual and auditory training tasks but only 
three subjects showed transfer of auditory control to the untrained visual stimuli. 
This failure could have been caused by the visual-matching training being 
insufficient to establish a stimulus class or alternatively the failure could have been 
related to the auditory stimuli. This was examined in experiment 2.
In experiment 2, two of the subjects who failed to show transfer in experiment 1 
received training on a new visual conditional discrimination. Two new visual
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stimuli served as samples for the two visual stimuli that had been directly related to 
the auditory stimuli in experiment 1. The subjects then received probe trials to see 
if this control transferred without further training to the other visual stimuli. Both 
subjects eventually responded correctly to over 90% of the visual probe trials. 
Followhig the probes for visual transfer the subjects again received auditory probes 
to see if they would show transfer to the auditory stimuli following correct 
responding with the new visual stimuli. One subject did demonstrate this transfer 
of auditory control while the other did not.
Although both subjects had failed to show transfer of auditory control in 
experiment 1, both subjects showed transfer of control to the new visual stimuli in 
experiment 2. This suggested that the previous visual discrimination training had 
established two visual stimulus classes rather than a series of independent visual 
discriminations. As the new visual sample stimuli had the same relation as the 
auditory sample stimuli to the visual choice stimuli, this suggested that the failure 
to demonstrate transfer may have been linked to the auditory sample stimuli.
Dixon and Spradlin suggested that this failure may have been due to the auditory 
labels being related to only one member of each class. They suggested that this may 
have caused the subject to respond to that label as a name for a specific stimulus 
rather than as a class name. Possibly relating the stimuli to two or more members 
of the class would cause the label to be extended to all members of the class. This 
was tested in experiment 3.
The subjects in experiment 3 were the remaining subject who failed to demonstrate 
transfer in experiment 1 and the subject who failed to demonstrate transfer of 
auditory control in either experiment 1 or experiment 2. The subjects were given 
auditory training as in experiment 1 but with a new pair of visual stimuli as 
comparisons for the same auditory samples. One subject showed transfer following 
this training. The other subjects performance improved but remained below 90% 
correct. This subject received auditory training with a third set of stimuli and 
demonstrated transfer following this. This experiment demonstrated that direct 
training given to only some members o f a class could transfer to the other members 
of the class without further training. However, it was also clear that the ease with 
which this transfer occurred varied considerably across subjects. The aim of 
experiment 4 was to determine the extent of this transfer with one of the subjects 
who had demonstrated transfer in experiment 1.
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In experiment 4, the subject was trained to match two new visual stimuli to the 
visual stimuli which had been matched to the auditory stimuli in experiment 1. 
Probes showed that the auditory control established in experiment 1 transferred to 
these new stimuli. The subject was then trained to relate two other new stimuli to 
the auditory samples used in experiment 1. The subject was then given probe trials 
where the two new stimuli were samples and the rest of the visual stimuli were 
comparisons. The subject selected the visual stimuli in accordance with the classes 
established. This experiment demonstrated that once a stimulus class had been 
established it was possible to add new members to the class with relatively little 
training. The new members of the class would also have all the controlling 
properties established for the original members o f the class. It was also possible to 
establish new controlling properties with relatively little training.
This series of experiments investigated the conditions under which a stimulus class 
could be established and how that class could be brought under auditory control by 
relating an auditory label to only some members of the class. These experiments 
were intended to investigate the ways in which human subjects are able to respond 
appropriately in new situations on the basis of previously learned information. As 
Dixon and Spradlin pointed out, this behaviour occurs all the time in a "natural" 
setting but had been difficult to investigate in a laboratory setting. The 
manipulations carried out in this study seemed to provide a way of examining the 
conditions necessary for transfer of this sort to occur,
Spradlin and Dixon (1916)
A paper by Spradlin and Dixon (1976) continued this analysis of stimulus classes 
and labels in the development of untaught behaviour. It was similar in nature to 
that of Dixon and Spradlin (1976) and provided some support for the hypotheses 
suggested in that paper. Spradlin and Dixon (1976) further refined the definition of 
a stimulus class as a concept. Spradlin et al (1973) had suggested that it was 
helpful to regard a concept as similar to Goldiamond's (1962) definition of a 
stimulus class; a set of stimuli which control common responses. Spradlin and 
Dixon felt that even tliis definition may be misleading. They pointed out that, in a 
typical match-to-sample task, there is no topographical difference between correct 
and incorrect responses. Rather, it is the relationship between the stimuli that 
determines if a response is correct or not. Spradlin and Dixon thus defined a 
concept as "stimuli or events which are substitutable for each other within a given 
context" (p. 5 5 5) and if two or more stimuli are established as functionally 
equivalent in one condition it is likely that they will be functionally equivalent in a
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second condition, even without direct training in that situation. Spradlin and Dixon 
attempted to expand the paradigm used by Spradlin et al for establishing a 
conditional discrimination without direct training. Spradlin et al had suggested that 
if several choice stimuli were brought under the control of a single sample 
stimulus, and a verbal label was then conditioned to control responses to one of the 
choice stimuli, then this control should transfer to the other choice stimuli. 
However, when Spradlin and Dixon tested this they found that the auditory labels 
did not control responding to the other choice stimuli. The aim of Spradlin and 
Dixon then was to see if  there were any non-verbal procedures which could be used 
to establish these stimulus classes and produce transfer of this sort. Research had 
indicated that there are a number of ways of establishing associations among 
stimuli. Jenkins and Palermo (1964) reviewed these and Spradlin and Dixon 
summarised them as:
Stimulus Equivalence Paradigm: if A controls B and C controls B, then A tends to 
control C.
Response Equivalence Paradigm: if A controls B and A controls C, then B tends to 
control C.
Mediation Paradigm: if  A controls B and B controls C, then A tends to control C. 
Four-Stage Paradigm: if A controls B and C controls B and A controls D tlien C 
tends to control D.
Spradlin and Dixon (1976) hypothesised that if  each stimulus in a set was used as 
both sample and comparison for the other members in a visual discrimination task, 
when an auditory label is conditionally related to one member of a set, the 
processes involved in all these paradigms should operate on all the remaining 
members of a set and produce the maximum opportunity for transfer to occur. 
Spradlin and Dixon tested this possibility in this experiment.
The subjects in this experiment were two adolescents with learning disabilities. 
Match-to-sample training procedures were used to establish two classes of visual 
stimuli. Each stimulus within a set served as a sample and a comparison stimulus 
for the other members within that set. The subjects were then given auditory 
discrimination training. One visual stimulus from each class was related to one of 
two nonsense syllables. The remaining three stimuli from each class were used as 
probes to see if the subjects would select a visual stimulus that was in the same 
class as the visual stimulus directly related to each of the nonsense syllables. Both 
subjects reached criterion on the visual discrimination and auditory training trials. 
However, when given the probe trials, neither subject showed much evidence of
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class transfer. The subjects therefore received auditory training with another visual 
stimulus from each class and the probe trials were given once more. This time both 
subjects showed transfer of control, responding at above 90% class consistent 
responses. When shown the visual stimuli and asked to name them, both subjects 
provided the correct name for a very high proportion of the stimuli.
Thus, the experiment showed that, when every stimulus in a set functioned as both 
a sample and a comparison for other stimuli in that set, and at least two stimuli 
fr om that set are given a label, that label will also be applied to the remaining 
stimuli in that set. This seemed consistent with Spradlin and Dixon's stated 
hypothesis that stimuli established as equivalent by direct training in some 
situations will have similar functions in different situations without direct training. 
The fact that transfer of function did not seem to occur until the auditory label had 
been applied to at least two stimuli also fits with Dixon and Spradlins's (1976) 
suggestion that a label may initially be treated as a name for a specific stimulus 
until it is related to two or more stimuli, when it may come to function as a class 
name.
Spradlin and Dixon also noted that it is possible for transfer to occur when stimuli 
are given only one common function (as in Sidman 1971, Sidman and Cresson 
1973, Sidman et al 1974, Spradlin et al 1973). However the results from Spradlin 
and Dixon (1976) and Dixon and Spradlin (1976) suggest that if  stimuli are given 
equivalent functions in several contexts, then it is more likely that this function will 
transfer without additional training to a new context. Extensive training such as 
this may prove to be especially important for young children or people with 
learning disabilities.
Van Biervliet (1977)
VanBiervliet (1977) used the procedures developed in the studies up to this point 
and applied them to tiying to establish word-object associations with subjects with 
learning disabilities. VanBiervliet's rationale was that the association of words with 
objects is thought to be crucial for language acquisition, but establishing these 
associations with some learning disabled individuals could be extremely difficult 
using standard training techniques. An alternative technique of pairing manual 
signs with words and objects had been suggested (Bricker 1972) but there was 
some resistance to the use of signs on the basis that children taught to communicate 
manually might not learn to speak but instead conununicate only with their hands. 
Bricker's research had provided some evidence that sign-word and sign-object
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training facilitated the acquisition of word object associations but had investigated 
only receptive word-object associations, not how word-object production might be 
affected.
VanBiervliet's study then had two purposes: firstly, to determine if  sign-object and 
sign-word training facilitated both receptive and productive word-object 
associations. In doing this the second purpose was to test Spradlin and Dixon's 
(1976) functional equivalence proposal; i.e. that if two or more stimuli are 
established as functionally equivalent by training, there is an increased probability 
that they will be functionally equivalent m a second condition even without direct 
reinforcement.
The subjects were 6 retarded adolescents. The stimuli were five nonsense words, 5 
junk objects and five nonsense manual signs. The subjects were taught: 1) Object 
matching; 2) Sign imitation; 3) Object-sign production; 4) Sign-object reception, 5) 
Word imitation; 6) Word-sign production; 7) Sign-word production. (See Fig. 2:4). 
This training established the relations between each stimulus and itself (relations 1, 
2 and 5) - e.g. in object matching (relation 1) when shown an object as the sample 
stimulus, the subject had to select the same object from the comparison stimuli.
The training also established the relations between objects and signs (relations 3 
and 4) and words and signs (relations 6 and 7). For example, in object sign 
production (relation 3) when given an object as a sample the subject had to produce 
the appropriate sign. Sign-object reception (relation 4) was the reverse of this, 
when shown a sign as sample the subject had to select the appropriate object. When 
the subjects had reached criterion on these tasks they were probed for the 
development of associations between the words and the object; word-object 
reception (relation 8) and object-word production (relation 9). All the subjects 
successfully completed the training tasks. On the probe tasks all subjects showed 
appropriate associations between words and objects.
Thus, following sign-object and sign-word training, all the subjects were able to 
correctly associate words and objects, which suggested that this might indeed be a 
viable way of training spoken language for some individuals. While this sort of 
training might not be necessary for normally developing children it might be more 
effective than normal teaching procedures for children with learning disabilities. 
VanBiervliet suggested that Spradlin and Dixon's (1976) functional equivalence 
proposal provided an explanation for the acquisition of these word-object 
associations. If two stimuli control the same response, they are likely to have the
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same function in other behavioural contexts, i.e. the sign production was controlled 
by both the object and the dictated word and so the object and the word became 
functionally equivalent.
Lazar f19771
Lazar (1977) used another procedure to investigate the development of functional 
equivalence classes. A sequential-response training paradigm was used to establish 
two stimulus classes - "first" and "second". The stimuli used in this procedure were 
then related to a new set o f stimuli by means of a match-to-sample procedure. 
Finally, probes were given to see if the new stimuli had acquired the functions of 
"first" and "second" through equivalence in the matching to sample.
The subjects were thiee normally able adults. Four pairs of stimuli were presented 
and the subjects were taught always to point to one stimulus in each pair first and 
the other stimulus second, regardless of spatial position. The aim of this was to 
establish foui* baseline sequences/pairs A 1^A 2, B1-^B2, C1->C2, D 1^D 2. 
Probes were then given to see if this training had established two classes: one 
consisting of stimuli to which the subjects responded first and one consisting of 
stimuli to which the subjects responded second. The probes consisted of 
presentations of "cross-over" pairs; for example, given the test pair A2/B1, the 
subjects were expected to respond to stimulus B1 first followed by A2. This would 
suggest tliat the subjects behaviom was controlled by the classes "first" and 
"second". These original stimuli were then related to two new pairs of stimuli, E l 
and E2, and FI and F2, using a match-to-sample procedure. The original stimuli 
served as samples and the new stimuli as comparisons, so that, for example, when 
the sample was stimulus A l, stimulus E l was the correct comparison and when the 
sample was A2, E2 was the correct comparison. Following this training, probes 
were again given to see if the new stimuli E l, E2, FI and F2 had acquired the 
fimctions of "first" and "second" as a result o f being conditionally related to the 
original A, B, C and D stimuli.
All thi'ee subjects learned the four baseline sequences, and probes demonstrated the 
establishment of the two classes "first" and "second". All tluee subjects learned the 
matching-to-sample tasks. Following this training, two subjects immediately 
responded to the stimuli in predictable sequences, pointing to E l and FI first and 
E2 and F2 second. The third subjects performance showed no evidence of transfer 
of function having occurred. Subsequent tests showed that the sample and 
comparison stimuli in the matching-to -sample tasks had not become functionally
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equivalent. This subject appeared to have treated the matching-to-sample trials as a 
number of unrelated tasks and, as a result, the transfer of sequence function would 
not have been expected.
The baseline training in the first part of this experiment established two sequence 
classes - "first" and "second" for all three subjects. When matching-to-sample was 
used to relate new stimuli to the stimuli in these sequence classes, two of the three 
subjects responded to these new stimuli in predictable sequences without further 
training. Thus, stimulus class membership can be extended by match-to-sample 
procedures, even when the original stimulus classes were not established in a 
match-to-sample context.
Lazar (1977) suggested that studies of this sort might be relevant to the study of 
language. Much o f this behavioural repertoire seems to emerge without direct 
training and had been difficult to account for using a functional analysis. Deese 
(1965) and Jenkins (1965) had suggested that the grammatical elements could be 
viewed as members of syntactical classes. Braine (1963) and Browne (1973) had 
shown some evidence that an early indication of syntactical structure was word 
order. Lazar suggested that words occupying equivalent positions might be 
members of the same grammatical class and so the results Jfrom this study might be 
similar to a child learning to combine an adjective and a noun appropriately. This 
study was "an initial attempt to apply a functional analysis to simple sequences that 
may be analogous to syntactical structures" (p.392).
Sidman & Tailbv (1982k 
Sidman. Rauzin Lazar. Cunningham. Tailbv & Carrigan (19821:
The Definition of Stimulus Equivalence
Sidman and Tailby (1982) and Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby and 
Carrigan (1982) carefully analysed the procedures used in trying to establish 
equivalence relations.
Sidman and Tailbv (19821
Sidman and Tailby (1982) considered the precise status of the relations between the 
stimuli in equivalence classes, and proposed a definitive firamework of relations 
and behavioural tests for the consistent demonstration of equivalence relations.
This definition proposed precise tests for determining if relations established 
between stimuli were conditional relations, or equivalent and could be called
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matching-to-sample. For example, in a conditional discrimination a subject learns 
to select stimulus B1 in the presence of stimulus A1 and stimulus B2 in the 
presence of A2. Sidman and Tailby stated that the relation between these stimuli, 
" i f . . .  then", was directly observable by reference to the subjects ongoing 
interaction with the procedure. However, a well established conditional 
discrimination may demonstrate not only the " i f . . .  then" conditional relations 
between the stimuli, but also an equivalence relation. If this equivalence relation is 
assumed the subjects performance may often be referred to as "matching-to- 
sample". However, to determine if a conditional relation is also an equivalence 
relation requires additional tests. Sidman and Tailby specified the tests necessary to 
demonstrate equivalence. These were derived from the mathematical definition of 
an equivalence relation and specified three properties: reflexivity, symmetry and 
transitivity.
Reflexivity
If a conditional relation is reflexive each stimulus must bear that relation (r) to 
itself; if  A then A - ArA. The demonstration of reflexivity requires generalised 
identity matching.
Svmmeti'v
The conditional relation between two stimuli must also be reversible if the stimuli 
are equivalent. This requires the demonstration of symmetry, so that if  two stimuli 
are conditionally related - A-B, it should then be possible to demonstrate B-A 
without further training. The demonstration of symmetry then is functional sample- 
comparison reversibility.
Transitivity
The demonstration of the third property, transitivity, requires three stimuli. If two 
conditional relations, A-B and B-C are established, then transitivity requires the 
demonstration of A-C. The transitivity relation shows the relation between the 
sample of the first conditional discrimination and the comparison of the second.
Sidman and Tailby (1982) stated that in order for a conditional relation to be called 
"matching-to-sample" all three properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity 
must be demonstrated. Sidman and Tailby also detailed combined tests for 
evaluating symmetry and transitivity simultaneously. For example, if  a subject was 
directly taught the relations A-B and A-C, the demonstration of B-C and C-B 
would require the properties of both symmetry and transitivity. Symmetry of the
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relations A-B and A-C would give B-A and C-A. Transitivity of B-A and A-C 
would give B-C while transitivity of C-A and A-B would give the relation C-B.
Sidman and Tailby then described an experiment which replicated the procediues 
of Sidman (1971), Sidman and Cresson (1973) and Spradlin, Cotter and Baxley 
(1973). The results &om these experiments were then related to Sidman and 
Tailby's definition of equivalence, and this training and test paradigm was also 
extended to consider 4-member equivalence classes. In Sidman (1971) and Sidman 
and Cresson (1973) the subjects learned or demonstrated the conditional 
discrimination AB (dictated names -^pictures). They were then taught the 
conditional discrimination AC (dictated names -> printed names). The subjects 
then demonstrated that these conditional relations were also equivalence relations 
by demonstrating the relations BC and CB (matching pictures and printed names 
and vice versa). These relations required a combination of symmetry and 
transitivity, the subjects were not explicitly trained to demonstrate these relations, 
and had not been able to relate these pictures and printed words to each other prior 
to learning the AB and AC conditional discriminations. The subjects also proved 
able to name the pictures (BD) and the printed words (CD) aloud (see fig. 2:1)
One of the main purposes of the experiment in Sidman and Tailby (1982) was to 
add one further stimulus to each class and so investigate the power of equivalence 
relations to generate a network of interchangeable stimuli (see Fig. 2:5). The ABC 
relations in this experiment, established by training AB and AC, represented a 
replication of the results from Sidman (1971) and Sidman and Cresson (1973).
This was then extended by training the relation DC, where new stimuli from set D 
functioned as samples for stimuli in set C. The aim was to see if  these DC relations 
expanded the three-member ABC class to a four-member ABCD class of 
equivalent stimuli (see Fig. 2:5). Spradlin, et al (1973) had demonstrated the 
emergence of relations similar to DB but had not tested for BD. As both DB and 
the symmetrical relation BD were necessary for the demonstration of 4-member 
classes, this experiment both replicated and extended Spradlin et al's findings.
The paradigm used in this experiment permitted the testing of equivalence in 
several ways. Training the relations AB and AC allowed equivalence to be tested 
by the relations BC and CB. This established the upper triangle in Fig. 2:5. In this 
case the trained relations shared the same sample stimulus, A. Training a further 
relation DC established the lower triangle in Fig. 2:5 and equivalence could be 
tested by the relation AD. In this case the trained relations shared the same
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comparison stimulus, C. It was then possible to test for the existence of 4-member 
classes by testing the relations DB and BD.
The subjects were eight normally able children aged between 5:0 and 7:5 
(years :months). As part of a series of pre-tests, the subjects were tested on identity 
matching with the Greek letters used in the experiment. This served as a test for 
reflexivity. The subjects were then taught three conditional discriminations. First 
they were taught AB, then AC, then these two discriminations were presented 
mixed together. The subjects were then taught DC and these relations were mixed 
with AB and AC to constitute a mixed baseline. The subjects were then tested for 
the development of 4-member and 3-member equivalence relations. The probes for 
each relation were inserted into an appropriate baseline of training relations so that, 
for example, the DB 4-member equivalence probes were inserted into a baseline of 
AB, AC and DC relations while the 3-member BC and CB equivalence probes 
required a baseline of AB and AC relations. Tests were given for both matching-to- 
sample and oral naming. The matching-to-sample probes were 4-member 
equivalence relations DB and BD; 3-member equivalence relations AD, BC and 
CB; and symmetiy probes CD. At the end of the experiment the subjects were 
tested for oral naming of the B, C and D stimuli.
Six of the eight subjects demonstrated the emergence of six new sets of conditional 
discriminations as a result o f being directly taught three sets of conditional 
discriminations. These performances included the emergence o f the 4-member 
relations as well as all the symmetrical and transitive relations defined as necessary 
for the relations to emerge. The children also named the stimuli in accordance with 
the class memberships established by training.
Two subjects failed to demonstrate the emergence of all these new conditional 
relations. Neither subject demonstrated the transitive relations required for the 4- 
member DB and BD relations. One of these subjects was given a series of tests to 
examine the status of the prerequisite relations. This subject's poor performance on 
the 4-member test was shown to be consistent with the absence of several of the 
prerequisite relations. Interestingly thougli, this subject's performance on the 
naming test was highly accurate. The other subject did not receive all the tests 
necessary to evaluate the prerequisite relations for equivalence.
These results suggested that Sidman and Tailby's definition of the properties 
necessary for stimulus equivalence was indeed useful. The six subjects who
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demonstrated 3 and 4-member equivalence relations also demonstrated all the 
relations defined as necessary for these equivalence relations to emerge. For at least 
one of the subjects who failed to demonstrate 4-member equivalence relations, this 
failure was predictable because of the failure to establish some of the prerequisite 
relations.
This experiment also showed how this stimulus equivalence procedure had 
enormous potential for generating large amounts of new behaviour from only a 
few directly trained relations. For instance, three conditional discriminations were 
directly trained, AB, AC and AD but six other conditional relations emerged 
without direct training, as well as oral naming relations.
Sidman and Tailby suggested that stimulus equivalence was likely to be 
independent of naming. The children in this experiment were able to name the set 
D letters with the same class names that had been explicitly taught for the B and C 
stimuli. This had raised the possibility that naming might be mediating the 
emergence of the new conditional relations. However, one subject's performance 
on the naming test suggested that this was unlikely. This subject named the B and 
C stimuli with no hesitation but was very reluctant to give names for the D stimuli 
imtil prompted. Sidman and Tailby suggested that this showed the subject had not 
named the D stimuli prior to the naming test, which occurred after the test for the 
emergent conditional relations. Therefore, although naming may facilitate 
equivalence relations when it occurs, it is not necessary for the development of 
equivalence. Sidman and Tailby also argued that naming was not sufficient for the 
development of equivalence. One subject was able to name the B, C and D stimuli 
in accordance with the predicted equivalence classes, but did not demonstrate the 
emergence of these classes on the equivalence tests. As Sidman and Tailby pointed 
out, it is not surprising that naming was not sufficient to establish these 
equivalence classes as the relation "is the name o f  does not demonstrate the 
required properties of an equivalence relation.
Sidman. Rauzin. Lazar. Cunningham. Tailby and Carrigan (19821 
Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby and Carrigan (1982) again noted the 
difference between a conditional relation and "matching-to-sample". They 
suggested that identity matching is one case where the two relations may be 
confused. For, instance, given a vertical line sample stimulus the correct 
comparison may be another vertical line. While this relation may appear to be one 
of sameness, or identity, it may in fact be a conditional discrimination in just the
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same way as if the stimuli were a vertical line sample and a colour comparison. In 
the same way, relations established between two physically different stimuli may 
be related only by conditionality or they may indeed be related by equivalence or 
"matching-to-sample". If the stimuli are related by equivalence they may have 
become mutually substitutable, as in the relation between the numeral 2 and the 
printed word TWO or the word RED and the hue red. Sidman et al suggested that it 
is tempting to assume that conditional discriminations establish equivalence as this 
would allow the use of conditional discriminations as a model for studying aspects 
of language, even with non-humans.
In both this paper and Sidman and Tailby (1982) the authors defined certain 
properties of the relationship between stimuli which should be demonstrable if the 
relations are tmly equivalence relations - reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. 
Sidman and Tailby demonstrated equivalence relations according to these criteria 
with normally able young children. Emergent equivalence relations were 
demonstrated with adolescents with learning disabilities (Sidman 1971, Sidman 
and Cresson 1973). Sidman et al noted however that they had been unable to 
demonstrate emergent equivalence relations rather than conditional discriminations 
with monkeys. The aim of Sidman et al was to describe some of the attempts to 
demonstrate symmetry with both rhesus monkeys and baboons.
hi all experiments unless otherwise stated the subjects were adult rhesus monkeys.
Experiment 1 - The subjects were first given experience with line-line and hue-hue 
discriminations. This provided experience of all stimuli as both samples and 
comparisons. The subjects were then taught a line-hue conditional discrimination 
so that with vertical samples they learned to select green and with horizontal 
samples to select red. Finally the subjects were given probes for the emergent hue- 
line symmetrical relations.
The subjects' performances on baseline trials were above 90% correct but 
performances on test probes were around chance level. This suggested that training 
had established only a conditional relation between the sample and comparison 
stimuli. There was no evidence that the stimuli had become equivalent.
Experiment 2 - This experiment investigated the possibility that the incorrect 
comparison as well as the correct comparison may be important in specifying the 
conditional relations. In this case, the conditional relation in experiment 1 might
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have been "If the sample is vertical and the comparisons are green and red, then 
green is the correct comparison" (Sidman et al 1982, p.30, italics in original). In 
this experiment, on the symmetry probes, the incorrect comparison remained the 
same and the sample and correct comparison were substituted for each other.
Even with the incorrect comparison held constant the subjects performance on the 
symmetry probes was around chance level. There was no improvement of 
performance from experiment 1. The conditional relations did not cause the stimuli 
to become equivalent.
Experiment 3 - A series of experiments had demonstrated that the conditional 
discrimination procedure does establish equivalence relations with a number of 
groups of subjects, e.g. retarded adolescents (Sidman 1971, Sidman and Cresson 
1973, Sidman, Cresson and Willson-Morris 1973, Spradlin Cotter and Baxley 
1973), normally able adults (Lazar 1977) and normally able children (Lazar and 
Kotlarchyk, note 2, Sidman & Tailby 1982). But these human subjects did not learn 
the same conditional relations as the monkeys and different methods of testing for 
equivalence were used. The aim of experiment 3 was to repeat experiment 1 with 
normally able children to see if the procedures would produce equivalence 
relations with this subject group.
The subjects in this experiment were six normally able children aged between 4:8 
and 5:9 (years :months). Four of the six children demonstrated symmetry of the 
trained conditional relations. This suggested that the monkeys failure to 
demonstrate symmetry using this procedure was not due to some procedural 
artifact. However two of the children did not demonstrate symmetry, suggesting 
that the stimuli had not become equivalent. The training and test procedures were 
re-appraised and, following changes to the baseline conditional discriminations 
these two subjects did give positive results on the symmetry test. As the new 
baselines may have been responsible for this emergence of symmetrical 
responding, the new baselines were then tested with tlie monkeys in experiment 4.
Experiment 4 - Successful responding on the hue-line symmetry probes required a 
successive discrimination between the coloured samples and a simultaneous 
discrimination between the line comparisons. The results from experiment 3 
suggested that the hue-hue and line-line training given may not have been 
sufficient to establish this repertoire. The hue-hue training did involve a successive 
discrimination between the hue samples but, when the subject was required to
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select the correct hue comparison, both the red and green hues were available 
simultaneously as comparisons and so may not have required the subject to learn 
the successive discrimination as intended. Similarly the line-line training may not 
have established the simultaneous discrimination required for probe trials. For this 
reason, the line-line and hue-hue training trials were replaced with form-line and 
hue-form training to try and establish the respective simultaneous and successive 
discriminations (see Table 2:1).
Once again the subjects did not show appropriate symmetrical responding. The 
subjects tended to select the vertical comparison in the presence of both colour 
samples. New baseline discriminations had been introduced to ensure the subjects 
had experience with appropriate forms of conditional discriminations but these did 
not produce equivalence relations between the stimuli. Sidman et al also noted that 
the data from this experiment also revealed the absence o f transitivity. The subjects 
were taught hue-form and form-line discriminations and these were sufficient to 
establish correct responding on the hue-line probes by transitivity, even without 
training the line-hue discrimination and testing for symmetry.
Experiment 5 - Different results were obtained using monkeys and children as 
subjects. It was not clear if this was due to species-related or experiential factors or 
both. Experiment 5 therefore repeated the procedure used in experiments 1 and 3 
with 2 baboons as subjects.
Performance on probe-trials was around chance level for both baboons. This data 
strongly resembled the data obtained with the monkey subjects on this procedure. 
There was no evidence that training had established anything more than conditional 
relations between the stimuli. There was no evidence that the stimuli had become 
equivalent.
Sidman et al described a series of experiments which showed that procedures 
establishing conditional discriminations also established symmetrical responding 
with young children but not with monkeys or baboons. Experiment 4 also showed 
the absence of transitivity in the monkeys conditional discriminations. These 
results replicated and extended similar findings with pigeons (Hogan and Zentall 
1977, Holmes 1979, Rodewald 1974). These procedures therefore, seemed to 
establish only conditional discriminations with monkey and baboon subjects but 
produced something more with the human subjects. For the children in this 
experiment the stimuli had become equivalent and it was appropriate to refer to
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their performance as "matching-to-sample". Sidman et al pointed out that, as a 
result of the findings, it would not be appropriate to assume that training a 
conditional relation established anything more than a conditional relation, 
particularly with non-human subjects.
One reason for interest in conditional discrimination paradigms was that they might 
provide a model for studying language, "where the conditional discrimination 
procedure does generate true matching to sample, the formation of stimulus classes 
defines a semantic correspondence between each sample and its comparison 
stimulus" (Sidman et al, 1982, p.43). The failure of non-humans to generate 
matching to sample limited the use of this paradigm as a model. However, as 
Sidman et al pointed out, the analysis of non-human performance on these tasks 
was still potentially useful. Analysis of the reasons why non-humans failed to show 
equivalence performances might suggest the necessary components for this 
matching to sample performance. Techniques for establishing these components in 
the non-human behavioural repertoires might also have implications for humans 
with leaining disabilities.
Summai-v from earlv experiments
These papers between 1971 and 1982 documented the investigation of the 
phenomenon that training some conditional relations could, with a number of 
groups of human subjects, lead to the emergence of new, untaught, conditional 
relations. Somehow these conditional relations had established more than 
conditionality, the stimuli involved had become equivalent - mutually substitutable.
These experiments investigating this finding showed a gradual change in how this 
was regarded and interpreted. The basic finding described by Sidman (1971) was 
considered in terms of reading and the pre-requisite skills for this behaviour, such 
as oral reading, auditory-receptive reading and reading comprehension. Much of 
Sidman (1971) and the other earlier papers (e.g. Sidman and Cresson 1973) was 
concerned with cross-modal transfer, for instance, how the visual behaviour of 
reading comprehension might have developed from previously learned auditory- 
visual equivalences. This approach seemed a logical one as it appeared to mimic 
developmental findings that visual behaviours such as reading emerged after 
auditory-visual behaviours such as selecting objects in response to spoken words. 
This shift, from auditory-visual behaviours to purely visual behaviours seemed to 
indicate a major developmental shift. Much of this early work then was aimed at
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discovering what mediated this transfer as it might have important implications for 
assisting children who seemed unable to make this shift and were not developing 
behavioiu’s such as reading.
One of the main aims then was to find what factors mediated this transfer and the 
data from these experiments were compared to results from "mediated-transfer" 
paired associate teclmiques such as those reported by Jenkins (1963) and Jenkins 
and Palermo (1964). However this emphasis gradually shifted to a more specific 
examination of the conditional discrimination paradigm itself. There was also a 
shift o f emphasis from consideration of emergent behaviour in terms of reading 
and its pre-requisites (Sidman 1971; Sidman and Cresson 1973) and concepts 
(Spradlin, Cotter and Baxley 1973; Dixon and Spradlin 1976; Spradlin and Dixon 
1976). Instead, the emphasis moved towards defining the precise conditions under 
which equivalence or "transfer" occurred in this conditional discrimination 
paradigm. VanBiervliet (1977) also described one experiment using this paradigm 
as a teaching tool.
This progression resulted in two very important papers: Sidman and Tailby (1982) 
and Sidman et al (1982). Sidman and Tailby's paper was important as it pointed out 
that it is not possible to assume that establishing a conditional discrimination will 
result in matching-to-sample or equivalence. Instead Sidman and Tailby described 
a series of properties which defined equivalence and proposed behavioural tests to 
determine if a conditional relation met these criteria for stimulus equivalence. This 
provided a basis for comparing across studies and ensuring a consistent evaluation 
of the phenomenon of emergent behaviour.
The stimulus equivalence paradigm in connection with reading had also developed 
considerably from Sidman (1971) to Sidman and Tailby (1982).
"Formal resemblances between conditional discriminations and reading do not 
prove one relevant to the other. The establislunent of stimulus classes does 
prove the relevance. . . . The equivalence paradigm provides exactly the test that 
is needed to determine whether or not a particular conditional relation involves 
semantic relations" (Sidman and Tailby, 1982, p.20)
Equivalence was still seen as relevant to reading but in a different w ay . The 
stimulus equivalence paradigm was useful as a explanatory tool for behaviours 
such as reading rather than being a mediating factor in cross-modal transfer.
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Sidman and Tailby (1982) also indicated how the stimulus equivalence paradigm 
had moved away from the idea of mediated-transfer. "The successful use of 
conditional discriminations to generate equivalences raises considerable doubt 
about the necessity for postulating the existence of mediating responses". (Sidman 
and Tailby, 1982, p,21). hi the conditional discrimination paradigm the only overt 
response is pointing or touching, which is the same for all stimuli, therefore the 
transfer was not mediated by differential response topography. Sidman and Tailby 
had already stated that they believed there was evidence to show that stimulus 
equivalence was not mediated by naming. Therefore they concluded that "the very 
logic of the conditional-discrimination procedure suggests that no other kind of 
mediating response need be postulated" (Sidman and Tailby, 1982,p.22)
Sidman et al's (1982) experiments emphasised that it could not be assumed that a 
conditional discrimination procedure would necessarily produce equivalence. The 
procedure which produced syimnetry with normally able children consistently 
failed to establish syimnetry with non-human subjects. This emphasised the 
usefulness of Sidman and Tailby's (1982) definition of the necessary properties of 
equivalence relations. Testing for the properties of the equivalence relation 
provided a consistent definition of equivalence and also, if equivalence was not 
demonstrated, specified exactly where the relationship was breaking down. Sidman 
et al noted that examining why the conditional discrimination procedure establishes 
equivalence in humans but not in non-humans might be productive. Understanding 
why the procedure fails with non-humans might help show how it establishes 
equivalence with human subjects.
These experiments through the 1970's to 1982 showed efforts to describe and 
quantify the emergence of untaught relations. By 1982 this had produced a 
definition of the necessaiy properties of equivalence and specified tests for these 
properties, giving some indication of the conditions under which equivalence 
would or would not develop, and with which groups of subjects. The stimulus 
equivalence paradigm provided a way of examining naturally occurring emergent 
behaviour in a controlled laboratory setting. It was also becoming clear that 
equivalence had the potential to be a very powerful tool both for explaining and 
establishing new behavioural repertoires.
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Fig. 2:1 Training and Test Relations, Sidman (1971)
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Fig. 2:2 Stimuli, Responses and Mediated-Transfer Paradigms. 
From Sidman, Cresson & Willson-Morris (1974)
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Fig. 2:3. Response Equivalence Paradigm, Jenkins & Palermo (1964)
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Fig. 2:4 Training and Test Relations, Van Biervlieet, 1977
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Fig. 2:5. Training and Test Relations, Adapted from Sidman and Tailby (1982)
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Table 2:1. Training and test relations, Sidman et al (1982)
Sample Comparisons
Correct Incorrect
lA X vertical horizontal
IB + horizontal vertical
2A green X +
2B red + X
* 3A vertical green red
* 3B horizontal red green
4A green vertical horizontal
4B red horizontal vertical
Trials 1A & B - form-line, trials 2A & B hue-form. 
Trials 3A & B - trained conditional discrimination 
Trials 4A & B - symmetry probes
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CHAPTER 3 
Examples of Cognition in Non-Humans
The Historical Background
There has long been interest in the cognitive abilities of non-humans, and 
particularly in how their abilities might relate to the cognitive abilities of human 
subjects on similar tasks. "Since the turn of the century the experimental 
investigation of problem solving has been a jfruitfiil source of information on how 
animals and men think and learn" (Scheerer, 1963, p.26)
Romanes (1888)
Even before the experimental investigation of non-human cognitive abilities 
attempts were made to describe animal intelligence. Romanes (1888) considered 
the reliability of various accounts of animal behaviour, from both scientific 
sources and from popular literature. Romanes suggested that it was not possible to 
accept many of these accounts uncritically, as many were fr om little known 
researchers, or even anonymous. Yet Romanes also noted that accepting reports 
only fr om well established researchers might neglect some valid evidence from 
lesser known observers. Romanes therefore suggested three principles to be applied 
when considering reports of animal intelligence. Firstly, not to accept any alleged 
fact without the authority of some respected name. Secondly, if  an alleged fact 
seemed important but the person reporting it was not well known, it was important 
to consider if  there was much opportunity for mal-observation. In other words, for 
the fact to be accepted the behaviour of the animal had to be clear and 
umnistakable. Thirdly, Romanes tabulated all observations by unknown observers 
in order to check if reports by one observer were corroborated by other independent 
observers. Romanes felt that this corroborated evidence was as trustworthy as 
statements based on the authority of a single, though well respected observer.
At this time, consideration of non-human cognitive abilities tended to be based on 
reports of animal behaviour rather than experimentation. However, Romanes 
documents principles for testing the quality of these reports and bases the limits of 
animal intelligence only on reports with considerable authority or on behaviours 
which had been clearly demonstrated on several occasions.
Romanes pointed out that when considering the phenomenon of "mind" in relation 
to non-humans only objective analysis is possible. Subjective analysis is possible of
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only a persons own mind as only that person has immediate cognisance of the 
processes operating. For all other minds, both human and non-human, such 
immediate cognisance is not possible and all knowledge of the processes operating 
can only be inferred through the medium of what Romanes referred to as 
ambassadors - the activities of the organism. From these observable activities the 
intention is to infer the underlying mental operations. However, as Romanes then 
pointed out, it can be hard to say exactly which abilities really show evidence of 
intelligence or "mind" - even quite complex adaptive behaviours can be performed 
without true purpose or consciousness. Romanes defines behaviour giving 
evidence of intelligence as adaptive behaviour where the mechanism of the nervous 
system, or reflex behaviour, is not sufficient to explain the behaviour observed. 
"Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in 
accordance with the results of its own individual experience?. If it does so, the 
fact cannot be due merely to reflex action . . .  for it is impossible that heredity 
can have provided in advance for innovations upon, or alteration of, its 
machineiy during the lifetime of a particular individual" (p.46)
Romanes goes on to point out that this definition of an organism showing itself 
able to learn by its own experiences requires the same evidence in animals as in 
humans. If tliis learning by experience is sufficient proof for evidence of 
mind/intelligence in humans then it must also be accepted as sufficient proof for 
evidence of mind/intelligence in non-humans.
Romanes went on to give some examples of obsei*vations which seemed to show 
that non-humans, and particularly monkeys and apes, displayed behaviour 
consistent with this definition of intelligence. For instance, a dog will eat when 
himgiy, a reflex action. But the dog can also learn not to eat, even when hungry, 
until it has received a particular verbal signal. Romanes suggests that this shows 
the same evidence that the dog's actions are prompted by mind as would be 
evidence with a human subject. Romanes also described several instances of apes 
learning to use sticks, and other objects, to obtain items which were out of reach, 
and suggested that these also fitted with a definition of learning by experience.
Thorndike 118981
Thorndike (1898) however argued that mere descriptions of behaviour are an 
msufficient basis with which to consider intelligence in non-humans. Thorndike 
states that "The main purpose of the study of the animal mind is to learn the 
development of mental life down through the phylum, to trace in particular the 
origin of human faculty" (p.63). However, Thorndike felt that this study of the
Chapter 3 : Cognition in Non-Humans 31
animal mind was poorly served by a descriptive account of animal behaviour. He 
argued that descriptions of animal behaviour "have all been about animal 
intelligence, never about animal stupidity" (p.64, italics in original) and were thus 
prejudiced to find evidence of intelligence in animals. Thorndike believed that this 
prejudice was worsened by the "facts" about animal intelligence being drawn from 
obseivations and anecdotes. He suggested that there was a tendency to report cases 
of exceptional animal behaviour while neglecting iionnal animal behaviour; "In 
short, the anecdotes give really the abnormal or super-normal psychology of 
animals" (p.65, italics in original). Even applying Romanes criteria o f the report 
having the authority of a respected name and ruling out the possibility of mal- 
observation is of little use if  there is a prejudice towards reporting atypical 
behavioui’. Possibly only Romanes third criterion of accepting reports of the same 
behaviour fr om independent researchers goes some way to addressing this problem.
Thorndike stated that the solution to the problem was to investigate animal 
intelligence through experimentation rather than observation. He felt that this 
procedure had notable advantages to just observation; the conditions could be 
repeated on several occasions to ensure that the animals behaviour on the first 
occasion was how it would typically behave, and a number of animals could be 
given the same test to ensure that the behaviour shown was typical of the species. 
Thorndike applied these principles by constructing experiments with a number of 
animals (cats, dogs, chicks) where the animal was put in a box or pen from which it 
could free itself, and gain access to food or company, by some simple device such 
as pressmg a lever or pulling at a loop of cord. The animals behaviour in this 
situation was then observed - did the animal show any evidence of insight into the 
problem or could its eventual release have been explained purely in terms of trial 
and error. Thorndike suggested that with this sort of approach
"The animals are put in situations which call into activity their mental functions
and permit them to be carefiilly observed And this actual vision of animals
in the act of using their minds is far more fruitful than any amount of histories 
of what animals have done without the histoiy of how they did it" (p.67).
Even more importantly, the animals behaviour was free of any influence by the 
obsei-ver. The only personal factors, according to Thorndike, were in the 
observation and interpretation and as the precise conditions of the experiment were 
recorded the experiment could be repeated independently by other researchers.
Lloyd Morgan (19091
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This experimental approach advocated by Thorndike proved to be useful for the 
analysis of both human and non-human cognition. When it came to interpretation 
o f the experimental data, as Scheerer (1963) has pointed out, one of the most 
influential views was that of Lloyd Morgan (1909) "In no case may we interpret an 
action as the outcome of the exercise o f a higher psychical faculty, if  it can be 
interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the 
psychological scale" (p.56). Or as Scheerer puts it "Always explain behaviour in 
terms of the simplest possible mechanism" (Scheerer, 1963, p.26). As an example 
of this, Lloyd Morgan describes his dog carrying a stick which was much heavier at 
one end than the other. Initially the dog held the stick in the middle but this proved 
to be unbalanced and awkward as one end of the stick was much heavier than the 
other. However, after some experience with the stick the dog began to hold the 
stick much closer to the heavier end which made the stick more balanced and 
easier to cany. As Lloyd Morgan pointed out, by this behaviour the dog had found 
the centre of gravity of the stick - a practical solution to a mechanical problem. 
However, when considering the dogs behaviour there is no need to assume that the 
dog had any perception of the spatial relationship of the stick and the centre of 
gravity. Instead, accordmg to Lloyd Morgan's canon of explaining behaviour in the 
simplest possible terms, the dog's action can be explained by "sense-experience". 
By trial and error the dog found the most comfortable way of carrying the stick, 
and while this was an intelligent adaptation to the circumstances there is no need to 
assume higher processes of insight or perception of the relations between the form 
of the stick and it's centre of gravity. This particular behaviour can be explained in 
terms of the lower process of sense-experience rather than the higher processes of 
perception or insight.
This account of the dog's behaviour is similar to the conclusion reached by 
Thorndike as a result o f his experiments "Whatever behaviour is rewarded is 
"stamped in " and whatever behaviour is not rewarded is "stamped out"" (Scheerer, 
1963, p.27). This explanation does not require assumption of intelligence or 
insight, merely that the animal is capable of learning new habits.
Kohler 119271
There were some objections to Thorndike's assessment of the animals behaviour in 
his experiments, particularly by the Gestalt psychologists. Thorndike's animals 
gained release from their enclosure by a process of trial and error, but Kohler 
argued that this was because the experimental setting did not permit the animal to 
behave intelligently. Kohler contrasted the behaviour of the animals in Thorndike's
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experiments with the behaviour of a chimpanzee in a related setting, hi Kohler's 
experiment a hungry chimpanzee was confined in a cage. A banana was outside the 
cage just beyond the chimpanzee's reach, and there was a stick lying on the floor of 
the cage. The chimp made a few attempts to reach the banana through the bars of 
the cage but was unsuccessflil. In one action, the chimp then picked up the stick 
and used it to retrieve the banana. This swift solution was in contrast to the trial 
and error behaviour shown by the animals in Thorndike's experiment. Kohler 
(1927) asserted that the chimp was able to behave intelligently m this situation 
because the solution was part of the overall situation (one of the defining features 
of Gestalt psychology) and so the chimp was able to perceive the solution to the 
distance problem. Kohler argued that Thorndike's test setting did not permit this 
sort of intelligent behaviour by the animal as the release mechanism in the cage 
was hidden and therefore not part of the perceived situation, and in any case its 
functioning was too complicated for an animal to comprehend.
What is notable though is that Kohler had no objection to Thorndike's assertion 
that experimental investigation of animal behaviour is necessary. Rather, this 
debate seems to prove the point Thorndike was making - by controlling the setting 
for the behaviour it is possible to identify the causes of the behaviour. Different 
experimental settings between Thorndike's and Kohler's experiments produced 
different behaviours and further manipulation of these variables was one way of 
establishing the limits of non-human cognitive abilities.
Stimulus Equivalence
There have been many attempts to demonstrate "human" cognitive abilities with 
non-human subjects. Numerous attempts have been made to demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence with non-humans, and to clarify under what, if  any, conditions it is 
possible to demonstrate equivalence with these subjects. Sidman and Tailby (1982) 
defined the necessaiy properties of an equivalence relation; reflexivity, symmetry 
and transitivity. Sidman et al (1982) attempted to demonstrate one of these 
properties, symmetry, with both rhesus monkey and baboon subjects. The evidence 
ft'om Sidman et al (1982) suggested that even if non-humans can demonstrate 
equivalence relations, they do not demonstrate them with the same ease as human 
subjects. Certainly the procedures used by Sidman et al (1982) which produced 
equivalence with normally able children gave no evidence of establishing stimulus 
equivalence with the non-human subjects (see chapter 2 for fuller discussion).
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Since Sidman et al (1982) there have been several attempts to demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence as defined by Sidman and Tailby (1982) with non-humans. Generally 
these studies have had little success, both with pigeon and primate subjects.
D'Amato. Salmon. Loukas and Tomie G 985)
This experiment by D'Amato et al followed on from the work by Sidman et al 
(1982) testing for symmetry and transitivity with non-human subjects. Sidman et al 
(1982) had found no evidence for symmetry or tiansitivity with non-human primate 
subjects. D'Amato et al (1985) tried to verify Sidman et al's results with monkey 
and pigeon subjects. D'Amato et al found no evidence for backward associations 
(symmetiy) following conditional discrimination training with monkeys, "If 
monkeys form backward associations . . .  those associations tend to be weak and 
easily swamped by competing sources of control" (p.41). However, following 
training of further conditional relations, the same monkey subjects showed 
convincing evidence of associative transitivity. D'Amato et al concluded that 
"associative transitivity appears from the present results to be a robust phenomenon 
in monkeys" (p.44)D'Amato et al then replicated this transitivity experiment as 
closely as possible with pigeon subjects. However there was no evidence of 
associative transitivity with the pigeons.
D'Amato et al therefore found evidence for one o f the properties of stimulus 
equivalence, transitivity, with one set of non-human subjects, monkeys. However 
there was no evidence for symmetry with the same group of subjects and no 
evidence for transitivity with a different set of non-human subjects, pigeons.
Dugdale and Lowe (19901
Dugdale and Lowe (1990) also reported an experiment evaluating symmetry with 
non-human subjects. Dugdale and Lowe's study is made particularly interesting by 
the subjects they used. Dugdale and Lowe had hypothesised that linguistic ability, 
and in particular naming, are necessary in order for a subject to demonstrate 
emergent equivalence relations, and this might explain why it had proved so 
difficult to demonstrate equivalence with non-human subjects. Dugdale and Lowe 
investigated the possibility of demonstrating stimulus equivalence with non-human 
subjects who had received language training. These subjects were three 
chimpanzees who had all participated in an ape-language training programme and 
who could communicate by touching lexigi'ams on a key board, each of which was
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associated with an object, action or location. (Rumbaugh 1977, Savage-Rumbaugh 
1984).
Dugdale and Lowe attempted to teach the chimps an AB matching relation and 
then to test for the emergence of the BA symmetry relation. One subject failed to 
learn the AB matching task. The other two subjects learned the AB task but 
showed no evidence o f BA symmetry, despite several procedural modifications 
designed to maximise the chimpanzees chances of success. These modifications 
included adding identity matching trials to the AB baseline so that the subjects had 
experience with all the stimuli as both samples and comparisons, and also 
providing reinforcement for correct responses on both baseline and test trials. 
Despite these modifications, neither subject showed any evidence of emergent BA 
symmetrical relations.
Dugdale and Lowe argued that, given the failure to display one of the properties of 
equivalence with these subjects, it was likely to be very difficult to display stimulus 
equivalence with other non-human subjects. Chimpanzees seemed more likely 
candidates to demonstrate equivalence than more distant non-human relatives such 
as pigeons and these particular chimpanzee subjects had an unprecedented history 
of complex training and testing. However, it must be noted that Dugdale and 
Lowe's procedure failed to establish even AB matching with one subject, and hi 
their review of stimulus equivalence with non-verbal organisms Dube, Mcllvane, 
Callahan and Stoddard (1993) suggested that limitations in experimental 
procedui es may have contributed to failures to demonstrate aspects of equivalence 
relations, at least with rats and pigeons.
Both D'Amato et al (1985) and Dugdale and Lowe (1990) showed failures to 
demonstrate some of the crucial components of equivalence with non-human 
subjects and other studies have found similar results (e.g. Kendall 1983, Lipkens, 
Kop and Mathijs 1988, Sidman et al 1982)
Two studies did claim to have demonstrated stimulus equivalence with non-human 
subjects: Mclntire, Cleary and Thompson (1987) and Vaughan (1988). However, 
several researchers have argued that it is inappropriate to regard the performances 
of the non-human subjects on these tasks as demonstrating stimulus equivalence.
Chapter 3: Coenition in Non-Humans 36
Mclntire. Cleary and Thompson (1987)
Mchitire Cleary and Thompson suggested that possibly two stimuli could be 
related because the same characteristic response is generated in the presence of 
each. Mclntire et al suggested that humans readily engage in behaviours such as 
this, e.g. emitting verbal names. By training monkeys to emit a characteristic 
responses for stimuli within a set, Mclntire et al hoped to demonstrate equivalence 
relations with non-humans. The monkeys were trained to respond to two sets of 
three stimuli. Stimuli 1, 3 and 5 were set "odd" and stimuli 2, 4 and 6 were set 
"even". A topographically different response, R, was trained to each set; R(odd) 
and R(even). An "odd" response required the subject to press the stimulus key and 
hold that press continuously for 3.5 seconds. An "even response requires the 
subject to press and release the stimulus key eight times successively. In a training 
trial the animals were required to emit the appropriate topographical response to 
the sample and then to the correct comparison, any other combination of stimulus 
selections or response topographies was not reinforced.
Mclntire et al trained six relations (notation from Hayes 1989):
A. l-R(odd) - 3-R(odd)
B. 3-R(odd) - 5-R(odd)
C. l-R(odd) - l-R(odd)
D. 2-R(even) - 4-R(even)
E. 4-R(even) - 6-R(even)
F. 2-R(even) - 2-R(even)
For example, in relation A, the subject had to emit response R(odd) to sample 
stimulus 1. This produced two comparison stimuli, one "odd" and one "even". The 
subject then had to correctly select comparison stimulus 3, and emit the appropriate 
R(odd) response to that stimulus.
Mclntire et al used two monkey subjects. Following training with the six relations 
detailed above, Mclntire et al claimed that both subjects demonstrated the emergent 
properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity and both passed the equivalence 
test requiring a combination of symmetry and transitivity. Mclntire et al stated that 
these performances were robust and stable in the absence of reinforcement.
However this procedure has been criticised on the grounds that it directly trains all 
the components of the tested relations, and as no relations were derived, the 
subjects did not show true stimulus equivalence. Hayes (1989) has argued that if 
relations A, B, D and E alone had been trained, Mclntire et al's findings would
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have been evidence for equivalence in non-humans, but that by training relations C 
and F, Mclntire et al directly trained all parts of the relations subsequently tested. 
For example, in relation C, l-R(odd) - l-R(odd), the animal sees stimulus 1 as the 
sample and emits response R(odd). Given stimuli 1 and 2 as comparisons the 
animal is reinforced for selecting stimulus 1 using response R(odd) rather than 
stimulus 2-R(even). The animal is thus reinforced for selecting stimulus 1 
immediately after engaging in the R(odd) response. A similar situation exists 
following training of relation F, 2-R(even) - 2-R(even), where the animal is 
reinforced for selecting stimulus 2 immediately after engaging in the R(even) 
response. During the test phase of the experiment the test for combined symmetiy 
and transitivity requires the subject to select stimulus 1 as the correct comparison 
when stimulus 5-R(odd) is the sample, and select stimulus 2 as the correct 
comparison when stimulus 6-R(even) is the sample. However, as Hayes (1989) 
notes, the annual has been reinforced for selecting stimulus 1 after engaging in an 
R(odd) response and selecting stimulus 2 after engaging in an R(even) response. 
Therefore the animal can respond correctly on the tests for equivalence without 
actually deriving any of the relevant relations. Instead, the animals performance on 
this task can be explained in terms of reinforced chaining. Hayes (1989) details 
how the components of the test relations of symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity 
have been directly reinforced in two or more o f the training relations. Hayes states 
that
"Because a name has been directly trained to both precede and follow all stimuli 
of the same set, moving from one to another in any possible test trial can occur 
as a series of simple discriminations. Nothing is derived about this 
performance" (p.387)
Because the test performances were not derived, the performances by Mclntire et 
al's non-human subjects do not satisfy the conditions for stimulus equivalence 
according to Sidman and Tailby (1982).
Another study which claimed to have demonstrated stimulus equivalence with non­
humans was a study by Vaughan (1988)
Vaughan (1988)
Vaughan examined stimulus equivalence in a different way to Sidman and Tailby 
(1982) and other researchers who trained conditional relations and tested for the 
emergence of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. Vaughan suggested that there 
was another way of viewing an equivalence relation; a partition. Vaughan defined a 
partition as consisting of "a set of disjoint subsets of the set, with the union of those
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sets equalling the original s e t . .  . .Any equivalence relation defined on a set 
induces a partition of that set, and any partition implies an equivalence relation" 
(p.36). For instance, Vaughan suggested that a similarity relation could be one 
example of an equivalence relation. In this case a similarity relation would partition 
a set of stimuli so that all the stimuli within a subset are similar to each other, 
while no stimuli in different subsets are similar to each other.
Vaughan investigated equivalence in the form of a partition using pigeons as 
subjects. Forty different slides o f trees were assigned randomly to two sets of 
twenty slides. One set was arbitrarily defined as S+ and the other set as S- and the 
two sets were presented mixed together. When performance was stable so that 
responses were high for S+ slides and low for S- slides, the functions of the stimuli 
were reversed so that the S+ slides became S- and the S- slides became S+. When 
the reversal discrimination was established and performance was stable, the 
contingencies were reversed once more. This discrimination training continued 
until eventually exposure to the first few slides in a set following reversal of the 
contingencies led to appropriate performances with the remaining slides in the set.
This study by Vaughan (1988) showed that functional stimulus classes can be 
established with non-human subjects. What has been disputed however, is whether 
Vaughan's study demonstrates anything more than the establishment of functional 
stimulus classes; in particular, is this definition of stimulus equivalence really 
relevant to the definition of stimulus equivalence by Sidman and Tailby (1982). 
Hayes (1989) has pointed out that this procedure does not allow for tests for the 
necessaiy properties of reflexivity symmetry and transitivity. This is part of the 
fundamental issue that a critical aspect of equivalence is the emergence of 
performances not traced to a history of direct reinforcement. Hayes (1989) argued 
that the contingency class performances had been directly trained through the 
repeated reversal procedure. Hayes therefore believes that Vaughan's procedure had 
established only functional stimulus classes rather than equivalence classes; 
"Equivalence relations are defined by the derived relations among members. 
Functional classes are defined by common response functions - nothing need be 
derived" (Hayes 1989 p.390).
Dube, Mcllvane, Callahan and Stoddard (1993) agreed with Hayes (1989) asserting 
that Vaughan's study did not demonstrate stimulus equivalence (However see 
chapter 5 for fuller discussion of Vaughan 1988). Nevertheless, Dube et al did feel 
that Vaughan's study was significant as it provided a convincing demonstration of
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functional stimulus class formation with non-human subjects and such class 
formation had previously only been demonstrated with humans. Dube et al (1993) 
pointed out that several studies with human subjects had shown that contingency 
class membership could be independent of equivalence class membership and so 
Vaughan's (1988) demonstration of contingency classes with non-humans could 
not be taken as a demonstration of equivalence classes with non-humans. However 
Dube et al also noted that contingency class membership was frequently 
accompanied by equivalence membership, suggesting that the two forms of class 
membership may have common behavioural prerequisites. Therefore, although 
Vaughan's findings can not be taken as a demonstration of equivalence class 
formation with non-humans, these findings are relevant to the question of whether 
it is possible to demonstrate stimulus equivalence with non-human subjects.
While neither Mclntire, Cleary and Thompson (1987) nor Vaughan (1988) 
demonstrated true stimulus equivalence with non-human subjects, there was some 
evidence that aspects of stimulus equivalence such as symmetry or transitivity 
independently could be shown with non-humans (e.g. Boysen & Bemtson, 1989; 
D'Amato et a l , 1985, Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith & Lawson, 1980; 
Tomonaga, Matsuzawa, Fujita & Yamamoto, 1991) and Vaughan's (1988) study 
had demonstrated functional stimulus classes with non-humans. However it was 
also clear that non-humans did not demonstrate stimulus equivalence with the same 
ease shown by a variety of human subjects. Dube et al (1993) analysed two 
possible interpretations for this difference between humans and non-humans on 
this task. They suggested that the difference could be either qualitative or 
quantitative. They suggested that if  the difference between human and non-human 
performances was qualitative this would suggest fundamentally different 
behavioural processes were operating. If  this were true it may require an 
explanation in terms of associative neural systems and such networks would be 
most appropriately investigated by biobehavioural techniques such as 
neuroimaging. On the other hand, the difference might be quantitative, implying 
that the failure to demonstrate equivalence with non-humans may be due to 
procedural deficits such as inadequate preparation, inadequate testing, or both. 
Dube et al suggest that a quantitative interpretation implies a behaviour-analytic 
investigation is most appropriate.
"The standard equivalence procedures involves behavioral pre-requisites that 
humans, but not laboratory animals are likely to have acquired through pre- 
experimental experience.. . .  The research path is to identify the behavioral pre­
requisites for equivalence by developing an instructional program that will teach
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equivalence by supplying those pre-requisites." (Dube et al, 1993, p.763, italics 
in original)
Quantitative approaches had already been used in this way to extend the range of 
behaviours shown by non-humans.
Dube et al's (1993) suggestion that it may be necessary to identify and teach 
behavioural pre-requisites in order to demonstrate equivalence with non-humans 
seems to be supported by a study carried out by Schusterman and Kastak (1993). 
This study appears to demonstrate stimulus equivalence quite convincingly with a 
sea-lion subject.
Schusterman and Kastak (1993)
Schusterman and Kastak (1993) noted that two studies not long prior to their own 
study had either failed to show symmetry with chimpanzee subjects (Dugdale and 
Lowe, 1990) or showed it only weakly (Tomonaga et al, 1991). Schusterman and 
Kastak suggested that one reason these studies failed to demonstrate symmetry was 
that the subjects did not have sufficient experience of the sample and comparison 
stimuli switching roles prior to equivalence testing with novel symmetrical 
relations. They also suggested that performances on test trials were subject to 
extinction procedures, which may have affected the results.
In their study Schusterman and Kastak used a simple-to-complex training protocol 
similar to that developed by Adams, Fields and Verhave (1993). In this simple to 
complex protocol, the test for each property of equivalence is given immediately 
after demonstration of its pre-requisites so, for example, accurate performance on 
AB is the only necessary pre-requisite for the BA symmetry test. Subsequent 
training of BC allows for testing of CB symmetry and AC transitivity. During 
simple-to-complex training, if  the subject fails to reach criterion on any test, that 
step is explicitly taught before the subject progresses to the next step. Schusterman 
and Kastak believed that this extensive training provided a breadth of experience 
that was important in allowing the subject to develop equivalence relations, and 
that training of this sort was most likely to facilitate equivalence class formation.
The procedure used in this experiment had several features designed to maximise 
the chances of a non-human subject demonstrating equivalence relations. Thirty 
potential 3 member classes were trained. The first twelve were used to provide the 
sea-lion subject with experience of sample and comparison stimuli switchmg roles. 
The other 18 were to be used for the CA equivalence test. This sample size was
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large enough to avoid using extinction procedures. Instead the first test trial was 
critical. To pass tests of symmetry, transitivity and equivalence, the subject had to 
respond correctly on the first test trial and also had to respond correctly on at least 
thiee out of the first four trials of a problem. Correct performance on trial one was 
used to show that the subject's performance was not dependent on reinforcement 
and the data from further trials was to show that this performance was relatively 
reliable (although reinforced). The subject's ability to infer reflexive relations was 
also checked with tests of generalised identity matching.
Schusterman and Kastak began testing with two sea-lion subjects. One subject 
failed to maintain the AB and BC relations and so data was reported from only one 
subject. This subject (Rio) was taught AB relations with all 30 potential classes. 
Twelve classes were then removed for testing and training. These classes were 
taken at random from the early, middle and late phases of training. These twelve 
classes were then tested for the emergence of BA symmetry, in two groups of six.
If necessary, the BA relations were trained to criterion. The BC relations were then 
trained for all 30 potential classes. The same 12 classes were then removed and 
tested for CB symmetry and if  necessary these relations were trained to criterion. 
These 12 classes were then tested for AC transitivity and again these relations were 
trained if necessary. Finally, these 12 classes were tested for CA equivalence and if 
necessary these relations were trained. Finally, the remaining 18 potential classes 
were tested for CA equivalence. This tested the subjects ability to combine 
transitivity and symmetry relations without having had previous symmetrical or 
transitive experience with them.
Following AB training, Rio's performance on the BA symmetry test with the 12 
selected relations was not significantly better than chance, although she did show 
some improvement in the second test session relative to the first. Following BC 
training, performance on the CB symmetry test was shown to be significantly 
above chance level. On the AC transitivity test Rio passed 11 out of 12 transitivity 
problems, a performance which was shown to be significantly better than that 
expected by chance. Following these tests of AB, BC and AC relations, Rio's 
performance on the CA symmetry test was again significantly better than that 
expected by chance.
The important equivalence tests were those carried out with the remaining 18 
potential classes. Rio reached criterion on 14 out of 18 test problems and made 
only two first-trial errors out of 18 presentations. These results were shown to be
Chapter 3: Coalition in Non-Humans 42
significantly better than would have been expected by chance. This suggested that a 
non-human subject had in fact demonstrated stimulus equivalence following 
training on AB and BC conditional relations.
Kastak and Schusterman (1993) showed that California sea-lions could transfer 
identity match-to-sample performance to novel visual stimuli. This study by 
Schusterman and Kastak (1993) extended this finding to examine the ability of a 
sea-lion to form concepts of symmetiy and transitivity following conditional 
discrimination training. On the initial BA syimnetiy test, Rio’s performance failed 
to reach criterion, a finding which was consistent with previous studies of 
symmetiy with non-humans. Sidman et al (1982) failed to demonstrate symmetry 
with non-humans, and they suggested that providing enough examples might 
facilitate the emergence of symmetry with non-humans. The data form 
Schusterman and Kastak seems to support this suggestion. Schusterman and 
Kastak state "We believe the critical factor in Rio's subsequent performance in 
passing tests of symmetry, transitivity and equivalence stems directly from her 
experiencing enough exemplars to group these interrelated concepts" (p.836). A 
study by Wright, Cook, Rivera, Sands and Delius (1988) had also shown multiple 
exemplar training to be helpful in acquisition of identity relations with pigeons. It 
also seems likely that the simple-to-complex training and test protocol was helpful 
in establishing equivalence performance by ensuring establishment of all the pre­
requisite repertoires.
Hayes (1989) had suggested that it might be harder to show derived symmetiy with 
a non-human than to show derived transitivity. Symmetiy requires a bi-directional 
stimulus-stimulus relation while transitivity only requires a uni-directional 
stimulus-stimulus relation although transitivity does require the co-ordination of 
two terms by means of a third, linking term. In this case, it may be easier to 
demonstrate accurate non-human performance on a task based on transitivity rather 
than symmetry. For this reason , experiments on transitive inference tasks using 
non-human subjects may be helpful in considering the range of animal cognition. 
Like equivalence, transitive inference requires the derivation of new relations on 
the basis of previously learned relations, but given Hayes' (1989) comments it 
would be expected that it would be easier for non-humans to demonstrate derived 
relations on a task of this sort.
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Transitive Inference
Transitive inference provided a useful way to explore the limits of non-human 
cognition. Higa and Staddon (1993) suggested that there has been a tendency by 
cognitive psychologists to treat humans as isolated subjects and ignore 
comparisons between human and non-human abilities. They believed that this 
isolated approach was mistaken and that transitive inference provided a way to 
"study" the conditions under which behaviour that in humans would be symbolic 
can be brought about, by non-verbal means in other animals" (p.265). McGonigle 
and Chalmers (1977) also believed that the transitive inference task could be of use 
to comparative psychology. They pointed out that monkeys seemed able to learn 
complex tasks but it was not clear if  they could reason. One problem was that the 
reasoning tests used tended to be very verbally dependent and "it is difficult to 
devise tests which are both meaningful to non-verbal subjects yet satisfy the 
stringent requirements of a formal reasoning test" (p.694). These formal reasoning 
tests tended to be very like those used by Burt, and later Piaget:
1. Edith is fairer than Suzanne
2. Edith is darker than Lili
3. Who is the darkest, Edith, Suzanne or Lili ?. (Burt 1919)
However, a transitive inference test for non-humans became possible following 
work by Biyant and Trabasso (1971).
Bryant and Trabasso (1971)
Piaget had suggested that children could not form transitive inferences until the age 
of about seven, when they reached the stage of concrete operations. Bryant and 
Trabasso suggested that children much younger than seven could in fact make 
transitive inferences provided they understood, and could remember the items of 
information they were being asked to combine. Bryant and Trabasso therefore 
suggested a simpler way of presenting the relational information the children had to 
combine in order to make a transitive inference. They taught the children a series of 
four overlapping pair discriminations, A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E, and then presented 
the test pair BD. By combining B>C and C>D the children could then infer B>D, 
even though the relation between these two stimuli had never been directly stated. 
The series of five stimuli were necessary in order to control for absolute 
responding. If a three stimulus series had been used, A>B, B>C, the subject could 
respond correctly to A rather than C without making a transitive inference just 
because responses to A are always correct and responses to C are never correct. 
Using a five term series, A>B>C>D>E, prevents this as the stimuli in the critical
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test pair BD are sometimes correct, B>C, D>E, and sometimes incorrect, A>B, 
C>D. Therefore the subject must make a transitive inference in order to derive 
B>D.
Bryant and Trabasso trained the overlapping series of pairs by presenting their 
normally able child subjects with different coloured wooden rods of differing 
lengths so that rod A was long and rod E was short. These were presented to the 
children in pairs embedded in a wooden base so that only the top inch of each rod 
was visible. This meant that the children had to use the different colours of the rods 
to make a choice between the different lengths. Using this procedure Bryant and 
Trabasso were able to demonstrate transitive inferences with children as young as 
four.
The children in this experiment were asked to make a choice on the basis of which 
rod they believed was longer, so Bryant and Trabasso’s procedure still had a verbal 
component.
McGonigle and Chalmers (1977)
McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) adapted Bryant and Trabasso’s procedure to a 
non-verbal procedure and tested for transitive inference with squirrel monkeys. In 
this case the stimuli were containers o f equal sizes but different colours. When the 
stimuli were presented in pairs, one stimulus was designated "light" and was 
empty, and the other was "heavy" and filled with lead shot, so that, for example, 
the rewarded stimulus was heavier than the non-rewarded stimulus. As only the 
two weights of "light" and "heavy" were used, no specific weiglit could be 
identified with stimulus B, C or D, so that when given the BD test pair the subjects 
could only respond correctly on the basis of the relational information trained. To 
select a stimulus the monkey had to move the tin from its position to reveal a 
foodwell. A peanut was concealed in the foodwell under the stimulus designated 
correct. Using this procedure McGonigle and Chalmers were able to demonstrate 
transitive inference performances with seven out of eight monkey subjects. The 
eighth subject did not show sufficiently stable training performance to be tested. 
The transitive choice performances shown by McGonigle and Chalmer's squirrel 
monkeys was very similar to tire performances shown by Bryant and Trabasso's 
normally able four year olds.
This basic finding of McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) with non-human subjects 
has been replicated on several occasions with different subjects. Gillan (1981)
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repeated the procedure with a chimpanzee subject, Fersen, Wynne, Delius and 
Staddon (1991) used pigeons as did Higa and Staddon (1993), and Davis (1992) 
demonstrated transitive inference in rats. All these studies demonstrated, to a 
greater or lesser degree, good evidence of transitive inference performance with 
non-human subjects.
Several of these studies also manipulated the transitive inference training paradigm 
to investigate further the precise conditions under which subjects would 
demonstrate transitive inference. This involved removing the end points from the 
transitive inference series and seeing what effect this had on transitive inference 
responding.
Gillan (1981)
This manipulation was first carried out by Gillan (1981). Using a chimpanzee 
subject, Sadie, Gillan trained the overlapping pairs A-B+, B-C+, C-D+, D-E+ (on 
each trial the subject received reinforcement for selecting the stimulus indicated + , 
and did not receive reinforcement for selecting the stimulus indicated -)to establish 
the series A<B<C<D<E (Experiment 1 A). Following this training the subject 
demonstrated transitive inference, consistently selecting D rather than B on the 
critical B<D test pair. Having demonstrated transitive inference responding on 
B<D, Gillan extended the series by training a further pair E-F+, and again tested 
for transitive inference formation using two new non-adjacent test pairs BE and CE 
(Experiment IB). Sadie responded correctly on these new test items choosing E 
over B and E over C.
In both these transitive inference tests the training stimuli formed a linear series. 
Gillan's next manipulation was to introduce a training pair which disrupted the 
order of this series by effectively removing the end points. This time Sadie 
received training with the adjacent pairs, A-B+, B-C+, C-D+, D-E+, E-F+ as had 
been trained in the previous manipulations, and also with a new pair F-A+ which 
removed the higli and low end points of the series, effectively making it circular. 
Sadie then received testing on the non adjacent pairs BD, BE and CE which had 
been tested in the previous two manipulations (Experiment 2A). When the F-A+ 
pair was introduced, Sadie was much slower to reach criterion than on any of the 
previous pairs. The introduction of tliis pair also affected performance on the A-B+ 
and E-F+ pairs. However Sadie did eventually reach criterion on all six adjacent 
pairs. When tested, Sadie maintained accurate performance on a high percentage of 
the directly trained adjacent pairs and this performance was comparable to the
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performance shown in the two previous manipulations. However, performance on 
the non-adjacent test pairs was veiy different to that shown previously and was 
close to chance level.
To ensure that disruption of performance was not just due to the addition of a sixth 
training pair, but was in fact due to that training pair violating the established order 
of the series, Gillan carried out a further manipulation. Gillan now trained the pairs 
A-B+, B-C+, C-D+, D-E+, E-F+ and A-F+. This meant that once again six adjacent 
pairs were trained, but where previously F-A+ had violated the order of the series, 
this time A-F+ preserved the series order (Experiment 2B). Sadie reached criterion 
on this task which restored the series order more quickly than she had on the 
previous task which disrupted the order. When tested Sadie again maintained 
accurate performance on the adjacent pairs. When tested on the non-adjacent pairs 
BD, BE, CE, she consistently selected D and E over B and C. This non-adjacent 
test pair performance was significantly different fi*om performance on the previous 
manipulation which removed the end points of the series but was not significantly 
different to performance on the two previous manipulations which maintained the 
series order. This suggests that Sadie's chance level performance on the non- 
adjacent test pairs in experiment 2A was not caused simply by the addition of a 
sixth training pair but was specifically related to the way that pair violated the 
established linear order of the sequence. This seems particularly likely as, when the 
training pair which violated the linear order was replaced by one which restored 
that order, Sadie's performance improved to the same standard as she had shown on 
the four and five item series.
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) had suggested that accurate performance on the 
adjacent training pairs was necessary in order for the subject to demonstrate 
transitive inference. Gillan (1981) now suggested that there were in fact two 
necessary conditions if  the subject was going to demonstrate accurate transitive 
inference performance; firstly, accurate performance on the adjacent training pairs, 
and secondly, the stimuli from the series must be ordered on some unidimensional 
scale. As a result of these experiments, Gillan suggested that transitive inference is 
a fundamental reasoning process in primates, and this was supported by McGonigle 
and Chalmer's (1977) findings with squirrel monkeys.
One important aspect of Gillan's (1981) experiment is that the pair comparisons 
were based on relative amounts o f food. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) presented 
their comparisons in terms of relative lengths of rods, and McGonigle and
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Chalmers (1977) used relative weights. Both these presentations used some 
concrete dimension which may have made it easier to order the stimuli. It was 
possible that Gillan's presentation using relative amounts of food would be more 
abstract and would be treated as a series of overlapping discrimination problems 
rather than forming a transitive series. However, the consistent choice of D and E 
on the non-adjacent pair tests and the fact that Sadie's performance was susceptible 
to manipulation of the series order, suggests that the adjacent pairs were in fact 
ordered mto a transitive series. "The results of the present experiments suggest that 
she had acquired a mental representation of the order of the stimuli in the series" 
(Gillan, 1981,p.l61).
One interesting feature that Gillan (1981) pointed out was that at the time of his 
and McGonigle and Chalmers' (1977) transitive inference experiments with non 
humans, two prominent theories of transitive inference performance with humans 
proposed that language was central to this type of reasoning (Clark 1969; Sternberg 
1980). Neither of these language orientated theories explained the data obtained 
with non-human subjects, and the data from these subjects suggested that language 
is not a necessaiy condition for the derivation of transitive inferences. Part of the 
problem of investigating transitive inference with non-humans had been finding an 
appropriate way to present the premises. This was made possible by adapting 
Biyant and Trabasso's (1971) procedure. It has also been difficult to demonstrate 
stimulus equivalence with non-humans. Possibly this is not because the ability to 
derive stimulus equivalence is linguistically based but because it proved more 
difficult than expected to develop ways of presenting the stimulus equivalence task 
non-linguistically.
Two further studies have repeated Gillan's (1981) procedure of disrupting the 
established transitive inference sequence. These studies have extended the analysis 
of transitive inference to non-primate subjects; Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon 
(1991) - pigeons, Davis (1992) - rats.
Fersen, Wynne. Delius and Staddon (1991)
Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon (1991) suggested that transitive inference 
testing might be assessing an ability with practical relevance; "the ability to rank 
objects on a hedonic scale and make judgements about the desirability of items that 
have never been encountered together must often have adaptive value" (p.334). 
Fersen et al aimed to show that the ability to form transitive inferences was not 
limited to primates by demonstrating transitive inferences with pigeon subjects. In
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their first experiment they established the series A>B>C>D>E and tested for the 
emergence of B>D. Four out of six subjects completed training and all four 
subjects showed correct selection of B over D at significantly above chance level.
In experiment 2, the five term series was extended to a seven term series by the 
addition of two new pairs of stimuli, one at either end of the series, X+A- and E+F- 
. This gave six possible non-adjacent test pairs that did not include end items, AC, 
AD, AE, BD, BE and CE, all of which were tested. The same four subjects that 
completed experiment 1 were used in experiment 2. Performance for each subject 
on each test pair was consistent with the derivation of transitive inferences.
In experiment 3 this seven term linear series was closed into a loop by training a 
new pair F+X-. With Gillan's (1981) chimpanzee subject this manipulation had 
disrupted the transitive inference series and produced random responding on the 
non-adjacent test pairs. A very similar performance was shown with the pigeon 
subjects. Following the introduction of the inconsistent item, one subject ceased to 
respond. Of the tlnee remaining subjects, only two discriminated above chance 
level on the training pairs and were given the test items. Tests were given on seven 
non-adjacent pairs, XB, XC, XD, XE, BD, BE and BF. Of the two subjects tested, 
neither showed stimulus preferences above chance level on any pair. These 
experiments showed that pigeons are capable of behaving according to transitive 
inference mles on five and seven term Imear series but not on a circular series, 
performances very similar to that shown by a chimpanzee subject by Gillan (1981).
Davis (1992)
Davis (1992) also investigated transitive inference performances by non-primates 
in a similar manner, using rats as subjects. Davis established a series A<B<C<D<E 
and tested for preference for D over B on the non-adjacent BD test pair. Three out 
of four subjects reached criterion on the training pairs and were tested on BD. Each 
of these subjects showed highly significant transitive inference performance. A 
second experiment, training the reversed series A>B>C>D>E and testing for 
preference for B over D established that this transitive inference performance was 
not an artifact of how recently the correct premise was reinforced during training.
A third experiment then extended the original series by training E<F, which was 
consistent with the relations already trained, and then made the series circular by 
training F<A, which was inconsistent with the series established. This procedure 
replicated that carried out by Gillan (1981). Davis (1992) stated that while it was 
clear that dismpting the internal transitive relations should affect the way in which
Chapter 3: Cognition in Non-Humans 49
inferences were made on the test pair BD, it was not clear how this disruption 
would manifest itself. Should it produce random performance on BD, or would it 
cause the series to reverse, giving a preference for B over D ? Also, would the 
introduction of this inconsistent relation cause immediate disruption of the internal 
structure or would the disruption develop gradually ? Davis counter-balanced for 
the order in which the disruptive training occurred. Three rats who had already 
completed experiment 1 and had received traming on the series A<B<C<D<E now 
received training on the relations E<F and F<A. Three experimentally naive rats 
were first taught E<F and F<A before receiving training on the series 
A<B<C<D<E. After training, all subjects were tested on two non-adjacent pairs, 
BD and BE. All subjects were affected by exposure to information that altered the 
logical structure of the transitive series. Although there were no significant 
differences between the two training conditions on the non-adjacent pairs, Davis 
believed there were some subtle effects according to the order in which premise 
inconsistencies were introduced. Subjects exposed to the inconsistencies before 
training seemed to have greater difficulty reaching criterion on the training trials. 
When tested, naive subjects failed to show a preference for stimulus D and in the 
subjects who had previously demonstrated transitive inference this preference for D 
was eliminated or reversed. On the test pair BE, E had formerly been the endpoint 
of the series and so it was expected that on the consistent series there would be a 
veiy strong preference for this stimulus. On the inconsistent series this preference 
for E was eliminated in 2 out of 3 subjects who had previously demonstrated 
transitive inference. The naive subjects showed a slight (non-significant) 
preference for E on the inconsistent series but Davis believed that this could be 
accounted for by reinforcement of E in tlie final stages of training with these 
subjects.
These results with rats as subjects were very similar to the results obtained with 
other non-human subjects. Both human and non-human subjects seem to be 
capable of making transitive inferences, as long as the stimuli form an ordered 
linear sequence. When the series' linear order is disrupted, transitive inference 
responding is also disrupted. However, Davis (1992) points out that while there 
may be evidence for a continuum of mental abilities, it may not be wise to assume 
that different species approach transitive inference problems in the same manner. 
As there are considerable neurological differences between humans, chimpanzees, 
monkeys, rats and pigeons it would hardly be surprising to find considerable 
cognitive differences as well.
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"If different species are truly approaching logical transitivity in the same way , 
then, to put the case crudely, either rats must be stretching their ability to the 
breaking point or humans must be barely using theirs" (Davis, 1992, p.348)
So while non-humans may be able to make transitive inferences it may not be wise 
to assume that they do this in the same way or with the same ease as human 
subjects. It is also doubtful that they can solve problems of the same complexity as 
those which human subjects can deal with.
Careful experimental investigation has demonstrated that non-human subjects are 
capable of solving quite complex cognitive tasks such as transitive inference and 
probably, stimulus equivalence. However, their behaviour on these tasks may not 
be the same as that of human subjects, so while Thorndike's view that data from 
non-human subjects is relevant to tracing "the origin of human faculty", it is 
important to be cautious when comparing human and non-human performance on 
similar tasks. A detailed analysis of both human and non-human responding is 
necessary in order to ascertain if  the processes operating are similar.
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CHAPTER 4 
Examples of Human Cognition
Chapter 3 considered the demonstration of cognitive abilities in non-human 
subjects. This chapter looks at the demonstration of the same abilities in human 
subjects.
Transitive Inference
To make a transitive inference requires the co-ordination of two pieces of 
information to reach a correct inferential conclusion. For instance, if  stimuli A and 
B are related to each other by relation r (ArB), and stimuli B and C are related to 
each other by the same relation r (BrC), then it can be inferred that A and C must 
also bear relation r to each other (ArC).
Piaget (1928) frequently used transitive inference tasks as a measure of cognitive 
development in children. Piaget, with others, proposed that children were unable to 
make these inferences until they reached the stage of concrete operations at around 
age seven. Piaget felt that pre-operational children were unable to make transitive 
inferences because they were dominated by immediate perceptual input and thus 
unable to reorganise this input to combine the information from two relations. 
Transitive inferences became possible when the child progressed to a "relativistic" 
conception of relations (Breslow 1981) and understood that a term can have two 
relations simultaneously, e.g. B can be smaller than A (B<A) and larger than C 
(B>C). This allows the child to co-ordinate the two independent relations B<A, 
B>C to infer the relation A>C.
B m n t and Trabasso (1971)
Some researchers, however, have challenged Piaget's conclusions that children can 
not make inferences before the age of seven. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) suggested 
that much younger children were able to make transitive inferences provided they 
could remember the comparisons they had to combine. They felt that previous 
failures may have been failures of memory rather than failures o f inferential ability. 
Bryant and Trabasso controlled for this possibility by training the initial 
comparisons veiy thoroughly, and also checking retention of these comparisons 
during testing. They tested for transitive inference by teaching four overlapping 
pair comparisons A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E and testing performance on the non- 
adjacent pair B>D, using a series of wooden rods of differing lengths and colours.
Chapter 4: Cognition in Humans 52
This sequence of five stimuli, rather than the more usual three stimuli, was 
designed as a control against "absolute" responding. Bryant and Trabasso pointed 
out that when three terms are used the correct response to the extreme properties 
was the same for both the initial comparisons and the test for inference. For 
example, given the relations A>B, B>C, A is always "larger" (A>B-initial 
comparison, A>C-inferential comparison) and C is always "smaller" (B>C-initial 
comparison, A>C-inferential comparison). Therefore, a subject could respond 
appropriately on the A>C test but without using an inferential strategy. This could 
be done by parroting the verbal labels "larger" and "smaller" from the initial 
training, or simply always selecting A and never selecting C. The five stimulus 
sequence used by Bryant and Trabasso controls for this possibility. The training 
given establishes the series A>B>C>D>E so that the correct response on the 
transitive inference test is B>D. During training the stimuli on the transitive 
inference test have both sometimes been "larger" (B>C, D>E), and sometimes 
"smaller" (A>B, C>D). In this case coiTcct responding requires co-ordination of the 
training relations via the middle term C.
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) trained this sequence using five coloured rods of 
different lengths and colours. These were presented to the subject embedded in a 
container so that each rod protruded fi*om the top of the container by one inch. This 
was designed to force the subjects to use the different colours when making a 
choice between different lengths. The training and test procedures were carried out 
with tliree groups of children, four year olds, five year olds and six year olds. All 
three age groups showed good evidence of deriving transitive inferences. This 
occurred whether the subjects received visual feedback during training and were 
shown the lengths of the rods after each trial, or whether they received verbal 
feedback and were just told which rod was longest and which shortest when they 
had made their selection. However, Bryant and Trabasso noted that while 
performance on the transitive inference task was significantly above chance level 
for all age groups, in no case was it perfect. Analysis of the data showed that the 
probability of making a correct inference on the BD task was directly related to the 
probability of jointly recalling the information fiom the necessary training pairs BC 
and CD. This seemed to support Bryant and Trabasso's hypothesis that children 
younger than seven could make transitive inferences provided they could remember 
the necessary comparisons.
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Lutkus and Trabasso (1974)
Lutkus and Trabasso (1974) replicated the procedures used by Bryant and Trabasso 
(1971) with pre-operational adolescents with learning disabilities. Again, a major 
concern was the age at which different subjects can make transitive inferences. 
Piaget (1970), Smedslund (1963,1965) and Youniss and Murray (1970) had all 
suggested that normally able children could not reliably make transitive inferences 
until the age of about 7 to 9 years, while McManis (1969, 1970) had suggested that 
learning disabled children were even fiirther delayed, until a mental age of 10 to 
11 years. Braine (1959, 1964) and Bryant and Trabasso (1971) had found evidence 
of transitive inferences with normally able children as young as 4.
Lutkus and Trabasso (1974) considered what were the necessary criteria for 
deciding whether or not a person was capable of making transitive inferences. 
Smedslund (1969) suggested that there were two kinds of errors that might be 
made when deciding if  a person was capable of making inferences. The first is a 
"false-negative" error, where a subject might be classed as non-transitive when in 
fact that subject is capable of making transitive inferences. This sort of error might 
occur if the subject does not understand the information given, or the instractions, 
or may forget either the information or the instructions. The second kind of error is 
a "false-positive" when the subject is classed as able to make a transitive inference 
when the subject does not in fact have this ability. This might occur when a non- 
inferential solution is available for an inference problem, or even if the subject just 
guesses correctly.
Piaget and others had tried to guard against false-positives by requiring a verbal 
explanation of the subjects solution to the problem. It was unlikely that a subject 
would use a non-transitive solution to solve the problem while also explaining the 
correct transitive solution. However as Thayer and Collyer (1978) pointed out "A 
child may be able to make the correct judgement on a transitive inference task but 
may be unable to verbalise an adequate explanation for the choice" (p. 1334). 
Therefore, although the child may have used an inferential solution to the problem, 
a failure to verbalise this solution might result in a false negative assessment of that 
subjects inferential ability. In contrast Bryant and Trabasso's (1971) experiment 
used a "symptom-response" to define the presence or absence of transitive 
inference. Bryant and Trabasso had trained four overlapping pair discriminations to 
establish the series A>B>C>D>E. The subjects were then tested for performance 
on the BD pair of B>D. Success on the BD pair was the "symptom-response" and 
the experiment was designed so that success on this pair could only be explained
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by transitive inference. Using this procedure Bryant and Trabasso had suggested 
that children as young as four could make transitive inferences. Lutkus and 
Trabasso (1974) aimed to replicate this procedure with adolescents with learning 
disabilities to see if these subjects would show transitive inferences at mental ages 
comparable to normally able subjects.
Lutkus and Trabasso (1974) used Bryant and Trabasso's (1971) procedure to test 
for transitive inference with 40 adolescents with learning disabilities. These 
subjects were divided into two groups of 20 subjects, one group with a mental age 
(MA) of 5.6 years, and one group with a mental age of 6.4 years. These subjects 
received traming on the four comparisons A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E. In the test phase 
the subjects were tested on the ten possible stimulus pairs - the four training pairs 
AB, BC, CD, DE and six new non-adjacent transitive pairs, AC, AD, AE, BD, BE, 
and CE. This included the test pair BD, the only test item that did not include one 
of the stimuli from the extreme ends of the series, and thus the most stringent test 
for transitive inference. These subjects learned the four initial direct comparisons 
very quickly and performance on this task was not significantly different to 
performance by normally able children of comparable mental ages. On the second 
training phase there were no significant differences between the two adolescent 
MA groups, but both groups took over five times longer to reach criterion than 
normally able children of the same MA. When given the test items, the learning 
disabled subjects scored significantly above chance level on all the transitivity test 
pairs. This is particularly important on the "double reversible" BD pair as high 
proportions of correct choices on this pair reflects inferential behaviour by the 
subject.
Both learning disabled MA groups performed like the normally able children on 
the test pairs involving the end items A or E. However, performance on the 
comparisons BC and CD and on the transitive inference pair BD was lower for the 
learning disabled subjects. This performance on BD was shown to be related to the 
retention of the initial BC and CD comparisons, thus supporting Bryant and 
Trabasso's (1971) hypothesis that transitive inference test performance was directly 
related to retention o f the initial premises. The distribution of performance on the 
BD test pair was compared for the learning disabled MA groups and the normally 
able comparable MA groups. There was no significant difference in distribution for 
either MA group or its comparable normally able group.
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This experiment showed that learning disabled subjects with mental ages that 
would be regarded as "pre-operational" were able to make transitive inferences, and 
their success rates on this task were similar to normally able children of 
comparable mental ages who had received the same training and testing. Lutkus 
and Trabasso also concluded that verbal explanations of the subjects behaviour 
were not necessary for concluding that there had been transitive reasoning on this 
task. Rather, they suggest that verbal explanations may produce MA differences in 
findings as linguistic ability is age dependent. They suggest that explicit transitivity 
can be verbalised by normally able children at around eight years old, but that these 
data showed that children or learning disabled adolescents with mental ages 
younger than eight can make use of relational information in a transitive way - even 
if they can't always verbalise the steps they go through.
Kuczai and Donaldson (1982)
Kuczaj and Donaldson (1982) suggested that there may be a distinctive 
developmental pattern in the way children learn to make transitive inferences. They 
felt that young children's ability to employ language and to create concepts 
suggests that children as young as four do indeed posses the cognitive 
sophistication necessary for inferential activity. However, they also suggested that 
while young children may be able to make transitive inferences they may not 
always make them appropriately and this ability must develop over time. Kuczaj 
and Donaldson suggested a pattern of four stages before children were able to make 
appropriate, mature transitive inferences. Firstly, an over specific phase when the 
child understands only a few terms that may form transitive relations e.g. 
bigger/smaller. This is followed by a gradual increase of the relational bases that 
may enter into transitive relations. This then results in overgeneralisation of 
transitive inference to include inappropriate terms e.g. love/kick that do not 
necessitate transitive relations. Finally these overgeneralisation errors are gradually 
eliminated to result in appropriate application of transitive inference skills.
Kuczaj and Donaldson ran two experiments to test this. They found that four and 
five year olds tended to give overgeneralised transitive responses and correct 
transitive responses. Six and seven year olds tended to give consistently only 
correct transitive responses. However, eight year olds showed the same pattern as 
four and five year olds, tending to give both correct and overgeneralised transitive 
responses. While this developmental pattern emerged, it failed to reach statistical 
significance. Kuczaj and Donaldson suggested that the responses o f the four and 
five year olds may have been based on a response strategy as correct transitive
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responses were rarely seen without overgeneralised transitive responses; this was 
tested in the second experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the procedure m 
experiment 1 but also tested if the subjects were likely to use a response strategy 
when responding. The data from this experiment suggested that the four year old 
children's overgeneralisations were indeed due to a response strategy as the 
children who gave correct transitive responses and overgeneralised transitive 
responses also gave transitive responses in the strategy task. However, this 
response strategy was not shown by the older children who gave correct transitive 
responses and overgeneralised transitive responses. This suggested that the 
overgeneralisation errors of the eight year olds may have been true 
overgeneralisation errors.
Kuczaj and Donaldson believed that these results demonstrated that transitive 
inference skills followed a specific to general developmental pattern, with children 
initially applying their transitive inference skills to a small number of appropriate 
terms followed by a gradual broadening of the application o f these skills. This 
broadening could result in overgeneralisation on the transitive skills to include 
inappropriate relational terms. The child must then learn to exclude these 
inappropriate terms from their repertoires while still continuing to add new, 
appropriate terms.
Artman and Cahan (1993)
A study by Artman and Cahan (1993) suggested that one of the most important 
influences on the development of transitive inference skills was a child's 
experience of schooling. Artman and Cahan felt that the transitive inference 
literature had tended to focus on two issues: the age at which children are first able 
to make transitive inferences, and how children of different ages actually make 
inferences. "However, little attention has been devoted to the causal model 
underlying this developmental process" (p.753). The authors suggested four 
reasons why schooling may be relevant to the development of transitive inference. 
First, schooling was explicitly aimed at developing intellectual abilities. Secondly, 
Artman and Cahan suggested there are structural similarities between cognitive 
tasks and common school assignments:
"(a) Both are self-contained: (b) there is typically one "correct" answer: (c) the 
content of the problems are often of limited, academic interest: and (d) they are 
solved for their own sake" (p.753)
Thirdly schooling may indirectly affect cognitive development as the higher the 
grade level, the greater the cognitive demands/expectations and the richer the test
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taking experience. Fourthly, they felt that the empirical evidence pointed to an 
effect of schooling on the development of cognitive skills (Ceci 1991).
Artman and Cahan also believed that schooling could have a positive effect 
superficially on transitive inference skills. "The school experience offers many 
oppoitunities to compare objects on various unidimensional scales, such as 
physical or psychological traits, all o f which are characterised by the transitivity of 
the order relation" (p.753). Bryant and Trabasso (1971) had already noted that if a 
child was unable to co-ordinate two items of relational information in order to 
make a transitive inference then that child would have difficulty understanding the 
most elementary principles of measurement. It would seem reasonable then that 
increased experience with measurements and relative values would also help to 
develop transitive inference skills.
However, some theoretical considerations suggest that the effect of schooling on 
transitive inference ability would be lower than the effect on other types of 
cognitive performance. An intelligence development approach predicts that 
schooling will only affect the development of "crystallised" abilities and "fluid" 
abilities such as transitive inference are influenced by "incidental" childhood 
learning. Also, neo-Piagetian approaches which regard working memory fiinctions 
as essential to successful performance on transitive inference tasks would attribute 
development to biological maturation rather tlian external interventions such as 
schooling.
All the same, Artman and Cahan believed it could still safely be assumed that 
schooling affected cognitive development and that the issue was the size of this 
effect; both the absolute size of the schooling effect and its size relative to the 
effect of chi’onological age. They investigated this by giving a transitive syllogism 
test of 22 thi'ee-term series problems to pupils in the fourth, fifth and sixth giades 
at school. They then analysed the data from this using a between-grades regression 
discontinuity paradigm to carry out post-hoc estimations of schooling versus age 
effects on success in the test. In this design the estimated effect o f a one year 
difference in cluonological age in a given grade equals the difference between the 
oldest and youngest students in that grade in mean predicted scores, and the 
estimated effect of one year schooling equals the difference in mean predicted 
scores between the youngest children in one grade and the oldest children in the 
lower adjacent grade (Artman and Cahan 1993, Cahan and Cohen 1989, Cahan and 
Davis 1987).
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Analysis of the data in this way indicated an effect of schooling on test scores. 
Furthermore, the estimated effect of one year of schooling and one year of age on 
the total score showed that schooling is a major influence on the increase of 
transitive inference test scores as a function of age. Artman and Cahan concluded 
that "schooling affects the development o f transitive inferences independently of 
chronological age and associated factors" (p.757). Two reasons they suggested 
might underlie this effect were, first that there might be a direct effect of schooling 
by providing experience with order relations and opportunities to practice relational 
reasoning. Secondly, schooling may develop other relevant skills such as memory, 
sériation and test experiences.
Siemann and Delius (1993)
Siemann and Delius (1993) exammed tiansitive inference in the context of 
implicit/explicit cognition. There was some evidence that "humans are . . .  capable 
of complex perceptual and mnemonic feats without necessarily being aware of it" 
(p.364). Siemann and Delius felt that transitive inference tasks provided a simple 
way to examine implicit/explicit deductive cognition. In doing this they used the 
training paradigm devised by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) and extensively used 
with non-human subjects. Twenty-four normally able adult subjects (mean age 23) 
were taught the overlapping pairs A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, and E+F- (in each 
pair, + denotes the reinforced stimulus, and - the umeinfbrced stimulus) to 
establish the series A>B>OD>E>F. This was done in the context of a computer 
game where the symbols comprising each stimulus were presented on doors. 
Selecting the correct symbol on the door produced a reward of one coin for the 
cartoon character and selecting the wrong door produced a cost of one coin for the 
character. Three transitive inference test pairs were presented, BD, CE and BE, and 
these were also tested in the context of the computer game (but without 
reinforcement). After the computer game section of the experiment was completed, 
the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire asking what they thought the 
purpose of the experiment was and what, if  any, strategies they had used. The 
subjects were also given cards of each of the six stimuli and asked to arrange them 
into any orderly arrangement that their experiences suggested to them. Of the 24 
subjects, 15 "solved" the problem and responded at significantly above chance 
level on the test pairs. Of these 15 subjects, the questionnaires showed that only 8 
subjects recognised the stimulus hierarchies. These "aware" subjects had verbalised 
the stimulus relation and were able to use this information to respond on the test 
pair. The other seven subjects who solved the problem did not know what the
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computer game was about. When questioned they said they had either guessed, or 
could not explain their responding, or used strategies that were not in fact correct. 
However this group's performance was no different in speed or accuracy to the 
eight "aware" subjects.
The seven "unaware" subjects were initially puzzled by the card organising task, 
with several insisting that they could not do it. However, five o f these subjects did 
eventually produce the correct sequences when pressed to complete the task. Of the 
nine subjects who did not solve the transitive inference task, only one was aware of 
the nature of the task, and none succeeded on the card-organising task.
These results showed that humans were able to respond according to deductive 
rules without being conscious of those rules, and importantly, the performance of 
these subjects who were responding "implicitly" was not significantly different to 
the performance of subjects who responded "explicitly". Siemann and Delius 
suggested that this might be evidence that even subjects who respond explicitly 
"may be behaving transitively without recourse to the propositional rules of 
classical logic" and that as such "transitive inference competence may be an 
evolutionary ancient trait" (p.366), and therefore can be demonstrated in a number 
of non-human subjects.
Siemann and Delius (1994)
A fuifher study by Siemann and Delius (1994) pointed out that one of the values of 
the procedure of training adjacent pairs A+B-, B+C- etc. was that it demonstrated 
the economy of a smgle hierarchical ordering. This economy of effort might have 
adaptive value for many organisms; "As information processing is associated with 
definite costs, any reduction of redundancy within this incoming stream generally 
signifies an advantage in fitness" (p.531). As previous research had shown, training 
four overlapping pair relations A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E was sufficient to specify the 
series A>B>C>D>E, which in turn allowed inference of six further nonadjacent 
pair relations. If the number of original pair comparisons increased, the importance 
of having an economical way of organising these relations would also increase.
This study extended previous work with non-human subjects (Davis 1992, Fersen 
et al 1991, Gillan 1981) which established a linear transitive sequence and then 
made that series circular. In this experiment Siemann and Delius used overlapping 
pair comparisons to train stimulus sequences with three groups of subjects. All 
subjects were taught 10 pair comparisons. For group GO all 10 comparisons
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complied with a linear structure A>B>C>D>E. For group G l, one of these pairs, 
E+A-, was inconsistent with this linear structure, while for group G3, three of these 
pairs were inconsistent with this linear order, D+A-, E+A- and E+B- (see Table 
4:1). Thus Siemami and Delius intended that this trainmg would establish a linear 
series with group GO, a circular series with group G3, and what they referred to as 
an "odd" series with group Gl (see Fig. 4:1). Siemann and Delius carried out this 
training procedure with both human and pigeon subjects, and examined the 
differences in performance between these subject gi'oups and between the GO, Gl 
and G3 groups on the different tasks.
Thirty normally-able human subjects (mean age 22.8 years) took part in this 
experiment, 10 in each group. The task was presented on a computer screen, with 
each pair of stimuli (simple geometric figures) appearing side by side. After 
training and testing by computer, the subjects were given a questionnaire and asked 
what they thought the experiment was about. Finally they were given five cards, 
one of each of the stimuli, and asked to arrange the cards into any sequence their 
recent experience suggested to them. Additional stimulus cards were available if 
tlie subject needed them.
There were significant differences in the number of learning blocks required by 
each group to reach criterion. Group GO subjects required a mean of 3 blocks, Gl 
subjects a mean of 5.1 blocks and G3 subjects a mean of 6.3 blocks. Two subjects 
in group G3 failed to achieve the accuracy criterion for testing. The data were 
analysed according to the symbolic distance between the stimuli. For instance, the 
adjacent pairs AB, BC, CD and DE had a symbolic distance of 1 (dl). Non- 
adjacent pairs AC, BD, and CB had symbolic distance d2, AD and BE had 
symbolic distance d3 and AE symbolic distance d4. This way of describing the 
distance between the stimuli in each pair was based on the linear ordering of the 
series and thus not entirely appropriate for the sequences established in Gl and G3, 
but it did give some indication of relative performance on these tasks compared to 
a standard ti ansitive inference task. The overall choice accuracies of the groups 
did not show any significant differences, but as all three groups had been tramed to 
the same accuracy criterion this is not surprising. However the overall choice 
latencies were highly significant, increasing from GO to G3. There were also 
significantly different choice latencies for the different symbolic distances. Group 
GO showed a symbolic distance effect, with choice latencies decreasing as the 
distance separating the stimuli increased. Group G3 also showed this symbolic
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distance effect, an unexpected result. The Gl data showed no significant latency 
differences.
When given the questionnaire and tested on the card sorting task, 9/10 GO subjects 
reported memorising a serial order and referring back to that when tested. These 
subjects also laid out the cards in the correct order, hi group G l, six subjects 
reported using a serial order strategy. Of these six subjects, four were able to lay 
the cards out in the correct sequence and three of those required an extra A 
stimulus card to complete the inconsistent E>A pair. However, of the Gl subjects 
who did not report using any strategy and who did not sort the cards correctly, two 
subjects still responded at above chance level in both speed and accuracy. This 
replicated Siemann and Delius' (1993) finding of a dissociation between 
knowledge and performance. The G3 subjects tended to report memorising the 
stimuli in pairs using verbal markers. None of the G3 subjects sorted the cards into 
the correct overall structure.
Nine pigeon subjects also received training on this experiment, three in each group. 
The stimuli were presented on two horizontal side by side pecking keys. All three 
pigeons in groups GO and G l and one pigeon in group G3 completed training. The 
remaining two pigeons in group G3 ceased to respond after 3 and 4 sessions 
respectively. Subjects in group G l and G3 showed considerably slower learning 
than subjects in GO. The mean error rate of group GO was significantly below 
chance level. When performance (% errors) was assessed across the symbolic 
distances, group GO showed a clear symbolic distance effect. Group Gl showed 
considerably increased error rates for D4 compared to the other distances. This 
result is not surprising as only the D4 pair AE was inconsistent with a linear series. 
The remaining subject in group G3 showed nearly random choices over all 
distances.
In suimnaiy then, botli human and pigeon subjects learned and retrieved the pair 
comparisons in this task most efficiently when the stimuli were organised in a 
linear hierarchical order. As the number of exceptions to this order increased, 
performance by both groups of subjects declined. However, the human subjects 
were all able to cope with even the most difficult task, G3, albeit at the expense of 
long reaction times. However, the pigeon subjects in the G3 task either ceased to 
respond or responded at around chance level. The questionnaire and card sorting 
task showed that for the human subjects, perception of the structure of the task was 
affected by increasing departures from a linear structure. Siemann and Delius
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suggested that these results showed that a hierarchical linear network had 
advantages for the processing of information as it allowed for economy of effort in 
coding and retrieving the information.
Stimulus Equivalence
Many of the early experiments developing the stimulus equivalence paradigm (e.g. 
Sidman 1971, Sidman and Cresson 1973, Spradlin, Cotter and Baxley 1973, Dixon 
and Spradlin 1976) used people with learning disabilities as subjects. Data from 
these experiments showed that even subjects with quite severe learning disabilities 
could produce the emergent relations which define equivalence relations (Sidman 
and Cresson 1973). The paper by Sidman and Tailby (1982) defining the properties 
of equivalence relations, reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, clearly 
demonstrated the emergence of stimulus relations with normally able children. 
Other papers examined the possibility of demonstrating equivalence relations with 
non-human subjects (e.g. Sidman et al 1982, Dugdale and Lowe 1990, D'Amato et 
al 1985). These studies tended to conclude that it was difficult, if at all possible to 
unequivocally demonstrate stimulus equivalence with non-humans. So given that it 
was possible to demonstrate equivalence with human subjects with quite limited 
abilities, but not to demonstrate equivalence with even the higher primates, it 
seemed reasonable to explore the limits to which human subjects demonstrated 
equivalence relations.
Devanv. Haves and Nelson (1986)
One study which tried to determine which groups of human subjects would or 
would not demonstrate the emergence of equivalence relations was carried out by 
Devany, Hayes and Nelson (1986). Devany et al suggested that stimulus 
equivalence appeared to relate well to the issue of symbolic activity in that a 
"symbol" and its "referents" form a class of mutually substitutable elements.
"The relations among the members of an equivalence class appear to 
approximate what psycholinguists and others mean when they say that a word 
represents or "stands for" its referent in a way that a conditionally related 
response does not", (p.244)
Just as the relations in an equivalence class are not uni-directional (like a 
conditional relation) but rather functionally reversible, so the relation between a 
symbol and its referent must be bi-directional. "A word "stands for" another event 
only if the event "is called" the word" (p.244). Devany et al suggested that if 
equivalence classes are in fact connected to symbolic/verbal activity then it would
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be expected that equivalence relations would be easy to demonstrate with human 
subjects but difficult to demonstrate with non-humans, as appeared to be the case; 
certainly hi equivalence research at that time. Therefore Devany et al speculated 
that the ability to form equivalence classes is related to language acquisition or use, 
and to test this compared the performance of normally developing children on an 
equivalence test with the performance of language impaired children on the same 
test.
Three groups of children took part in this experiment (four children in each group): 
normally able children, learning disabled children who demonstrated expressive 
speech or sign skills, and learning disabled children who lacked fimctional speech 
or signing. Each child was matched with a child in each of the other two groups on 
a measure of mental age. There were four levels of mental age for each group, 
ranging fiom 14 to 36 months. The children were taught four conditional 
discriminations, A-B, A-C, D-E, D-F, to try and establish two equivalence classes; 
ABC and DEF. The stimuli were made up of animal like figures.
The learning disabled subjects with no expressive language required significantly 
more trials to complete training than either of the other two groups. There were no 
significant differences between the normally able subjects and the learning disabled 
subjects with expressive language in the number of trials needed to complete 
training. The learning disabled subjects with no expressive language also required 
more prompts (visual and manual) in training
When given the equivalence test, all the subjects in both the normally able group 
and learning disabled with expressive speech group showed high percentages of 
correct responding, indicating that they had derived the predicted equivalence 
classes. Responding by the learning disabled subjects with no expressive language 
remained near chance level throughout, indicating that they had not derived the 
equivalence classes. These results were consistent across children with varying 
mental ages in each group. Statistical analysis showed that on the equivalence test, 
there was no significant difference between the performances of the normally able 
subjects and the learning disabled subjects with expressive language. However 
there was a significant difference between these two groups performances and 
performances by the learning disabled subjects without expressive language., with 
the two "language-able" groups performing significantly better on the equivalence 
test.
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These results identified a particular group of subjects (learning disabled with no 
expressive language) who failed to show equivalence class formation, even though 
these subjects had each been matched on a measure of mental age with subjects in 
other groups who did show equivalence class formation. This failure could not be 
explained by a failure to learn conditional discriminations as all the subjects 
reached criterion on the training tasks. Although the learning disabled subjects 
without expressive language required substantially more training to reach this 
criterion. Devany et al felt that the data provided support for the view that symbol 
use/language and the ability to derive equivalence classes are closely related. The 
results also mcluded data from the youngest subject reported, to that point in time, 
to show equivalence class formation; 25 months (normally able group).
Devany et al did note however that caution was needed when interpreting these 
data. For instance, the learning disabled children differed from the other children in 
ways other than in a failure to speak or sign. They required substantially more 
conditional discrimination training and more prompting within that training. Also, 
using mental age scores provided only a veiy crude way of matching the children in 
the different groups. For a child without language skills to be matched by mental 
age to a child with language skills, the first child would have to have better 
developed non-verbal skills. So the matching of subjects and assignment to subject 
groups may not have been perfect. Devany et al also noted that while the data 
seemed to support the view that symbol use and language was related to 
equivalence class formation , these results were correlational and "it is not possible 
to say . . .  whether the ability to form equivalence classes is a precursor of symbol 
use, a product of it, or if  the two are both a refection of the same process" (p.254). 
However the data did seem to provide some support for Devany et al's hypothesis 
that language-ability and equivalence class formation were related. The experiment 
also seemed to identify a group of human subjects who did not readily demonstrate 
equivalence relations, despite having learned the requisite conditional 
discriminations.
Barnes, McCullagh and Keenan (1990)
One of the problems with interpreting the data from Devany, Hayes and Nelson 
(1986) was determining to what extent the subjects' expressive language abilities 
may have affected their performance on the equivalence task, and to what extent 
these results were confounded by the subjects' degree of learning disability. A 
study by Barnes, McCullagh and Keenan (1990) replicated the procedures used by 
Devany et al with three groups of subjects who differed in their degree of
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expressive language ability but none of whom had learning disabilities. In this 
experiment the tliree groups of subjects were: normally developing pre-schoolers, 
normally developing, partially hearing children who demonstrated some expressive 
language, and normally developing, partially hearing children with little or no 
expressive language. There were two subjects in each group. As Devany et al had 
reported that the youngest human subject they had found to demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence was aged 2 years and 1 month, the partially hearing children were 
classified into Set 2 (expressive language age of 2 years and above) and Set 3 
(expressive language age of 2 years and below). Set 1 were the non-hearing 
impaired children. The expressive language ages of the subjects had been 
established using the Reynal Developmental Language Scales.
The subjects were taught four conditional discriminations, A l-B l, A2-B2, A l-C l 
and A2-C2. They were then tested for the emergence of the B l-C l and B2-C2 
equivalence relations. When tested, both the children in Set 1 (normally hearing) 
and both the children in Set 2 (partially hearing, expressive language age above 2 
years) clearly demonstrated the emergence of equivalence classes (95% - 97.5% 
correct). Of the two children m Set 3 (partially hearing, expressive language age of 
below 2 years), one subject (Clare) clearly demonstrated equivalence relations 
(97.5% correct). The other subject (Claudia) initially scored 0% correct when 
tested. Following this unusual result, this subject received training with a different 
set o f stimuli and was re-tested. On the second test the subject scored 50% correct., 
exactly chance level, demonstrating that equivalence classes had not been formed.
These results replicated the findings of Devany et al (1986) in that all the subjects 
in Sets 1 and 2 (who had an expressive language age of above 2 years) 
demonstrated the formation of equivalence classes. Of the subjects in Set 3 
(expressive language age of below 2 years) one subject did demonstrate 
equivalence relations and the other did not. The subject who did demonstrate 
equivalence relations was found to have an expressive language age of 1.5 to 2.0 
years, which would put her near the language ability of 2 years which Barnes et al 
felt might be critical for the development of equivalence relations. The other 
subject, Claudia, had an expressive language age of 1.0 to 1.5 years, the lowest age 
of all the subjects tested. So although the results did not precisely match Barnes et 
al's prediction that the subjects in sets 1 and 2 would demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence while the subjects in set 3 would not, the data still fit quite well with 
the hypothesis that expressive language skills and the ability to show equivalence 
relations are in some way related. Equally importantly, in this experiment the
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subjects were all normally developing children and thus any differences in 
performance cannot be attributed to some degree of learning disability.
The subjects in the experiment by Devany et al (1986) who failed to show stimulus 
equivalence had also required significantly more training trials to reach criterion 
than subjects who did demonstrate equivalence relations. Devany et al suggested 
that the discrepancy might be due to some unspecified aspect of the subjects' 
learning disabilities. This suggestion seems to be supported by Barnes et al's 
findings, as the subject who failed to demonstrate equivalence, Claudia, actually 
required fewer training trials to reach criterion than did another subject Aidan 
(normally hearing) who did demonstrate equivalence (120 vs. 210 trials).
Like Devany et al (1986) the results fi-om the experiment by Barnes et al (1990) 
seemed to suggest a link between expressive language ability and the ability to 
derive equivalence relations (to be discussed in greater detail later). However, as 
the findings from the subjects in Set 3 show, the nature of this relationship was not 
clear; but both experiments identified a group of human subjects for whom 
conditional discrimination training did not result in the emergence of equivalence 
relations, even though the same training produced equivalence relations with other 
subjects matched on certain measures.
Lipkens, Haves and Haves (1993)
A study by Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes (1993) took a different approach to 
investigating the demonstration of equivalence relations with normally able 
children. Lipkens et al carried out a longitudinal study of the development of 
equivalence relations with one child. The child, Charlie, was 16 months old at the 
beginning o f the study and 27 months old at the end. Devany et al and Barnes et al 
had tried to isolate one aspect of development (expressive language) that they 
thought might be important in the development of equivalence. In this study, 
Charlie was tested on a number of measures on several occasions during the study. 
By this Lipkens et al hoped to establish the stages at which different aspects of 
derived relations would emerge.
Steven Hayes had proposed a relational frame account of the derived relations 
found in stimulus equivalence (S.C. Hayes, 1991).Wliile Hayes' relational frame 
account will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, Lipkens et al used the 
terminology of relational firame when discussing their results and these terms 
should be specified here. The definition of stimulus equivalence by Sidman and
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Tailby (1982) requires the demonstration of three properties, reflexivity symmetry 
and transitivity. Relational firame also has three defining characteristics; mutual 
entailment, combinatorial entailment and transfer of ftuiction. This study by 
Lipkens et al tested for two of these properties, mutual entailment and 
combmatorial entailment. In mutual entailment, if A is related to B in a given 
context as a result of training, then B is related to A in tliat context by derivation. 
For instance, if  A is better than B, then by derivation B is worse than A. Symmetry 
would be another example of a relation of mutual entailment. The second 
characteristic, combinatorial entailment, implies that if A is directly related to B 
and B is directly related to C, then some relation is entailed between A and C. 
Transitive and equivalence relations as defined by Sidman and Tailby (1982) 
would be relations of combinatorial entailment. These relations of entailment as 
defined by Hayes (1991) encompass a wider range of possible stimulus relations 
than the relations proposed by Sidman and Tailby. However, the training and 
testing cairied out by Lipkens et al is very similar to that used in standard 
equivalence experiments. In considering Lipkens et al's procedures in this 
experiment, tests for mutual entailment were roughly synonymous with tests for 
symmetry and tests for combinatorial entailment were roughly synonymous with 
tests for transitivity and equivalence.
Lipkens et al hypothesised that a longitudinal study might be an effective way of 
examining the processes underlying stimulus equivalence and supporting or 
refuting some of the theories about the basis of stimulus equivalence.
"If derived relations are a primitive process, no developmental trend need be 
posited. If they are mediated by language, they should not be evident in veiy 
young infants but should emerge as language develops. If they are instances of 
learned behavior that underlying (sic) language, they should emerge early and 
should show clear developmental trends" (Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes, 1993, 
p.204)
Lipkens et al also gave tests for stimulus exclusion. A standard exclusion test 
might involve presentation of a novel word as sample and a known word and a 
novel word as comparisons. Research has shown that normal and learning disabled 
children (e.g. Hutchinson 1986, Mcllvane and Stoddard 1981) and animals 
(Schusterman and Krieger 1984) tend to select novel comparisons given novel 
samples. Lipkens et al argued that there were two types of exclusion - exclusion 
with mutual entailment and exclusion without mutual entailment. Lipkens et al 
suggest that selecting a novel comparison given a novel sample could occur
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because of: a mutual relation of difference between the novel sample and the novel 
comparison, a mutual relation of co-ordination ("sameness") between the known 
sample and the known comparison, and a derived mutual relation of co-ordination 
between the novel sample and the novel comparison. In this case, the relation 
between the novel sample and the novel comparison would be one of exclusion 
with mutual entailment. However, selecting a novel comparison given a novel 
sample might be based on direct characteristics of the stimuli such as avoidance of 
known forms. Lipkens et al term this exclusion without mutual entailment. Hayes 
and Hayes (1989, 1992) had argued that "behavior based on derived stimulus 
relations that show properties of mutual and combinatorial entailment is verbal 
behavior by definition" (Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes, 1993, p.205). Therefore they 
termed exclusion with mutual entailment "verbal exclusion" and exclusion without 
mutual entailment "non-verbal exclusion". One of the aims of the study was to see 
if there was a developmental transition between non-verbal and verbal exclusion.
The subject in this study was Charlie, a normally developing infant. Charlie was 
aged 16 months 18 days when the study began and 27 months and 11 days when it 
finished. The experiment used both visual and auditory stimuli. The visual stimuli 
were large line drawings of familiar objects (e.g. ball, cat) and of novel objects 
(strange and prehistoric animals). The auditory stimuli were familiar spoken words 
(e.g. dog, horse) and novel words (e.g. ui, neus).
Experiment 1 tested for relations o f mutual entailment. Charlie was taught A- 
B/picture-name relations (given the picture, what is its name), and then tested for 
the emergence of B-A/name-picture relations (given its name, where is the picture). 
The training and test tasks were then reversed with a new set of stimuli so that 
Charlie was taught B-A (name-picture) relations and tested on A-B (picture-name) 
relations. Charlie was 16 months and 22 days when picture-name testing began. In 
picture-name training, Charlie was taught A l-B l, A2-B2 and tested for B l-A l and 
B2-A2. Charlie was then taught A3-B3 and A4-B4 and tested on B3-A3, B4-A4. hi 
training trials Charlie did not always produce the stimulus name when asked "What 
is this?", A lB l - 50%, A2B2 - 30%, A3B3 - 33%, A4B4 - 83%. However, when 
tested on the name-picture task, Charlie demonstrated relations of mutual 
entailment B lA l - 83%, B2A2 - 100%, B3A3 -100%, B4A4 - 67%. At the time 
these tests finished Charlie was 17 months and 7 days old.
Charlie was then taught B-A (name-picture) relations B5-A5 and B6-A6. This set 
of relations proved much more difficult to teach. Initially training consisted of
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presenting the two pictnies and asking "Where is OEF/B5 (or UI/B6) ?". During 
testing one picture was presented and Charlie was asked "What is this?". As this 
procedure seemed much more difficult for Charlie to learn, a new procedure was 
introduced where on training trials initially only one picture was presented and 
Charlie was asked "Where is OEF (or UI) ?". When performance was stable on this 
task the original training procedure with both stimuli was reintroduced. During the 
last training sessions, where two pictures were presented, Charlie responded 
correctly on 67% of B5-A5 trials and 83% of B6-A6 trials. When tested on A-B 
(picture-name) relations, Charlie responded correctly on 83% of both A5-B5 and 
A6-B6 trials. Charlie was 19 months and 8 days when this experiment ended.
Experiment 2 investigated the effect of temporal delays on the arbitrary stimulus 
relations. Saunders, Saunders and Spradlin (1990) had given a mildly retarded 
subject reinforced baseline training trials and then retested the baseline and 
equivalence relations two and three years after the original training. They found 
that the subject's performance in the absence of feedback was highly accurate, and 
they suggested the stable performances on these relations were similar to the long 
term stability of language. In this experiment Lipkens et al wanted to investigate 
changes or retention of relations across time when training and test performances 
were not optimal. Charlie had shown mutual entailment in experiment 1 even when 
performance on the trained relations was not highly accurate. Lipkens et al 
suggested that performance on the underlying trained relations might improve as 
Charlie acquired more relational and imitative abilities so Charlie was tested on the 
set 2 A3-B3, A4-B4 (and vice-versa) relations after two weeks with no additional 
training. Lipkens et al also repeated experiment 2 with a new set of stimuli, A7-B7 
and A8-B8, but this time with delayed testing. This was to investigate whether, if 
the trained relations were once again weak, the trained and mutual entailment 
relations would emerge over time.
After the initial training of set 2 A-B (name-picture) and testing of B-A (picture- 
name) relations with A3, B3, A4 and B4, there was a two week gap before retesting 
these relations. During this time the B5-A5 and B6-A6 relations in experiment 1 
were trained and the A-B relations tested. The set 2 relations (both training and 
test) were then retested without any additional reinforcement. Charlie now 
responded 100% correctly on all training and test trials. So even in the absence of 
reinforcement Charlie's performance had improved dramatically on the test trials 
and even the training trials where performance had previously been rather weak.
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Two new picture-name relations, A7-B7 and A8-B8, were also trained. Charlie 
responded correctly on 58% of A7-B7 trials and 0% correctly on A8-B8 trials. On 
the majority of the trials where Charlie's response was scored as incorrect he failed 
to say anything when asked "What is this?" when shown the sample. The tests for 
B-A mutual entailment were not given immediately after A-B training. Instead 
there was a gap of seven days between the last training session and the first test 
session, when both the training and test relations were probed without additional 
reinforcement. When tested on the training relations Charlie responded 100% 
correctly on the A7-B7 relations and 33% correctly on the A8-B8 relations. In the 
tests for B7-A7 and B8-A8 mutual entailment Charlie responded 100% correctly 
on all trials. Charlie was 18 months and 11 days old when experiment 2 ended.
Lipkens et al suggested that these data refuted one criticism of operant accounts of 
language development, that as parents do not continuously reinforce their children's 
verbal behaviour an operant account is not viable. Lipkens et al believed that the 
data showed that continuous feedback was not necessary to maintain or improve 
collect responding on trained or derived relations.
Experiment 3 tested for derived relations of combinatorial entailment. Tests for 
combinatorial entailment require two sets of related conditional discriminations 
and several procedures were tried before a successful method for teaching these 
was found. The relations trained were A-B (picture-name) as in experiments 1 and 
2 and A-C (picture-sound). On A-C trials Charlie was shown a picture and asked 
"What does this say ?". After training, tests were given for the emergence of B-C 
(name-sound) and C-B (sound-name) relations of combinatorial entailment.
The relations trained were the set 1 relations A l-B l and A2-B2 trained in 
experiment 1, and two more relations were added to these, A l-C l and A2-C2. 
These A-C relations were then tested for the emergence o f C-A relations o f mutual 
entailment. The training and testing in this experiment were carried out over a 
period of 4 months and 13 days. On the tests for mutual entailment Charlie scored 
97% correct on B-A (name-picture) relations and 83% correct on C-A (sound- 
picture) relations. These were overall results with Charlie's performance improving 
over the time of testing. Charlie showed a similar improvement on the tests for 
combinatorial entailment. When first tested Charlie scored 0% correct on C-B trials 
and 62.5% correct on B-C trials. On the final tests Charlie scored 93% correct on 
C-B tiials and 87.5% correct on B-C trials. So when first tested Charlie showed 
little evidence o f derived combinatorial entailment but these relations had emerged
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by the end of the testing. However, as Lipkens et al noted , it is not clear if this 
improvement was due to a developmental trend or merely due to an increase in task 
familiarity.
Experiment 4 was designed to test if  a stimulus exclusion paradigm would generate 
derived relations. If so, would these derived relations be based on formal/direct 
properties or on arbitrary relations between the stimuli. Tluree tests were given, at 
different stages in the experiment. All the relations tested are described in Fig. 4:2. 
On the first test two pictures, A9 and AlO were presented. A9 was a picture of a 
dog and Charlie had already shown that he could name the picture and understood 
the word "DOG". The other picture, AlO, was of a Torosaurus, which Charlie had 
never seen before and did not know the name for. When the two stimuli were 
presented Charlie was asked "Where is the DOG ?" or "Where is NEUS?" in 
random order (name-picture trials). Charlie was then given picture-name trials 
where one picture was presented and Charlie was asked "What is this?". After this 
training the same procedure was carried out with another set of stimuli o f a known 
picture, a new picture, a known name and a new name. A ll ,  A12, B ll  and B12. 
Charlie was aged 16 montlis and 26 days when testing began.
With the first set of stimuli Charlie scored 67% correct on B9-A9 and 100% 
correct on A9-B9 tests, both known relations. On the excluded BIO-AIO (name- 
picture) relations Charlie scored 100% correct, but 0% correct on the AlO-BlO 
(pictuie-name) relation. Charlie showed similar performance with the second set of 
stimuli. On the known relations Charlie scored 83% correct on B11-A ll and 100% 
correct on A ll-B ll  relations. On the excluded B12-A12 trials Charlie scored 
100% correct but on A12-B12 performance was never correct. Therefore in both 
sets Charlie clearly demonstrated exclusion in name-picture problems; when given 
a novel name he pointed to a novel object. However he did not derive a mutual 
relation between this novel name and the novel object, as his performance was 
never correct on picture-name trials.
Eight months later (when Charlie was aged 24 months and 13 days) Charlie was 
given the second test when both sets of the first test were again tested for 
exclusion. Two new test trials were also given. The two new pictures AlO and A12 
were presented and Charlie was asked "Where is NEUS/IEP ?". On this occasion, 
with the first set of stimuli, Charlie scored 91% correct on B9-A9 and 73% correct 
on A9-B9, both known relations. On the excluded relations he scored 91% correct 
on BIO-AIO and 18% correct on AlO-BlO. With the second set of stimuli Charlie
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scored 100% correct on both the B ll -A l l  and A ll-B ll  known relations. On the 
excluded relations he scored 90% correct on B12-A12 and 10% correct on A 12- 
B 12. On the two new test relations where the novel stimuli AlO and A12 were 
presented together, Charlie scored 100% on BIO-AIO and 90% correct on B12- 
A12. Lipkens et al suggested that this showed the novel name - novel picture 
relation in the exclusion trials was not dependent on a familiar figure once the 
relation had been derived. However this derived relation was not mutual as 
Charlie's performance was poor on all A-B (picture-name) relations.
For the third test, a third set of stimuli, A13,A14, B13 and B 14 were used. This 
time the B-A (name-picture) and the A-B (picture-name) trials were preceded by 
some familiar questions. So for instance, before the B-A (name-picture) relations 
were tested, Charlie might be shown pictures of a cat and a pig and asked "Where 
is the cat/pig ?". He might then be shown stimuli A13 (picture of a baby) and A14 
(picture of a chameleon, named a moemoe), and asked "Where is the 
baby/moemoe ?". Before testing the A-B (picture-name) relations, Charlie might be 
shown a picture of a car and asked "What's this ?". He could then be shovm A13 
(baby) and asked "What's this?", and similaiiy for A 14. Reinforcement was 
provided on the familiar questions but not the questions involving A13, A14, B13 
and B14.
On this task, Charlie showed improvement over time. Using this procedure, on the 
first set of tests Charlie scored 100% conect on the B13-A13 and A13-B13 known 
problems. On the excluded relations Charlie scored 83% correct on B14-A14 and 
33% correct on the A14-B14 relations. In the last test session, Charlie again scored 
100% correct on the known B13-A13 and A13-B13 relations. On the excluded 
relations Charlie scored 83% correct on B14-A14 and 100% correct on A14-B14 (a 
substantial improvement on previous A-B (picture-name) relations). Charlie was 
27 months and 11 days old at the end of this experiment.
Charlie demonstrated non-verbal exclusion at 17 months old (three months 
younger than any previous demonstration). Verbal exclusion appeared to emerge 
over time. In the first test Charlie got none correct, in the second test he averaged 
14% correct, by the third test he began at 33% correct and was scoring 100% 
coiTcct by the end of testing.
The four experiments in this study showed that a variety of derived stimulus 
relations could be demonstrated with a very young child with a relatively limited
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verbal repertoire. Several of these relations were demonstrated at a younger age 
than in the previously published literature. Lipkens et al suggested that the 
demonstration of derived stimulus relations in a child as young as 17 months meant 
that it was unlikely that these relations were dependent on language mediation, as 
only very simple language processes would have been available to the subject.
The data also suggested that there might be a developmental trend in relational 
responding. There was a delay of 2 months 9 days between the demonstration of 
derived name-picture mutual entailment relations and picture-name mutual 
entailment relations. Similar delays were shown between derived picture-name 
mutual entailment relations and sound-name/name-sound combinatorial entailment 
relations. Experiment 3 also showed the gradual emergence of verbal exclusion.
The studies by Devany, Hayes and Nelson (1986) and Barnes, McCullagh and 
Keenan (1990) had both tried to identify groups of human subjects for whom 
conditional discrimination training did not seem to result in the emergence of 
equivalence relations. By comparing the performances of these subjects with 
performances by subjects who were matched on a number of measures, but who 
did demonstrate equivalence relations, Devany et al and Barnes et al were able to 
speculate about the processes underlying equivalence relations. Lipkens, Hayes and 
Hayes (1993) took a slightly different approach by studying at what stage a young 
child was able to demonstrate differing aspects of derived relations. In this way 
they tried to compare the child's performance on tasks of derived equivalence with 
the cognitive processes available to the child at that time. In this way Lipkens et al 
were also able to speculate about the possible basis for emergent equivalence 
relations.
Following research like this, several theories have been put forward to e x p l^  
these emergent, untaught relations. Each of these theories has been supported or 
contradicted by varying experimental investigations and these will be considered in 
greater detail.
Sequence Classes
One area of research which seems to link the paradigms of stimulus equivalence 
and transitive inference is the investigation into the establishment of sequence 
classes. As with stimulus equivalence and transitive inference, this research looks 
at the establishment of new relations as a result o f previously established relations.
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One of the first investigations into this area was by Lazar (1977). This study came 
fi'om attempts to expand the usefulness of the matching-to-sample paradigm being 
developed by Sidman and his co-workers throughout the 1970's. Sidman's 
experiments had shown that having been directly taught several relations between 
stimuli via matching-to-sample training, new relations between the stimuli 
emerged untaught, and the subjects formed appropriate classes of equivalent 
stimuli on the basis of this training. Lazar's (1977) experiment was an attempt to 
expand the usefulness of this paradigm to include stimulus relations established in 
different contexts.
"The matching-to-sample procedure would become of greater importance if it 
could provide a means by which stimuli gain membership in classes established 
outside the matching paradigm" (p.382)
Lazar (1977)
The basic plan of this experiment was to establish two stimulus sequence classes, 
"first" and "second", so that the subjects always responded to the stimuli in one 
class first and the stimuli in the other class second. The stimuli in these classes 
were then directly related to new stimuli via a matching-to-sample procedure. 
Following this training, the new stimuli were tested to see if they had become 
members in the sequence classes "first" and "second".
Lazar (1977) tested three normally able adult subjects. In the first phase of the 
experiment the subjects were presented with a pair of visual stimuli, e.g. A1 and 
A2, and taught to point first to A1 and then to A2 (A1-^A2), regardless of the 
spatial position of each stimulus. This training was repeated to establish the 
sequences A1->A2, B1->B2, C1~>C2, D1->D2. All three subjects learned these 
four baseline sequences. The subjects were then presented with mixed pairs, e.g.
B1 and A2, to see if  this training had established sequence classes, so that the 
subject's behaviour was controlled by a class of stimuli to which they responded 
first and by a class to which they responded second. If these classes had been 
established, given the pair B1 and A2 the subjects would be expected to respond in 
the order B1->A2, given the pair B2 and C l to respond C1-^B2 etc. Two subjects 
(S2 and S3) clearly demonstrated the establishment of the sequence classes "first" 
and "second". One subject (SI) performed at chance level when initially tested, but 
following remedial training with different stimuli demonstrated the sequence 
classes when tested a second time.
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Before continuing to the match-to-sample training, the subjects were given 
sequence pre-training with novel stimuli E l, E2, FI and F2. This was to check that 
the subjects consistent sequential responding was a result of the training given 
rather than a spontaneous tendency to respond sequentially. For all three subjects, 
performance on the previous baseline and sequence class trials was at or near 100% 
correct, while performance on the new sequence trials was around chance level. 
Thus, the subjects were not by themselves producing consistent patterns of 
sequential responding but rather this responding could be attributed to the training 
given.
The next phase constituted the mam purpose of the experiment. The aim was "to 
determine whether matching-to-sample would transfer sequence class membership 
from stimuli in the baseline sequences to the new stimuli" (p.387). The matching- 
to-sample trials were presented to the subjects in three sets. In all sets the sthnuli 
E l and E2 or FI and F2 functioned as the comparison stimuli. In set 1 the sample 
stimuli were A l, A2, C l, 02, so that A1 and Cl were related to E l and FI, and A2 
and C2 were related to E2 and F2. The subjects also received trials where E l, E2, 
FI or F2 functioned as samples as well as comparisons. These trials were to control 
for possible sequence effects in the matching-to-sample procedure. While the 
subjects did not have to touch the sample in the matching procedure they did have 
to observe it before responding to one of the comparison stimuli. This responding 
to the comparison second might have caused all the new stimuli to become 
members of the class "second". Giving trials where the new stimuli functioned as 
both samples and comparisons was designed to prevent this happening. In set 2 of 
the matching-to-sample training, stimuli B 1 and B2 functioned as the sample 
stimuli and in set 3 the sample stimuli were D1 and D2. The matchmg-to-sample 
training was split into these three sets as it was possible that the new stimuli would 
become members of the critical sequence classes after being related to only a few 
of the baseline stimuli. Thus, initially the relations in set 1 were trained and then 
relations from all three sets were tested. If performance on sets 2 and 3 were poor, 
the set 2 relations were trained and all sets of relations were tested again. If 
performance on set 3 relations was still poor, the set 3 relations were directly 
trained.
All three subjects learned the matching to sample relations in set 1 and were tested 
on the relations for all three sets. All three subjects scored 100%' correct on the 
directly trained relations, e.g. given A l, C l, E l or FI, they reliably selected E l or 
FI, and given A2, C2, E2, or F2 selected E2 or F2. However no subject scored
Chapter 4: Coenition in Humans 76
above chance level on the relations in sets 2 and 3 which had not been trained yet. 
The BE and BF matching relations in set 2 were then taught. When tested, all 
subjects responded at 100% on the directly trained set 1 and set 2 relations but 
subject SI also responded at 100% on the untrained set 3 relations suggesting that 
this performance had emerged as a result of the directly trained set 1 and 2 
relations. Performance on set 3 was around chance level for subjects 82 and S3 so 
both these subjects received direct training on the set 3 relations.
The final question in this experiment was whether the matching-to-sample training 
given would cause transfer of sequence class membership from the original A, B, C 
and D stimuli used as samples to the new E and F stimuli used as comparisons. 
Therefore if the subjects were shown the stimuli E l and E2 would they touch them 
in the order E1-^E2. Similarly, would E2, FI produce the sequence F 1 ^ E 2  ?.
Two subjects, SI and S2 responded at almost 100% on these tests. "Without a 
direct history of training on these tasks, they responded in predictable sequences, 
pointing to E l and FI first, and E2 and F2 second" (p.389) Subject S3's 
performance was similar to that on the sequence pre-tests prior to matching-to- 
sample training, around chance level.
Subject S3 had received the same training that produced transfer with subjects SI 
and S2 and had clearly demonstrated the sequence classes "first" and "second" 
earlier in training. Subject S3 therefore received fiirther testing to see if the 
matching-to-sample training had established stimulus classes independent of the 
baseline sequence classes or if  the training had failed to establish classes at all. If 
the sample and comparison had become equivalent through the matching procedure 
they should have been mutually substitutable as sample and comparison stimuli. 
Therefore subject S3 was given a series of tests where the stimuli that had 
previously frmctioned as samples now functioned as comparisons and vice-versa. If 
the stimuli in the matching procedure had become equivalent, S3 should have been 
able to respond appropriately on these tests without further training. When tested, 
subject S3 responded at 100% correct on the original matching trials but at chance 
level on the new matching tests, suggesting that the stimuli had not become 
equivalent and were not interchangeable. This made the failure of sequence class 
membership to transfer to the new E and F stimuli more understandable.
This experiment showed that the matching-to-sample/equivalence paradigm being 
developed by Sidman could be a useful way of establishing class membership. 
"Matching-to-sample can extend class membership to new stimuli even when the
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stimulus classes are originally established outside the matching context" (p.391). 
However Lazar did note that this procedure did not produce perfect transfer of 
class membership as only two out of three subjects eventually displayed this 
transfer. Also, there were good theoretical grounds for expecting the subjects to 
display transfer of function to all stimuli after receiving only set 1 matching 
training, yet training on at least set 1 and set 2 matching trials was necessary before 
any transfer was shown. However, despite this, the matching paradigm had proved 
to have some utility in extending class membership and Lazar suggested that there 
were good reasons for continuing investigation of this type. For instance, it may be 
relevant to the emergence of aspects of language; "a behavioral repertoire, much of 
which seems to emerge without direct training" (p.391). Lazar suggested that 
possibly words that occupy equivalent positions could be members of the same 
grammatical class; "this might, for example, permit a child to combine a separately 
learned adjective and noun appropriately, even though that particular combination 
has never been directly trained" (p.392). Lazar was not suggesting that the 
procedure detailed in this experiment explained or described the development of 
linguistic behaviour, but rather that this procedure might provide a way to examine 
some of the pre-requisite skills.
Lazar and Kotlarchvk (1986)
A study by Lazar and Kotlarchyk (1986) was designed to examine if normally able 
pre-school children would show similar behaviour to the adults in the study by 
Lazar (1977) and also extended the paradigm used by Lazar (1977) by bringing the 
sequence classes under second order control.
"The objective .. . was to ascertain whether stimulus-class formation could 
serve as a basis for new sequence behavior in pre-school children, and in 
addition show that sequences can be brought under second-order stimulus 
control" (p.206)
In this experiment the subjects were four normally able children (1 male, 3 female) 
aged from 5:10 to 6:4. hi the first phase of the experiment, the subjects were 
taught to match Greek letter comparisons to colour samples. For example, when 
the sample was red, the subjects were taught to select stimulus A l, and when the 
sample was green, to select stimulus B1. When the sample was red the subject was 
to select A2 and when green to select B2 etc. All subjects were able to learn the 
baseline matching tasks. The purpose of this training was to establish two 5- 
member stimulus classes: red, A l, A2, A3, A4 and green, B l, B2, B3, B4. The 
subjects then received tests to see if  these classes of equivalent stimuli had formed.
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If the stimuli had formed equivalence classes it should have been possible for the 
subjects to match the stimuli within each class to each other without fiirther 
training, e.g. given stimulus A l they should select stimulus A2 rather than B2 etc. 
The subjects were therefore expected to match all the A stimuli to each other and 
all the B stimuli to each other. When tested on this task the subjects all performed 
at nearly 100% correct on the baseline matching tasks and demonstrated the 
formation of classes of equivalent stimuli in between 1 and 4 sessions.
Having shown that the matching to sample training had established classes of 
equivalent stimuli, the subjects then received sequence training with the red and 
green stimuli that had previously functioned as samples. The sequence training was 
under the control of two auditory stimuli, so that in the presence of tone 1 the 
subjects had to touch the stimuli in the order red^green, and in the presence of 
tone 2, touch the stimuli in the order green^red regardless of the spatial position 
of the two stimuli. All four subjects learned these second-order sequences. Having 
learned these sequences "the experimental question was whether the ordinal-class 
properties of red and green would be acquired by corresponding members in the 
two equivalence classes" (p.212). In other words, if the A stimuli had acquired the 
fiinction of the red stimulus and the B stimuli had acquired the function of the 
green stimulus, then in the presence of tone 1, given a pair of stimuli such as A l 
and B l, the subjects should touch the stimuli in the order A1->B1, and in the 
presence of tone 2, touch the stimuli in the order B l-^A l. This should occur 
whatever the combination of A and B stimuli, e.g. A2 and B2, A l and B4 etc. The 
subjects were therefore given tests for the emergence of these ordinal properties. 
For all four subjects baseline performances were nearly perfect and performances 
on the untrained, second order-sequences were almost 100% correct within 2 
sessions. Therefore the order functions of the green and red stimuli had transferred 
to the other members of their respective stimulus classes without an explicit 
training history.
Tliis experiment effectively replicated Lazar's (1977) findings with adults with pre­
school children and also extended Lazar's (1977) procedure by bringing the 
sequence classes under contextual control. As Lazar stated, these findings provided 
support "for the notion that stimuli which have become equivalent in the context of 
matching to sample can also share membership in classes established outside the 
matching paradigm" (p.213).
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Lazar and Kotlarchyk stated that a reason for interest in the characteristics of 
equivalence classes was "The resemblance between simple linguistic performances 
and the outcomes of arbitrary matching to sample" (p.213). The results from 
Sidman (1971) and Sidman and Cresson (1973) showed that pictures and words 
had become mutually substitutable as a result o f the training given and Lazar and 
Kotlarchyk (1986) suggested that this meant the stimuli had acquired "semantic" 
properties. Similarly the results from Lazar (1977) and Lazar and Kotlarchyk 
(1986) showed that matching to sample extended membership in classes with 
"structur al" properties - e.g. sequential relations. Lazar and Kotlarchyk (1986) felt 
that this represented an approximation of grammar by showing that stimuli could 
share multiple membership in ordinal classes in the same way that a word "can 
function in more than one position in a sentence depending on the context "(p.213). 
Lazar and Kotlarchyk pointed out however that they were not trying to teach a form 
of grammar but rather trying "to establish procedures that examine generative 
sequence behaviour" (p.214).
Wulfeit and Haves (19881
Another study by Wulfert and Hayes (1988) examined transfer o f sequential 
function through equivalence classes. As with Lazar (1977) and Lazar and 
Kotlarchyk (1986), Wulfert and Hayes were interested in how performances on 
equivalence classes and sequential classes may be related to the development of 
semantics and syntax. Wulfert and Hayes therefore carried out two experiments, 
with different training histories but designed to produce functionally identical 
responses. Experiment 1 examined the transfer of sequential responding through 
equivalence classes (phase 1) then through conditional equivalence classes (phase 
2), then the transfer of conditional sequential responding through conditional 
equivalence classes (phase 3). Experiment 2 established equivalence classes and 
sequential responding as in experiment 1 (phase 1). Then the order of training was 
reversed compared to that in experiment 1, with the sequence training being 
brought under conditional control (phase 2) and then the equivalence classes being 
brought under conditional control (phase 3). Wulfert and Hayes argued that it was 
unlikely that verbal behaviour was acquired in a strict sequential fashion. Therefore 
if the subjects’ performances on these tasks varied according to the order of 
training given, then it was unlikely that these experiments were investigating the 
processes operating in syntax and semantics. However, “a demonstration that 
functionally identical complex response patterns can emerge from different 
histories would increase the plausibility of the proposed account” (p. 131) i.e. that
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these experiments were investigating some of the processes operating in syntactic 
and semantic behaviour.
Eight college students took part in this study, four in experiment 1 and 4 in 
experiment 2. All four subjects in both experiments showed the transfer o f the 
sequence response, whatever the order of training, although in both experiments 
there was considerable intersubject variability in the amount of training and testing 
needed to complete the experiment.
Wulfeit and Hayes suggested that if  equivalence relations are semantic in nature, as 
proposed by Sidman (1986), then the performances shown in these experiments 
may parallel the emergence of simple two-word utterances in a young child. If the 
child has learned several concepts (e.g. colours, toys food) he or she may then be 
able to combine these in a number of ways, from only a few directly trained 
instances.
“If the assumption is correct that verbal concepts originate from the participation of 
verbal stimuli in equivalence or other relational classes, the emergence of new, 
untrained combinations of elements of these classes seems to lose its mysterious 
quality” (p. 139)
Wulfeit and Hayes did note that their subjects were adults who already had well 
developed language skills and sophisticated behavioural repertoires and this may 
have facilitated their performance on these tasks, so their performance may be 
significantly different to that of a young child who is still developing semantic and 
syntactic skills. However they felt this research demonstrated that “the enviromnent 
can establish rather sophisticated control over sequential responses to symbols and 
that fr om few trained instances a very large and flexible number of untrained 
sequences can arise” (p. 140) and that continued research of this type would help to 
elucidate some of the processes involved in verbal behaviour.
These studies by Lazar (1977), Lazar and Kotlarchyk (1986) and Wulfert and 
Hayes (1988) were very much rooted in the matching to sample/stimulus 
equivalence paradigm that had been developed by Sidman and his co-workers. 
Lazar (1977) and Lazar and Kotlarchyk (1986) in particular were not so much 
interested in the features of sequence classes themselves but more in sequence 
classes as away of examining transfer of function in an equivalence paradigm.
Other researchers however, have made a more detailed study of the development of 
sequence classes and the emergent properties within these classes. In many ways.
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this research had drawn more on findings from transitive inference research than 
from stimulus equivalence.
Robert Stromer and Harry Mackay carried out much of this research into the 
development of sequence classes. Their work aimed to “extend the analysis of 
sequential performances further and to assess the defining properties of ordinal 
stimulus classes” (Stromer and Mackay, 1990, p.2). Sidman and Tailby’s (1982) 
definition of stimulus equivalence requires that it should be possible to 
demonstrate the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity if  true 
equivalence relations have formed. Sequence relations or ordinal relations also 
demonstrate transitivity but in this case are asymmetric. Perhaps the best example 
of tills is in transitive inference. If the subject is taught A>B (A “greater than” B) 
and B>C, then thiough transitivity the subject can infer the relation A>C, but this 
requires that the relation is asymmetric, A cannot be “greater than” (>) and “less 
than” (<) C at the same time. In the case of sequential relations this asymmetry is 
described by the terms “before” and “after” as the subjects are taught to touch, or 
respond to, the stimuli in a specific order.
Stromer and Mackav (1990)
Stromer and Mackay (1990) carried out a study investigating some of the 
characteristics of sequence relations. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) and Lutkus and 
Trabasso (1974) had established a sequence of five stimuli A>B>C>D>E by 
training four overlapping two-term sequences A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E. Other two- 
term sequences were derived from this. Stromer and Mackay asked if directly 
training a five term series would produce the two-term sequences found by Bryant 
and Trabasso (1971) and Lutkus and Trabasso (1974). A normally able adult was 
taught to touch five arbitrary visual forms in the order A1->A2-»A3-^A4->A5 
and subsequently produced ten two-term subsequences, A1->A2, A1->A3, A l ^  
A4, A l—^A5, A2—^A3, A2—^A4, A2—^A5, A3—^A4, A3—^A5, A4—^A5. Stromer 
and Mackay suggested this showed that “the stimuli were related to one another by 
virtue of their relative positions in the five term sequence trained originally” (p.3).
If responding to the stimuli was controlled by serial position then it was possible 
that stimuli occupying the same serial position in independent sequences would 
form a class. To test this the subject was taught a second five-term sequence, B l->  
B2->B3~>B4->B5 and again demonstrated the two-term subsequences. The 
subject was then given 20 probe trials of two-term subsequences mixed from the 
five-term sequences, e.g. A1->B2, B2~>A3 etc. Performance on these
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subsequences was consistent with the experimentally designated sequences, 
suggestmg that the stimuli had formed classes based on their position in the 
sequence and were therefore mutually substitutable. The emergence of the mixed 
two-term subsequences A2—>B4 and B 2 ^A 4  suggested that relations in the 
sequences were transitive. As in the transitive inference experiments the relation 
between the stimuli in the second and fourth positions in the sequence was the best 
indicator of transitivity as it did not involve the endpoints of the series and so did 
not involve absolute responding. However even the demonstration of A2-^A4 and 
B2->B4 was not reliable evidence of transitivity as the subject had direct visual 
exposure to the stimuli involved through the five term sequences. However in the 
mixed A2-4-B4 and B2->A4 subsequences the stimuli had never appeared together 
before and so provided good evidence for transitivity.
A third experimental phase extended these findings by establishing a new “second” 
(X2) and a new “fourth” (X4) sthnulus. These were trained by teaching the 
sequences A1->X2, X 2^A 3, B3->X4 and X4-^B5. Performance was assessed on 
a number of two-term subsequences, both adjacent e.g. X 2^B 3 and non-adjacent 
X2-4-A4 etc, and on four five-term sequences e.g. A 1 -^ X 2 ^ A 3 -> A 4 ^A 5 . 
Performance on all these was very good and improved with repeated testmg. 
Another set of “second” and “fourth” stimuli was established (Y2 and Y4) and 
once again probe performances were almost perfect. This included mixed two and 
five-term probes of the new stimuli (e.g. X2-4-Y4 and A 1 ^ Y 2 ^ A 3 ^ X 4 -^ A 5 ), 
giving further support to the proposition that the stimuli formed sequence classes 
and that the five-term sequences were transitive. In the final phase of the 
experiment Stromer and Mackay tested whether training a series o f adjacent two- 
term sequences would produce probe performances indicating transitivity and the 
formation of ordinal relations. The five-term A and B sequence baselines were 
maintained and the subject was taught Z1->Z2, Z2->Z3, Z 3^Z 4 , Z4->Z5. 
Subsequent probes were consistent with the establishment o f ordinal relations - 
both two-term, Z2-^Z4 and five-term probes, Z1->Z2->Z3^Z4->Z5, and mixed 
probes A2->Z4 etc.
This study examined some of the conditions under which sequence classes will 
develop and demonstrated that the stimuli in these classes are mutually 
substitutable. This study extended the procedure used by Lazar (1977) who trained 
A1->A2, B1-»B2, C l—>C2 and D 1 ^D 2  and then demonstrated mixed sequences 
such as B1->C2, A1->D2. By using aspects of the procedures used to investigate
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transitive inference, Stromer and Mackay were able to make a more detailed 
analysis of the development of sequence classes.
Stromer and Mackay (1992)
Stromer and Mackay developed this analysis of sequence classes with another 
study in 1992 which examined conditional stimulus control of trained sequence 
classes. In this experiment the subjects were six normally able children, aged 8 to 9 
years. The children were taught to produce two five-term sequences by teaching 
them to select abstract visual stimuli in a specific order. The stimuli were presented 
on a computer screen, with all the stimuli for each sequence presented mixed 
together in a choice area. Selecting a stimulus moved it to a sequence construction 
area. The children were taught the series A1-^A2->A3->A4->A5 and Bl->B2-> 
B3^B4->B5. When both these series had been established, the A sequence was 
brought under conditional control. When the printed word BIF was displayed at the 
top of the computer screen, the subjects were reinforced for touching the stimuli in 
the order A1-->A2->A3-»A4->A5. When the printed word NUK was displayed the 
subjects were reinforced for touching the stimuli in the reverse order A5-^A4~>A3 
—>A2-^A1. The subjects then received probe trials to see if the conditional control 
by the printed words BIF and NUK had transferred to the B sequence stimuli. Four 
subjects immediately produced the appropriate B sequences under conditional 
control and a fifth subject (LA) showed improved accuracy when the test session 
was repeated. One subject (LD) always touched the stimuli in the order trained 
originally. The subjects who had demonstrated appropriate conditional control then 
received multiple-substitution probes - two or three stimuli that occupied the 
second, third and fourth positions in the A sequences replaced the comparable 
stimuli in the B sequences, and vice versa. Four of the subjects immediately 
produced these mixed sequences accurately. The fifth subject (LA), who had 
required a second test session with the B stimuli, was always incorrect on the 
mixed sequences.
The two subjects, LA and LD, who did not initially succeed on the test probes then 
received further training and testing to see if this would improve their performance. 
Subject LA had shown conditional control on the B sequence but had failed to 
respond correctly on the multiple-substitution probes. LA was given single 
substitution probes where one o f the B stimuli substituted for one of the stimuli in 
the A sequence and vice versa - e.g. A1->B2->A3->A4~>A5. Subject LA was still 
below criterion on this task so these single substitution sequences were trained
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directly. Following this training LA was given the multiple substitution probes 
agam and this time scored 81% correct.
Subject LD had failed to show transfer of conditional control from the A to the B 
sequences, so this conditional sequencing was taught directly and then the subject 
was tested on the multiple substitution probes. Performance on these probes was 
well below criterion, so as with subject LA, LD was taught the single substitution 
sequences and the multiple substitution probes were tested again. At best LD 
achieved only 31% correct.
This experiment extended the work on sequence classes by Lazar and Kotlarchyk 
(1986) and Wulfert and Hayes (1988) by "demonstrating transfer of conditional 
control without first using matching to sample tasks to establish equivalence 
relations between the stimuli involved" (p.910) As in the previous experiment 
(Stromer and Mackay, 1990), this experiment showed that stimuli occupying the 
same serial position in separate sequences were mutually substitutable, suggesting 
that the training had established functional stimulus classes based on the arbitrarily 
assigned positions of the stimuli.
However, subject LA's data suggested that the establisliment of sequence classes 
and the transfer of conditional control may be independent of each other. This 
subject demonstrated transfer of conditional control but required additional training 
before performing correctly on the multiple substitution probes.
Stromer and Mackav (19931
A further study by Stromer and Mackay (1993) repeated some of the procedures 
already reported (Stromer and Mackay, 1990) under more rigorous conditions, and 
with a larger number of subjects. Experiment 1 tested whether subjects taught to 
touch five stimuli in a particular order would also touch pairs of these stimuli in an 
order consistent with training. If the subjects were able to respond in this way it 
would suggest that the trainmg had established ordered relations among the stimuli 
in the sequence rather than a simple discriminative chain. This experiment also 
tested whether stimuli occupying the same position in different five term sequences 
would prove to be mutually substitutable, suggesting that the training had 
established functional stimulus classes. The emergence of these mixed sequences 
would also provide further evidence against a chaining account of the procedure.
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In experiment 2 of this study, an overlapping two-term sequence training 
procedure, similar to the procedures used in experiments on transitive inference, 
was used. The results from the transitive inference experiments (e.g. Bryant and 
Trabasso 1971, Gillan 1981, Lutkus and Trabasso 1974, McGonigle and Chalmers 
1977, Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon 1991) had suggested that this procedure 
also determines the position of each stimulus in the overall series. To test this, after 
training with four two-term adjacent sequences, the subjects were tested for the 
emergence of non-adjacent sequences, and also for the emergence of a new five- 
term sequence. Probes were also given to see if mixed sequences would emerge 
consisting of stimuli trained by a five-term training procedure and stimuli trained 
using the overlapping two-term procedure. This would provide further evidence for 
the development of sequence classes, and against a chaining account of the 
sequence relations.
The subjects in these experiments were two normally able children aged 9 and 10 
years, and five normally able adults in their mid-twenties. In experiment 1, two 
five-term stimulus sequences, A1->A2->A3->A4~>A5 andB l->B 2-^B 3->B 4^ 
B5 were trained and the subjects were tested to see if they produced appropriate 
two-term subsequences, and also if  they would produce appropriate mixed A/B 
two-term and five-term sequences. Two adults (MM and AM) and one child (AS) 
participated,
Subject MM received training on the A and B five-term sequences. MM then 
produced all the two-term A sequences and all the two-term B sequences correctly. 
MM also responded correctly on all the mixed two-term A/B sequences - even 
though these probes involved mixtures of stimuli that had not occurred together in 
training.
Subject AS was also taught the five-term A and B sequences but this subject was 
given the two-term mixed A/B probes first and the two-term A and B probe 
sequences next. Performance on the two-term A/B probes was correct for 
sequences beginning with an A stimulus but was not correct for sequences 
beginning with a B stimulus. However performance on the two-term A and B 
sequences was perfect. When given five-term mixed A/B single substitution probes 
AS's performance was consistent with training only on probes where A5 and B5 
were substituted for each other. Because of this inconsistent performance these 
mixed A/B five-term single substitution sequences were trained directly. Following 
this training, performance on the five-term multiple substitution sequences was
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nearly perfect. Before retesting the two-term mixed A/B sequences the eight 
adjacent two-term A and B sequences were directly trained and added to the 
subjects baseline to see if this would facilitate correct responding. Performance on 
the five-term mixed A/B multiple substitution sequences and on the two-term 
mixed A/B sequences was then reassessed. As before, performance on the two- 
term sequences was correct only for those sequences beginning with an A stimulus. 
Performance was nearly perfect on the five term multiple substitution sequences.
Subject AM was taught the five-term A and B sequences. This subject was then 
tested on the five-term multiple substitution A/B sequences, then on the two-term 
A/B sequences, then on the five-term multiple substitution sequences once more. 
Performance on all these two and five term A/B probe sequences was nearly 
perfect.
In summary then, following training on two five-term A and B sequences, subject 
MM was able to respond correctly on mixed A/B two and five term probes, 
suggesting the formation of classes of sequence stimuli. Subject AM's performance 
replicated and extended these results. AM also produced appropriate mixed two 
and five term sequences, but as AM had not received testing on the within- 
sequence two-term A and B sequences, it would seem that these within-sequence 
performances were not necessary for occurrence of the mixed performances.
Both subject MM and AS had demonstrated appropriate two-term A and B 
sequence performance following the training of independent five-term A and B 
sequences. However, this training appeared to have established sequence classes 
for subject MM but not for subject AS. Initially AS's performance was incorrect for 
both five-term and two-term A/B sequences. Training the five-term single 
substitution sequences resulted in accurate performance on the five-term multiple 
substitution sequences, but this effect was limited to the five-term sequences. 
Performance on the two-term A/B sequences remained incorrect, even though 
performance on the two-term A and B sequences was accurate. This suggested that 
subject AS could discriminate the A and B stimuli but did not treat the stimuli 
occupying the same position in separate sequences as mutually substitutable.
The fact that subjects could respond correctly on mixed probes and within 
sequence probes suggested that the relations between stimuli established during 
training involved more than simply chaining. However, as Stromer and Mackay 
pointed out
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"The difference between subjects’ performances on mixed probe trials 
emphasizes that the contingencies involved in the independent training of 5- 
term sequences does not require that stimuli that occupy the same position in 
different sequences become mutually substitutable" (p.l 18, italics in original).
In experiment 2, subjects were directly taught one five-term sequence (A or B, e.g. 
A1->A2->A3->A4—>A5) and the foui' adjacent two-term sequences that were its 
components (A1->A2, A2->A3 etc.). They were also taught four adjacent two- 
term sequences using five new C stimuli; C1->C2, C 2^C 3, C 3^C 4, C4->C5.
The subjects then received probes to assess performance on: the five-term C 
sequence that could be derived from the two-term relations trained, the possible 
five term multiple substitution sequences, and for some subjects, two-term 
sequences involving the C stimuli. The subjects were three adults (SM, MK, DE) 
and one child (TJ).
Subject TJ was taught the five-term B sequence and it's components and the four 
adjacent two-term C sequences. TJ immediately produced the five-term C sequence 
when probed. Performance was also assessed on five-term multiple substitution 
B/C sequences. This performance was almost perfect.
Subject SM was taught the five-term A sequence and it's component parts and the 
adjacent two-term C sequence. SM was perfect on the five-term C sequence 
probes. SM was then given probes on five-term multiple substitution A/C 
sequences and on the two-term sequences A 2^C 4, C2-^A4, A 2^A 4 , C2-^C4. 
Performance was perfect on all these probes.
Subject MK was taught the five-term A sequence and it's components and the 
adjacent two-term C sequences. MK produced the correct five-term C sequence on 
only 2/8 trials. This five-term C sequence was added to the baseline sequences and 
MK was tested on the five-term multiple substitution A/C sequences. On these 
sequences MK always touched the A stimuli, in the correct order, first, and then the 
C stimuli in the correct order. This subject then received traming with adjacent 
two-term A/C stimuli to try and produce the mixed probe sequences; A 1^C 2, C2 
—>A3, A3—>C4, C4—>A5, C l—>A2, A2—>C3, C3—>A4, A4—>C5. The subject was 
then re-tested on the mixed five-term A/C probes and tested on the two-term 
sequences A2->C4, C2—>A4, A2->A4, C2-4-C4. Performance on the five-term 
and two-term probes was perfect.
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Subject ED was taught the five-term A sequence and it's components and the two- 
term adjacent C sequences. Initially none of the five term C probes were correct as 
the subject always placed C l at the end of the sequence rather than the beginning. 
After a three day break, the baseline relations were retrained and performance was 
perfect when tested again. When the five-term A/C sequences were tested ED 
showed the same pattern of responding as MK; selecting the A stimuli in order first 
and then the C stimuli in order. ED was then taught a series of adjacent two-term 
sequences with new D stimuli in the same way as the C stimuli had been taught. 
When tested on the five-term D sequence ED's performance was consistent with 
training. ED was then tested on mixed five-term A/D sequences but showed the 
same pattern of responding was with the A/C stimuli, touching the A stimuli first 
and then the S stimuli.
As with subject MK, ED was taught adjacent pairs of two-term A/C sequences to 
try and produce mixed sequences. ED was then tested on five-term A/C and A/D 
probes and on eight mixed two-term probes: A2->C4, A 2^D 4, C2->A4, C2->D4, 
D2->A4, D2~>C4, C2->C4, D2->D4. Performance on the mixed five-term probes 
was highly accurate and perfect on the two-term probes.
In summaiy then, following training with adjacent two-term C sequences, two 
subjects (TJ and SM) immediately derived the five-term C sequences, suggesting 
that the relations established among the stimuli were transitive. For these two 
subjects the C stimuli also proved to be interchangeable with the A or B stimuli in 
the sequence trained previously, suggesting that the training had established 
sequence classes.
For the other two subjects (MK and ED), the new five-term C sequence emerged 
only after repeating the probes or following additional training with new stimuli. 
These subjects also required training witli adjacent two-term A/C sequences before 
they were able to produce mixed five-term A/C sequences. As with subject AS in 
experiment 1, the subjects' initial performances on the mixed five-term probes 
demonstrated that the training/test contingencies in this experiment do not require 
the production of mixed sequences of stimuli. Both subjects selected the A stimuli 
first, in order, and then the C stimuli in order (e.g. A1->A3->A5->C2->C4 or A2 
^A4-»C1-->C3~>C5). These performances were consistent with the relations 
established by training, and showed that the subjects discriminated the sets of 
stimuli, but also showed that at this initial test the training procedures had not 
caused the formation of sequence classes o f interchangeable stimuli.
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The results from this experiment replicated and extended some of Stromer and 
Mackay’s preliminary findings (Stromer and Mackay, 1990). The more rigorous 
testing procedure and greater number of subjects allowed for a more detailed 
analysis of the results and consideration of the conditions underlying the formation 
of sequence classes. The two experiments demonstrated that:
1. The training that directly established each five-term sequence may also enable 
accurate performance on two-term probe sequences involving the same stimuli - a 
finding which is consistent with some results &om non-human subjects (D'Amato 
and Colombo, 1988).
2. Establishing two separate five-term sequences may cause the emergence of 
stimulus classes consisting of stimuli that occupied the same position in the 
different sequences - extending prior findings (Lazar 1977, Lazar and Kotlarchyk 
1986, Wulfert and Hayes 1988).
3 Following training on adjacent two-term sequences, subjects may demonstrate 
the emergence of a new five-term sequence, and the stimuli in this sequence may 
also become members of sequence classes - results which complement and extend 
findings from transitive inference studies (Biyant and Trabasso 1971, Lutkus and 
Trabasso 1974).
Stromer and Mackay went on to consider what conditions might underlie or 
explain performances on these tasks.
The training procedure in experiment 1 could have established simple behaviour 
chains. However Stromer and Mackay pointed out that it does not seem possible 
that chaining provides a sufficient explanation for the performances demonstrated. 
For example, on many of the two term probe trials (e.g. A2->A3, A2->A4) the 
choice pool did not contain the initial stimulus in these sequences (A l), and the 
training could not have established A2, A3 etc. as a discriminative stimulus. Also, 
many of these probe trials demonstrated accurate performance on non-adjacent 
pairs (e.g. A2->A4) for which chaining does not provide a sufficient explanation 
for accurate performance. Probably the most conclusive evidence against a 
chaining account of these performances is the emergence of the mixed chains. 
"Because the stimuli for the different A and B sequences never appeared together 
in training, the contingencies that could have established mixed chains never 
occurred" (p. 126)
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Another explanation for the performances might have been based on the simple 
and conditional discrimination ftmctions that may have been served by the stimuli 
in each baseline sequence. Performance on the two-term sequences involving 
stimuli A l and/or A5 might be explained by the simple discrimination function of 
these stimuli. In training, when other stimuli from the A sequence were present, 
selection of A l was always reinforced and selection of A5 was never reinforced. In 
that case it would not be surprising if  A l was always selected first on probes trials 
and A5 always selected last. A similar history would apply to stimuli B1 and B5 in 
probes with B sequence stimuli and could explain performance on A/B probes 
containing stimuli A l, A5, B1 and B5.
Another possible explanation might be that the sequence training actually 
established a set of conditional discriminations involving the stimuli in that 
sequence. For example, having just selected A l select A2, having just selected A2 
select A3 etc. This would be sufficient to explain accurate performance on the two- 
term sequences A 1^A 2, A2->A3, A3->A4, A4~>A5. However this account 
camiot explain accurate performance on the non-adjacent two-term sequences (e.g. 
A2->A4) and the subjects' success on these probes would suggest that training 
must have established more than these conditional relations. Once again, the 
emergence of accurate performance on the A/B probe trials suggests that the 
establishment of conditional relations is insufficient to explain the results obtained. 
"Because the A and B stimuli never appeared together during training, the 
contingencies that could have established the specific conditional 
discriminations that would be required for performance on mixed probes never 
occurred " (p. 127)
Stromer and Mackay suggested that research on transitive inference might provide 
an explanation for one aspect of the derived performances. The training procedure 
may have established transitive relations between the stimuli in the sequence which 
would allow successfiil performance on, at least, the within sequence probes. For 
instance, as in transitive inference tasks, correct production of the two-term 
sequence A2->A4 might be based on transitivity of the conditional relations A 2 ^  
A3 and A3->A4 (therefore A2->A4). The best evidence for the establishment of 
these relations comes fi:om the procedure used in experiment 2. In this experiment 
the procedure established the five-term C sequence by training adjacent pairs of C 
sthnuli. The emergence of the five-term C sequence and the correct performance 
on the non-adjacent two-term probes provided evidence that the training had 
established transitive relations between the stimuli.
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The other feature which Stromer and Mackay suggested might help explain the 
results obtained was the development of sequence classes. The best evidence for 
the development of these classes comes from the emergence of new mixed 
sequences of stimuli. The subjects were able to touch the stimuli presented, in an 
order consistent with training, even though these stimuli had never appeared 
together before.
"Whether training used the 5-term or the adjacent-pairs procedure, the stimulus 
control that it often engendered was not restricted to the specific set of stimuli 
involved.. . .  Apparently, the stimuli that occupied the same ordinal position in 
different sequences came to form classes of fimctionally equivalent stimuli." 
Ü%128)
Not all subjects in either experiment immediately responded correctly on the basis 
of the sequence training given. However, for those subjects who did respond 
correctly on probe trials following the training of one or two stimulus sequences, 
the establishment of transitive relations and sequence classes may explain the 
emergence of new performances, not required as a result of the contingencies 
arranged in training.
Stromer. Mackav. Cohen and Stoddard H993)
A study by Stromer, Mackay, Cohen and Stoddard (1993) replicated the procedures 
of Stromer and Mackay's 1990 and 1993 experiments using adults with learning 
disabilities as subjects, to see if  these subjects would demonstrate similar emergent 
performances. A study by McManis (1969) had suggested that it might not be 
possible to establish ordinal relations in subjects with a mental age less than 10 or 
11 years. However studies of transitive inference by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) 
and Lutkus and Trabasso (1974) suggested that ordinal relations could be 
established in subjects with mental ages of 5 to 6 years. Stromer et al used the non­
verbal sequence production tasks developed in Stromer and Mackay's previous 
experiments to investigate ordinal learning in subjects with low mental ages. "The 
goal was to assess with these individuals whether sequence-production training 
would establish performances based on the sequential relations among stimuli" 
(p.244).
The subjects in this experiment were two adults with learning disabilities (BF and 
AP) and one normally able child (DC). BF (aged 45) had Down's Syndrome. Her 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) age-equivalent score was 2-10 (years-
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months). AP (aged 61) had a PPVT age-equivalent score of 7-7. The pre-school 
child (DC) was 5 years old. The stimuli used were abstract visual shapes, presented 
by a computer with a touch-sensitive screen.
All three subjects were taught the five-term A sequence A1->A2->A3->A4~>A5 
and were then tested for performance on two-term A sequence probes (e.g. A l->  
A3, A2->A4). They were then taught the five term B sequence B1->B2->B3-->B4 
—>B5 and tested on the two-term B sequence probes. The subjects were also tested 
on mixed two-term A/B probes. The two subjects with learning disabilities (BF and 
AP) were also given probes to assess performance on single and multiple 
substitutions on five-term mixed A/B sequences.
Subject BF was taught the five-term A sequence and given the two-term A 
sequence probes. BF's performance was good on probes that required her to touch 
A l first (e.g. A1-^A3, A 1^A 4) and on non-adjacent probes (e.g. A 2^A 4, A3-> 
A5). However on the adjacent stimulus probes (e.g. A 2^A 3, A3->A4) her 
responding was about chance level. BF was then taught the five-term B sequences 
and given the two-term B sequence probes. BF also received three-term probes 
(e.g. B1->B3-^B4, B2—>B3->B5) to see if additional contextual support might 
produce higher probe scores. Performance on the two-term B sequences was very 
similar to those on the two-term A sequences. Performance was perfect for probes 
beginning with B1 and generally higher on non-adjacent probe pairs than on 
adjacent probe pairs. On the three term probes BF's performance was highly 
accurate on probes beginning with B l, but on probes where B2 or B3 had to be 
touched first performance was often not consistent with training.
hi an attempt to improve BF's performance differential reinforcement was provided 
on the two-term probes. This resulted in a considerable improvement in accuracy 
but errors continued to occur on the 2->3 and 3->4 probes so BF was directly 
taught the two term sequences A2-^A3, A3->A4, B 2^B 3, B3->B4. BF was then 
presented with two-term mixed A/B probes (e.g. A2->B3, B1->A4). There were 
twenty possible A/B two term combinations and in the first probe session BF 
responded correctly on 19 out of 20 probes (B4->A5 incorrect). Immediately after 
the two-term mixed A/B probes BF was given five-term mixed A/B probes. These 
were both single substitution probes, where each of the A stimuli replaced its 
corresponding B stimulus in the sequence (e.g. A 1 ^ B 2 ^ A 3 —>A4->A5) and vice 
versa, or multiple substitution probes, where two or three of the sthnuli assigned to 
the second, third or fourth positions of the original sequences were substituted for
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one another (e.g. A2->B2->B3^A4->A5). On the single substitution probes BF's 
performance was perfectly consistent with training and on the multiple substitution 
probes responses on 6/8 trials were consistent with training.
Subject AP was taught the five-term A sequence and given the two-term A 
sequence probes. Performance was highly accurate on 9/10 two-term probes (A3—> 
A5 performance below 0.83). AP was then taught the five-term B sequence and 
was tested on both the A and B two-term sequences. Performance was perfect on 
the two-term A sequences and correct on 8/10 two -term B sequence probes. AP 
was then tested on the two-term mixed A/B probes. Performance was perfect for all 
A->B probe types and correct on 8/10 B ^ A  probe types. Finally AP was tested on 
single and multiple substitution five-term mixed A/B probes. AP's performance 
was almost perfectly consistent with training, responding correctly on 9/10 single 
substitution probes and all multiple substitution probes.
Subject DC was taught the five-term A sequence and subsequently responded 
correctly on all two-term A sequence probes. DC was then taught the five-term B 
sequences. When tested on the two-term B sequence probes DCs performance was 
consistently better when the probes contained either of the end stimuli B l or B5. 
This performance may have been due to DC noting that the probes (all two-term) 
were never reinforced. To prevent this problem in further probe trials the adjacent 
two-term A and B sequences were added to DCs reinforced baseline trials. This 
was designed to make the two-term probes less discriminable with respect to not 
producing reinforcement. DC was then tested on the two-term mixed A/B probes. 
Performance on these probes was virtually always consistent with prior training.
hi summary then, two adults with learning disabilities and one normally able pre­
school child were taught two five-term sequences. Following this training, all three 
subjects were able to produce novel two-term mixed sequences (e.g. A 2^B 4) that 
were consistent with the serial position of the stimuli in their baseline training. One 
adult (AP) and the child (DC) were usually capable of producing most of the two- 
term sequences (e.g. A 2^A 3, B2->B4) that made up the baseline five-term 
sequences. The other adult (BF) responded appropriately on many o f these two- 
term sequences but made repeated errors on others, especially those involving 
stimuli occupying the second and third positions in the five-term baseline). 
However once these relations had been established (by direct training if necessary) 
all three subjects immediately produced almost perfect mixed two-term probe 
performances.
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As with previous research (Stromer and Mackay, 1990, 1992, 1993) a chaining 
account of this behaviour is insufficient to account for the emergent performances - 
especially as the A and B stimuli had never occurred together in training, yet the 
subjects were able to respond accurately on mixed A/B probes. Instead Stromer et 
al believed that these emergent performances were based on the relations 
established between the stimuli in training and the development of functional 
sequence classes.
"These outcomes suggest that the subjects' baseline behaviour was based on 
relations among the stimuli and that these relations reflected stimulus control by 
the relative as well as the absolute positions of the stimuli in the baseline
sequences Furthermore, the mutual substitutability of the A and B stimuli
on mixed . . .  probe trials support a conclusion that the subjects had learned five 
two-member functional classes, each consisting of an A and B stimulus that 
occupied the same serial position in the sequences trained directly " (p.257).
This experiment replicated and extended previous studies suggesting that ordinal 
learning might be established at an earlier mental age than had previously been 
thought. Lutkus and Trabasso's (1974) findings suggesting the establishment of 
ordinal relations in subjects with mental ages of 5-6 years would have predicted 
these results with DC and AP. However no previous research would have predicted 
the successful performance of BF on these tasks (PPVT age equivalent 2 years 10 
months)
Summai-v
The different studies on transitive inference, stimulus equivalence and sequence 
classes show that human subjects can demonstrate a large number of emergent 
relations in a variety of contexts. The study by Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes (1993) 
showed that relations of equivalence could be demonstrated with a child of just 17 
months old, and Stromer, Mackay, Cohen and Stoddard (1993) were able to 
demonstrate ordinal learning with a subject with learning disability who had a 
suggested mental age of 2 years 10 months.
The fact that human subjects are able to derive relations such as this at such an 
early stage suggests that these “emergent abilities” may be useful from quite early 
on with regard to integrating new information with existing knowledge. In fact
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these skills may be more than “useful” in structuring existing knowledge and the 
learning of new relations, they may prove to be essential to these processes. The 
power of these processes may be illustrated by a study by Sidman, Kirk and 
Willson-Morris (1985). In this study subjects were taught 15 conditional 
discriminations (five groups of three) which established tliree six-member stimulus 
classes. As a result of the training given the subjects demonstrated 60 new 
conditional discriminations that they had not been explicitly taught. The number of 
relations derived in relation to the number of relations explicitly taught gives some 
idea of precisely how useful this ability to derive new relations from existing 
knowledge can be and could help explain the rapid rate of learning shown by 
normally able young children. While the study by Sidman, Kirk and Willson- 
Morris (1985) focused on derived relations in the context of stimulus equivalence, 
the paradigm of transitive inference similarly shows a substantial number of 
derived relations resulting from a small number of explicitly trained relations. For 
example, the procedure developed by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) explicitly trains 
four relations, the overlapping stimulus pairs A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E. Hiis training 
can then result in the derivation of up to six new non-adjacent relations. As the 
number o f overlapping pairs explicitly trained increases them so too does the 
possible number of relations which can be derived. For instance, training one 
fruther overlapping pair E>F has the potential to produce another four non-adjacent 
relations. Given the potential power of the ability to derive these emergent relations 
it would be surprising if this ability were not important in normal learning.
The paradigm of transitive inference has been investigated mainly in the context of 
cognitive psychology while stimulus equivalence has been very much rooted in 
behaviour analytic techniques. However, the experiments on sequence classes have 
drawn heavily on previous research in both the areas of inference and equivalence. 
The fact that the results obtained can be shown to be consistent with previous 
results in both these areas suggests that these paradigms are not investigating 
separate types of learning but rather, different manifestations of processes which 
facilitate learning in general.
The techniques and stimuli used to investigate these paradigms of transitive 
inference and stimulus equivalence tend to be very arbitraiy and abstract. This is 
necessary in order to investigate the precise conditions under which these emergent 
relations can be demonstrated although, it can have the result of making this 
research seem very academic and not particularly relevant to natural learning. It has 
been suggested that stimulus equivalence is relevant to symbolic skills such as
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language. For example, it may establish the relations between spoken and printed 
words and pictures and allow the development of abilities such as reading, writing, 
telling the time etc. Lazar (1977) suggested that the study of sequence relations 
may give some insight into how relations of grammar and word order can be learnt 
by young children without being directly taught. So while the paradigms of 
transitive inference and stimulus equivalence may appear abstract and academic 
they may in fact give some insight into how quite complex symbolic behaviours 
seem to be established quite naturally with normally developing human subjects.
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Table 4:1, Training Relations for groups GO, G1 and G3, Siemann and Delius (1994)
Plus and minus signs indicate reward and punishment. Boldface type indicates pairs inferring a 
linear A to E hierarchy in transitive inference tasks. Italic type indicates pairs inconsistent with this 
linear hierarchy, (Adapted from Siemann and Delius 1994)
A B C D E
Group GO
A A+B- A+C- A+D- A+E-
B B+C- B+D- B+E-
C C+D- C+E-
D D+E-
E
Group G1
A A+B- A+C- A+D-
B B+C- B+D- B+E-
C C+D- C4-E-
D D+E-
E E+A~
Group G3
A A+B- A+C-
B B+C- B+D-
C C+D- C+E-
D D+A- D+E-
E E+A- E+B-
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Fig. 4:1. Graphic representation of the task structures GO, G1 and G3. The arrowheads represent 
inequalities not directions.
From Siemann and Delius (1994)
GO G1 G3
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Fig. 4:2. The tested known (known name-picture and known picture-name) relations and derived 
(novel name-novel picture and novel picture-novel name) relations in Experiment 4. (A, pictures; 
B, names).
From Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes (1993).
A. Pictures B. Names
A9=Dog Tested Relations 89=’DOG"
A10=Torosaurus B10="NEÜS"
A. Pictures B. Names
A11=BaH Tested Relations B11="BALL"
A12=Parasaurolophus B12='IEP'
A. Pictures B. Names
A10=Torosaurus Tested Relations B10="NEUS"
Al 2=Parasaurolophus B12="IEP''
A. Pictures B. Names
A13=8aby Tested Relations B13="BABV"
A14=Chameleon Jl,4?."MOEMOE'
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CHAPTER 5
The Basis of Stimulus Equivalence
The defining feature of stimulus equivalence is the emergence of new relations 
from previously established relations, in the absence of direct training or 
reinforcement. The biggest problem in equivalence research has been how to 
account for the emergence of these untaught relations. Just what processes underlie 
the derivation of these untaught relations is not yet clear. There have been three 
main explanations proposed to account for their emergence. Dugdale and Lowe 
have suggested that equivalence is the result of verbal mediation; that language 
leads to equivalence. Sidman suggests that equivalence may be a primitive 
stimulus function; that like reinforcement, discrimination etc. it may be 
unanalysable. Hayes has suggested a relational frame theory to account for 
equivalence relations; that humans' histories include training that leads to the 
development of generalised arbitrarily applicable relational responding.
Naming as the Basis for Stimulus Equivalence 
Dugdale and Lowe (1990)
Dugdale and Lowe (1990) proposed that naming provided an explanation for the 
emergence of equivalence relations. They suggested that intuitively naming made 
sense as an explanation - after all five lOp coins and one 5 Op coin could be given 
the common label "fifty" and accepted as equivalent even though they are very 
different stimuli physically. Or possibly naming could mediate equivalence, even if 
the stimuli weren't given a common name, as long as the names could be 
incorporated in a verbal rule that linked the sample and comparison.
As evidence for the role of naming Dugdale and Lowe noted that if  equivalence 
does require naming, then non-humans should be unable to pass equivalence tests, 
and certainly at the time of this paper there had been no convincing demonstration 
of equivalence with non-humans. This difficulty in demonstrating equivalence 
relations with non-humans did seem to implicate language as being important in 
equivalence relations and thus naming would be a plausible basis for equivalence 
class formation. Dugdale and Lowe then asked, if language was the crucial factor 
in the development of equivalence relations, would non-human subjects who had 
been given language training be able to demonstrate equivalence relations. To test 
this, one of the authors (Dugdale) ran a series of tests with three chimpanzee 
subjects who had all participated in an ape-language training program conducted
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by Duane Rumbaugh and Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. These chimps were all able to 
communicate by touching lexigrams associated with objects, actions or locations 
which were arranged on a keyboard. However during this training and testing for 
equivalence the chimps did not have access to a lexigram keyboard.
The aim of the experiment was to teach the chimps two A-B matching relations 
and then give B-A probes to test for die emergence of symmetry. The A stimuli 
were two forms ( a Y shape and a zigzag) and the B stimuli were two colours 
(green and red). Given the Y sample the chimps were taught to select the green 
comparison and given the zigzag sample to select the red comparison (see fig.l). 
Two of the three chimps (Sherman and Lana) learned the AB matching task, the 
third did not. When the subjects reached criterion on this AB task, the rate of 
reinforcement was lowered so that only 1 in 5 correct responses were reinforced, 
and unreinfbrced BA test trials were then interspersed among the sparsely 
reinforced AB trials.
When tested, Lana's BA performance was at chance level even though her AB 
performance was around 90% correct. Lana had therefore failed the symmetry test, 
there was no evidence that the sample and comparison stimuli had become 
equivalent. The training and test procedure was then modified in two ways to try 
and produce equivalence responding. Reinforcement was made available for 
correct responses on both baseline and test trials as it was possible Lana had 
perceived that reinforcement was never given on test trials and thus did not attend 
to the stimuli on BA trials. Secondly, identity matching trials were added to the 
baseline so that Lana had experience with all stimuli fimctioning as both samples 
and comparisons. Despite these modifications Lana's performance on test trials 
remained at chance level. The other chimpanzee, Sherman, who had completed AB 
training was also tested on the BA symmetry relation. In all his test trials Sherman 
received reinforced test trials and identity matching controls as had been 
introduced with Lana. Despite this Sherman's performance remained at around 
chance level on symmetry tests.
Both chimps then failed the symmetry tests given after training a single arbitrary 
matching relation. As symmetry is a necessary property of equivalence, failure on 
this task was sufficient to conclude that the stimuli had not become equivalent. 
Dugdale and Lowe suggested that these chimpanzee subjects must have been 
among the favourites to be the first non-humans to pass a symmetry test. As 
chimpanzees they were one of the closest relations to humans in the animal
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kingdom, and even more importantly these particular subjects had an 
unprecedented history of complex training and testing. Yet despite this, and several 
modifications to the test procedure designed to maximise the chimpanzees chances 
of success on the symmetry test, they showed no evidence of having derived the 
BA relations as a result of the training given on the AB conditional discrimination.
Negative evidence of this sort provided some support for Dugdale and Lowe's 
theory that non-humans would be unable to pass equivalence tests because stimulus 
equivalence was dependent on linguistic ability. Dugdale and Lowe felt that more 
direct evidence of the importance of naming in equivalence came from studies such 
as Devany, Hayes and Nelson (1986, see chapter 4). where normally able 2-year 
olds and 2-4 year old learning disabled children with functional spontaneous 
speech and signing demonstrated equivalence class formation, while 2-4 year old 
learning disabled children with no functional verbal skills failed to demonstrate 
stimulus equivalence. The study by Barnes, McCullagh and Keenan (1990, see 
chapter 4) would provide additional support for this view by effectively replicating 
Devany et al's findings but having eliminated degree of learning disability as a 
confounding factor. Devany et al had concluded that language and stimulus 
equivalence were closely related, albeit it was not clear in what way they were 
related.
Dugdale and Lowe felt that several studies demonstrated not only that language 
and equivalence were correlated, but in fact that language was necessary for 
equivalence. Lowe and Beasty (1987) showed that children aged younger than 4 
who had initially failed equivalence tests subsequently passed these tests when 
taught to name the sample-comparison pairings during baseline training. The 
children were taught to match a vertical line sample (A) to a green comparison (B)
- AB, and a vertical line sample (A) to a triangle comparison (C) - AC. Tlie 
children were then tested for the emergence of BC/CB (gieen-triangle and vice- 
versa) equivalence relations. Subjects who failed the equivalence test were taught 
to say "up-green" on the A-B training trials and "up-triangle" on the A-C training 
trials. Following this training the subjects responded correctly on the BC and CB 
tests for equivalence. Dugdale and Lowe believed that this provided evidence that 
naming was necessary for the derivation of equivalence relations. The question 
then was how did naming produce these equivalence relations. One possibility 
suggested (Lowe, 1986) was that the triangle and the green stimuli both controlled 
the common word "up" spoken by the subject. This common name may have 
caused the triangle and the green stimuli to become equivalent.
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To investigate this suggestion further, Dugdale (1988) carried out another 
experiment, trying to establish AB/BA symmetrical relations by means of a 
common name. The relation to be established and the stimuli used were the same 
as those trained with the chimpanzee subjects Sherman and Lana (see fig. 1). 
However the training used to try and establish this was very different. The subjects 
in this experiment were six 4 and 5 year old children who had consistently failed to 
learn the AB conditional discrimination relations. Five children were taught to give 
common labels to the stimuli. The stimuli were presented to the children one at a 
time, in response to the Y shape and the green colour the children were taught to 
say "OMNI", and in response to the zigzag and the red colour to say "DELTA". 
Effectively then the children were taught the labelling relations AX and BX (see 
fig. 2). These relations were learned rapidly and the children were then given AB 
and BA matching-to-sample test trials
One subject was given a different training procedure. This subject (Jessica) was 
taught to select the A and B stimuli conditionally upon labels dictated by the 
experimenter so that when the experimenter said "OMNI" Jessica selected the Y 
shape or the green comparison and when the experimenter said "DELTA" Jessica 
selected the zigzag shape or the red comparison. This effectively taught the 
relations XA and XB (see fig. 3). Jessica then also received AB and BA matching- 
to-sample tests.
Four of the five subjects taught AX and BX common labelling demonstrated 
appropriate AB and BA matching relations. These subjects gave the appropriate 
common labels to the sample from the beginning of testing. One subject who had 
been taught AX and BX and Jessica, the subject who had been taught XA and XB 
upon hearing common labels, responded at around chance level on the AB and BA 
tasks. Neither of these subjects applied common labels to the samples. A common 
labelling intervention was then introduced so that both subjects were asked "Is it 
OMNI or DELTA ?" when the sample appeared. Both subjects then produced 
appropriate common labels for the same stimuli and there was also an 
improvement in their AB and BA test performances so that they also responded 
appropriately on these matching relations. Dugdale and Lowe believed that "in the 
case of all six subjects, each shape and the corresponding colour had become 
equivalent thi'ough the subjects' use of common set X labels" (p. 129).
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However Dugdale and Lowe also noted that performance on the BA task tended to 
be better than performance on the AB task, and that the BA relation tended to 
emerge prior to AB. Analysis of why this may have occurred gave some indication 
of how Dugdale and Lowe believe naming may produce equivalence. Dugdale and 
Lowe described this process in terms of the relations established between the green 
sample (B) and the Y shape (A), using verbal labels.
When the green sample appeared the subject must say “OMNI”, relation BX which 
was directly established in training. Having said “OMNI” the subject then had to 
select the Y comparison (relation XA). Thus a two-stage process is established - 
BX and XA therefore BA. While BX had been directly established by training, 
relation XA had not (saying “OMNI” and selecting the Y shape). Dugdale and 
Lowe thus suggest that when relation AX was established so too was the potential 
for the symmetrical relation XA - the training had resulted in the formation of 
symmetrical relations between the A shapes and the X labels. This allowed the 
emergence of XA and thus accurate responding on BA.
The AB relation can be seen in a similar way. The subjects had to see the Y shape 
and say “OMNI” (AX) and having said “OMNI” then select green (XB). The AX 
relation had been directly established by training but the XB relation had not. 
However, while the AB relation did eventually emerge it did not do so 
immediately. Initially when the Y shape appeared the subject did label it “OMNI”, 
but having said “OMNI” did not consistently select green. While the BX relation 
had been established by training it’s XB symmetry counterpart (necessary for the 
AB relationship) had not been established. This may have been due to spontaneous 
labelling of the coloured stimuli.. All the subjects who derived BA before AB 
spontaneously labelled the colours with their appropriate names “RED” and 
“GREEN”. These labels may have interfered with the emergence of the XB relation 
where the subjects had to say “OMNI” and then select Green. This interference 
may not have occurred with the emergence of the XA relation if the subject did not 
have names for the A stimuli prior to being the X labels.
Therefore, the BA relation required the relations BX, which had been directly 
taught, and the relation XA which may have emerged immediately from the taught 
AX relation as there were no prior names to interfere with this symmetrical 
relation. However the AB relation required the relation AX, which had been 
directly taught, and the relation XB, derivation of which may have been affected by 
the conventional labels “green” and “red” which the subjects displayed prior to
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being taught the set X labels. This may explain why relation BA emerged prior to 
AB.
What is most notable about this account is that it emphasises the bidirectionality of 
the relations between the stimuli and the set X labels. “Given the presence of 
bidirectionality between words and shapes, should we say that the behaviour' in this 
instance is best described, not merely as labelling, but as naming ?”. (P. 132, italics 
in original)
The relations established between the stimuli and the labels proved to be 
symmetrical, and as symmetry appears to be one of the defining properties of 
symbolic behaviour, (Catania 1986, Devany et al 1986) Dugdale and Lowe 
proposed that “naming is itself a symbolic skill that involves bidirectionality”
(p. 132) and this skill of naming would require “not only should a particular 
stimulus control a subjects’ verbal response, but the subjects’ verbal response 
should also exert control over other behaviour (e.g. selection) with respect to that 
particular stimulus” (p. 133). Naming then requires both language production and 
comprehension, and most importantly, these skills are not independent but linked 
within a single “emergent” symmetrical relation. This is why the children’s’ 
behaviour in this experiment can be described as symbolic and “naming”; having 
learned to produce a verbal response conditional upon a stimulus they were able to 
produce the reverse without further training. If both components had been trained 
then they may not have been displaying true naming.
Dugdale and Lowe felt that the data firom the subjects in tlie experiment above 
supported this interpretation. Initially the labels “OMNI” and “DELTA” were not 
symmetrically related to the set B colours, hence the sub-criterion performance on 
the AB tests. However, according to Dugdale and Lowe’s interpretation the 
subjects were able to name BOTH the colours and the shapes with the labels 
“OMNI” and “DELTA” and thus the stimuli became fiilly equivalent.
The question then was how do the data from the chimpanzee subjects fit such an 
interpretation of equivalence, especially as these subjects had received some 
liguistic training. Some children also failed tests for equivalence initially but 
subsequently passed equivalence tests once they could apply a common label to 
each member of a stimulus set. According to Dugdale and Lowe these children’s’ 
behaviour was symbolic at that point and that in using the common labels they 
were in fact naming the stimuli. It was possible then that the chimps were not
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“naming” the stimuli in the sense described here and their lexigram responses may 
not be functionally equivalent to the naming shown by the children.
One problem with this account of naming as the basis of equivalence, which 
Dugdale and Lowe acknowledge, is that they are arguing not only that naming is 
necessary for forming a symmetrical relation, but also that naming itself is a 
symmetrical relation. Dugdale and Lowe get round this problem by differentiating 
between stimulus-response symmetry (naming) and stimulus-stimulus symmetry 
(an equivalence relation). The stimulus-response (naming) symmetry is primary 
and they argue that this underlies stimulus-stimulus symmetry and equivalence 
relations.
Dugdale and Lowe suggested that naming may arise as a result of the natural 
trainmg within a developing cliild’s enviromnent. Within this environment a child 
learns to function as both a speaker and a listener, and also learns to say a 
particular word conditional upon a stimulus and also to produce that stimulus 
conditional upon the spoken word. Thus, the naming relation may be rooted in the 
verbal community in which many exemplars of stimulus-response reversals are 
reinforced.
Dugdale and Lowe had suggested that there was evidence to show “not only that 
equivalence is absent when naming is absent but also that equivalence emerges 
when naming is introduced” (p. 124). Naming itself, they argued, was a 
bidirectional symbolic skill, a stimulus-response relation which then resulted in the 
emergence of bidirectional stimulus-stimulus relations. They believed that the 
emergence of equivalence relations required appropriate naming behaviour.
Eikeseth and Smith (1992)
A study by Eikeseth and Smith (1992) also studied the possible role of naming in 
the formation of equivalence relations. This study carried out a number of 
manipulations to try and investigate if, and how, naming facilitated equivalence. 
The training and testing in this experiment took place in 5 phases, arranged in an 
ABCDA design:
Phase 1 - A - Two sets of conditional relations were taught and equivalence tests 
given, without any programmed naming.
Phase 2 - B - If the subjects did not display equivalence in phase 1, naming was 
added to the conditional discriminations and equivalence was retested.
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Phase 3 - C - This assessed the effects of naming the stimuli without giving match- 
to-sample training.
Phase 4 - D - New, unnamed stimuli were related to the named stimuli trained in 
phase 3 by matching-to-sample. Would untrained relations develop between the 
named stimuli and the new unnamed stimuli, and would untrained relations 
develop between the new unnamed stimuli ?
Phase 5 - A - Again, conditional relations were taught and equivalence tests given, 
in the absence of programmed naming. Would the subjects still fail to develop 
equivalence relations ?
The subjects in this experiment were four high-functioning, pre-school aged 
autistic children. The authors felt that these subjects were an appropriate group to 
study because some research suggested that autistic children seemed less likely to 
display untrained relations than other human populations (Lovaas 1977). This 
meant that these subjects might give a good indication of the conditions under 
which equivalence relations would or would not develop. Prior to training the 
subjects were tested on a number of measures e.g. the Leiter International 
perfoiinance Scale and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised. The 
subjects ranged in chronological age from 3.5 to 5.5 years. In general all subjects 
displayed average or above average visual-spatial skills but displayed deficits in 
language.
hi phase 1 of the study, the subjects were taught AB and AC baseline conditional 
discriminations using a match-to-sample procedure. Having mastered these 
relations the subjects were tested on the BC and CB equivalence relations.
Criterion was set at 90% correct responding. If the subjects failed to demonstrate 
equivalence, symmetry was tested by probing performance on BA and CA 
relations. Regardless of the result on this test the BC and CB relations were probed 
again. Finally the AB and AC relations were tested to check for any extinction of 
the baseline discriminations. All four subjects learned the AB and AC conditional 
discriminations and, having reached criterion on this task, maintained these 
relations thr oughout phase 1. However none of the subjects demonstrated the 
emergent BC and CB conditional relations. On the BA and CA symmetry relations, 
two subjects displayed accurate performance, one subject performed at chance 
level, and one subject performed at above chance level but below criterion.
Phase 2 tested whether the introduction of naming would facilitate the emergence 
o f the BC and CB equivalence relations. First the subjects were taught to speak one
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common name when shown each member of the first stimulus class (A l, B l, C l), 
and to speak another common name when shown each member of the second 
stimulus class (A2, B2, C2). The subjects then had to perform the AB and AC 
baseline discriminations while correctly labelling the stimuli. Having mastered this 
task the BC and CB relations were reassessed. Two subjects (Joe and Danny) 
immediately demonstrated the emergence of the untrained BC and CB relations. A 
third subject (Trey) performed at above chance level but below mastery. The fourth 
subject (Rory) continued to perform at chance level. For two of the subjects then, 
naming appeared to facilitate the emergence of equivalence relations.
hi phase 3 the subjects were presented with new stimuli D, E and F. They were 
taught to speak one common name in response to the first potential stimulus class, 
D l, E l and FI, and another common name in response to the second potential 
stimulus class, D2, E2 and F2. Once the subjects could label the stimuli correctly 
they were tested on the DE and DF conditional relations to see if  naming itself was 
sufficient to establish these relations in the absence of matching-to-sample training. 
The EF and FE relations were then assessed, but any subjects who had failed to 
develop the DE and DF relations were taught these relations before EF and FE 
were probed. After learning to label the stimuli, two subjects (Trey and Damiy) 
immediately showed mastery of the DE, DF, EF and FE relations. The other two 
subjects did not demonstrate these relations and were explicitly taught the DE and 
DF conditional discriminations. Following this training Joe demonstrated the 
emergent EF and FE relations while Rory performed at above chance level but 
below criterion. In phase 3 a visual-naming procedure had been introduced for 
Rory as this subject had lower levels of language skills than he other subjects but 
had good visual-spatial skills. The visual names were block structures built on top 
of the stimuli e.g. the “name” for the first stimulus class was a tower of two blue 
blocks, and the “name” for the second stimulus class was a pyramid of three orange 
blocks. Using this procedure Rory’s performance was not perfect, but performance 
was still better than with the vocal naming procedure. Overall then, Eikeseth and 
Smith felt that the naming procedure seemed to facilitate the emergence of 
untrained conditional relations, particularly for Trey and Danny but also to some 
extent with the other two subjects.
In phase 4 two new, unnamed stimuli were related to each of the classes of D, E 
and F stimuli by teaching EG and FH conditional discriminations (i.e. E lGl ,
E2G2, F lH l ,  F2H2). Would untrained conditional relations develop between the 
named stimuli and the new, unnamed stimuli ? To test this, performance on the GD
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and HD conditional discriminations was assessed. Also, would untrained 
conditional relations develop among the new unnamed stimuli ? To test this 
performance was assessed on the GH and HG conditional discriminations. One 
subject (Trey) demonstrated all four emergent relations, GD, HD, GH and HG, 
indicating that relations had formed between the named stimuli and the new, 
unnamed stimuli, and also between the new, unnamed stimuli. The results were 
rather mixed for the other subjects. Joe performed accurately on GD and HD only, 
indicating the relations had formed between the named stimuli and the new, 
unnamed stimuli, but not between the new unnamed stimuli. Danny demonstrated 
emergent relations between the new unnamed stimuli on GH and HG and to some 
extent between the named stimuli and the new unnamed stimuli by accurate 
responding on HD but not on GD. Rory showed accurate performance only on HD 
(new unnamed - named) but did approach criterion on GH and HG.
In phase 5, the subjects were once again taught two conditional relations and tested 
for the emergence of equivalence relations, in the absence of programmed naming. 
With a new set o f stimuli the subjects were taught the conditional discriminations 
IJ and IK using a matching-to-sample procedure and then tested for the emergence 
of JK, KJ, JI and KI. Two subjects, Joe and Danny demonstrated the emergence of 
all these relations. The other two subjects. Trey and Rory, did not demonstrate any 
of these relations.
During phases 2 and 3 the subjects were taught to label the stimuli within each 
potential class with a common name. During the match-to-sample probes in phase 
2, 3 and 4, three subjects (Trey, Joe and Rory) continued to label the stimuli 
correctly even though naming was not requested on these probes. The subject 
labelled the individual stimuli correctly even when they responded incorrectly on 
match-to-sample tests. One subject (Danny) did not use overt labels on the match- 
to-sample tasks and labelled the stimuli only when required. None of the subjects 
used overt labels during phases 1 and 5 when naming was not directly 
programmed for any of the stimuli.
Eikeseth and Smith felt that these results did show a causal relationship between 
naming and the development of equivalence relations. One subject. Trey, 
consistently responded accurately on probes of untrained relations when naming 
was programmed, and equally consistently failed to show emergent relations when 
naming was not programmed. While the other subjects performances were not as
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consistent as Trey’s in this respect, they were also more likely to display untrained 
conditional relations when naming was programmed.
Eikeseth and Smith suggested that naming established the different stimuli that had 
been given the same name as members of a functional class (Goldiamond, 1962), 
i.e. the different stimuli came to evoke the same response - saying a certain name. 
Thus, even though the functional classes may have been established outside a 
match-to-sample task, emergent relations were demonstrated within a match-to- 
sample context. Eikeseth and Smith thus believed that “the establishment of 
functional classes through naming facilitates the development of untrained 
conditional relations, some of which appear to be equivalence relations” (p. 132). 
However it is unlikely that the relationship between naming, fimctional classes and 
equivalence classes is a simple one. After all, one subject (Danny) clearly 
demonstrated equivalence relations in phase 5 when no naming was programmed, 
and Danny only used overt names for the stimuli when required to do so. So while 
it is not possible to exclude the possibility that Danny was naming the stimuli 
covertly, it is equally possible that he was not naming the sthnuli at all, in which 
case naming would not provide a sufficient explanation for the emergence of the 
untaught relations. Eikeseth and Smith themselves acknowledge that the 
relationship between functional and equivalence classes is likely to be complex. A 
study by Sidman, Wynne, Maguire and Barnes (1989) concluded that while there 
seems to be a relation between functional and equivalence classes, they do not 
constitute the same behavioural process. However, Murray Sidman has since 
substantially re-evaluated this conclusion (cf. Sidman, 1994; discussed more fully 
later in this chapter)
However this study by Eikeseth and Smith was a useful attempt to investigate a 
possible causal link between naming and the emergence of stimulus equivalence, 
and to determine whether naming in itself is sufficient to establish equivalence 
relations. The conclusions from this study would seem to be that naming may 
facilitate equivalence class formation but it is not clear that naming causes 
equivalence class formation.
Horne and Lowe (in press)
A recent study however, Home and Lowe (in press) has provided a very detailed 
account of precisely how the authors believe naming brings about emergent 
behaviour, such as stimulus equivalence. According to Horne and Lowe “naming” 
is the basic unit of verbal behaviour and it is this which, when learnt, plays a
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crucial role in the development of stimulus classes and of symbolic behaviour. This 
account of naming and symbolic behaviour draws heavily on B.F. Skinner’s 
analysis of verbal behaviour (1957) and the basic verbal relations which he 
identified (i.e. the “tact”, the “mand” and the “intraverbal”) are all seen as 
becoming variants of the basic name relation. Horne and Lowe believe that the 
development of naming requires that conventional listener and speaker behaviours 
combine and that this occurs as a result of echoic responding, either overt or 
covert.
This study focuses on the way verbal behaviour may develop in a very young child 
as a result o f behavioural interactions between the child and it’s 
enviromnent/primary caregivers. In particular they describe how they believe 
naming develops from earlier, pre-linguistic behaviour. It has been suggested that 
before children learn to speak they must learn to listen and Skinner (1957) termed 
this “listener behaviour”. Home and Lowe felt that the development o f this 
“listener behaviour” was crucial to the development of linguistic behaviour and 
described the circumstances under which it might be established. Ultimately this 
behaviour should become discriminative for object or event-related behaviour.
First the caregiver would produce a vocal stimulus such as an object name in the 
presence of both the object and the child. Typically the caregiver would observe 
what the child was looking at, and then indicate that object or event before naming 
it. This “joint regard” increases the likelihood that the name produced by the 
caregiver will become discriminative for the child looking at the object which the 
caregiver has indicated. This may then develop when the child points to an object 
or gives an object to the caregiver, and this behaviour becomes discriminative for 
the caregiver naming that object. At the same time the caregiver may teach the 
child how to perform conventional behaviour in relation to the object. The child’s 
imitation of these conventional behaviours is reinforced and this imitation may be 
prompted or shaped by the caregiver. As this behaviour is established, the 
caregiver’s vocal stimulus will increasingly precede the child’s behaviour rather 
than accompanying it. In this way the caregiver’s vocal stimulus becomes 
discriminative for the child performing these object-related behaviours until the 
child reliably behaves appropriately to that object given the vocal stimulus. Thus 
the child can be said to have acquired listener behaviour'.
Horne and Lowe illustrated this with the example of a caregiver seeing a shoe, 
pointing at it, and saying to the child “where’s shoe ?”. By the process described 
above the child may learn to orient to the shoe, and point to it or hand it to the
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caregiver. This listener behaviour' is extended when the child learns that the term 
given to that object may also apply to a number of other objects. For example, the 
term “shoe” is not applied just to one particular shoe but rather to a variety of 
different shoes, and in this way a class o f objects may be established by the 
caregiver naming each of the different exemplars “shoe”. Home and Lowe state 
that in this way the child learns a series of relations between the auditory stimuli 
produced by others and her own responding to a class o f stimuli. This listener 
behaviom' may be extended following several examples of vocal stimuli such as 
“where’s the shoe ?”, “where’s the cup ?” etc. The first “Where’s the ...?” part of 
the stimulus may come to elicit orienting behaviour, such as pointing, while the 
second part of the stimulus determines the object to which this orienting occurs. 
New listener behaviours can then be added to the child’s repertoire by teaching 
behaviours such as “Pick up . .  .shoe/spoon etc.”. The “pick up . . . ” behaviour may 
thus generalise to all the objects to which the child has learned to orient.
The crucial feature of the acquired listener behaviour is that it is determined by 
other’s speaking. For Home and Lowe’s theory it is important that the child 
progresses to being a speaker/listener and they suggest that this occur s through 
echoic responding. One of the precursors of echoic behaviour may be the 
consonant-vowel “babbling” vocalisations displayed by human infants. There are 
several findings to suggest that these vocalisations are dependent on exposure to 
the speech sounds of a verbal community. Home and Lowe suggest that raising the 
operant level of these vocalisations is an important step towards the acquisition of 
speech. The “echoic” is one of the classes of functional relations in verbal 
behaviour' defined by Skinner, and involves responding or “echoing” a heard verbal 
stimulus. Horne and Lowe believe that this echoic relation is important in 
establishing the second link of the naming relation - a relation between a child 
making an utterance and hearing that utterance. The caregiver sees an object and 
names it, creating an auditory stimulus which the child attempts to reproduce, and 
is reinforced for doing this by the caregiver. However the caregiver’s initial vocal 
stimulus also occasions the child orienting to the object (as seen previously). The 
child’s echoic reproduction of this vocal stimulus creates another auditory 
stimulus, functionally equivalent to that of the caregiver, and so itself causes 
listener behaviour (orienting) to the named object. This may produce further echoic 
repetitions of the vocal stimulus. Home and Lowe believe that it is at this point that 
the child becomes a speaker-listener with respect to her own verbal stimulus. It has 
been suggested that the child’s repeated echoing of the object name may sustain the 
listener behaviour of orienting to, and interacting with, the object. Initially the
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echoic responses must occur overtly in order for them to be reinforced by the 
caregiver. But it is possible that this echoic behaviour will become increasingly 
covert and “abbreviated”, particularly in the case of repetition or self-echoing. The 
listener behaviour occasioned by these covert echoics will reinforce this echoing 
and serve to maintain it, so that once the child has learned generalised echoic 
behaviour', and to emit formerly overt echoics covertly, new echoics may be 
acquired solely at a covert level. Although the child’s speaker-listener behaviour is 
still only instigated by other’s vocalisations, Horne and Lowe suggest that this 
echoic behaviour sets the conditions for the object itself to directly control the 
child’s verbal behaviour and in this way produce naming.
Important to this development of naming is the verbal relation the “tact”. This is a 
verbal relation that results from, or is linked with, that which has gone before. The 
tact may come about as a result of repeated echoic interactions. For instance, the 
caregiver may give the child an object and if  the child says the name of that object, 
the caregiver may reinforce this responding by smiling, praising the child etc. So 
that eventually that object becomes discriminative for the child producing it’s 
name, hiitially the caregiver may present the object and say the name, e.g. “shoe”. 
This verbal stimulus causes the child to orient to the object and echo it’s name until 
eventually the child will produce the appropriate verbal response without any need 
for the caregiver to speak. Home and Lowe suggest that it is at this point, when the 
object alone occasions the verbal response and accompanying listener behaviour, 
that it can be said that the child has leamed to name.
However this relation alone would also fulfil the criteria for a tact as defined by 
Skinner (1957) and Horne and Lowe state that the properties of naming go beyond 
those of tacting. “The tact relation between a stimulus and a response is uni­
dimensional and non-symbolic. On the other hand . . .  the name relation as outlined 
here has all of these defining characteristics of symbolic behaviour”. These 
defining characteristics being that a name can represent a stimulus; refer to it; 
stand for it; and specify it; which a tact cannot. Home and Lowe suggest that when 
a child sees an object and makes a “tact” response, this generates a verbal stimulus 
which causes her to re-orient to that object (as described previously). However this 
verbal stimulus may cause her to “see” not just that particular object but any of the 
other instances in her listener behaviour class. Thus, Home and Lowe suggest, 
naming establishes bi-directional relations between a class of objects or events and 
the speaker-listener behaviour they occasion. They believe that this naming 
behaviour is a fusion of conventional speaker and listener functions which was
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brought about by echoic behaviours. There also seems to be evidence to support 
this suggestion that listener behaviour is closely linked to production. For instance, 
Harris, Yeeles, Chasin and Oakley (1995) found evidence that once the child learns 
to act as a speaker-listener with respect to one object, they will then be able to 
name other objects in the same stimulus class to which they have previously only 
responded as a listener.
The name relation will also be extended beyond the original object to include new 
items. Horne and Lowe suggest that this extension of the name is controlled by the 
child's verbal community, with idiosyncratic extensions being corrected by the 
child's caregiver. For instance, an over-extension may be corrected - e.g. "No, 
that's not a dog, that's a cat" while under extensions may result in the caregiver 
pointing out ftirther exemplars and establishing the name relation to these.
The authors suggest that initially joint attention to objects is established by cues 
such as pointing at objects and phrases such as "Where's the . . .? "  etc. and several 
repetitions of these behaviours may be necessary to establish the name relation. 
Eventually though, the caregiver's naming of, and pointing at, an object may be 
sufficient to evoke the sequence of behaviour that makes up the name relation and 
the names may be learnt after the caregiver has named the object only once or 
twice. Thus Home and Lowe argue that the name relation is established as a 
"higher-order behavioural relation", short circuiting earlier means of constructing 
it, and this higher order naming may become increasingly covert.
A further development of the theory is that the names provided by the verbal 
community also assign common class names to objects which, while different 
physically, have a shared cultural function - i.e. are functionally equivalent. Thus 
they suggest that naming establishes functional stimulus classes for the child.
These culturally defined functions then become an integral part of the child's 
listener behaviour towards those objects so that when a new object also has these 
functions the child may apply the same name to that new object. This extension of 
the name is not directly trained or reinforced but rather occurs as a result of 
common listener behaviour towards that object. Home and Lowe also suggest that 
naming can establish a number o f levels of functional equivalence. For example, 
having learned that a particular object is called a "chair", the child can leam that a 
chan may also be called the more general name "furniture" establishing a more 
general level of functional equivalence.
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The fact that naming may establish classes o f objects is crucial to Horne and 
Lowe's account o f how naming relates to emergent behaviour. If a new listener 
behaviour is established with some exemplars from a functional class, the name 
relationship established for that class may cause this new listener behaviour to 
generalise to other members of the class without the caregiver having to reinforce 
the target behaviour with each individual object. The child will treat each item in a 
similai’ way, as if it were functionally equivalent. Home and Lowe believe that this 
is what happened in the study by Eikeseth and Smith (1992) when the autistic 
subjects were taught the same name for all the stimuli in a class and then 
subsequently the subjects were able to select the comparison stimulus that was in 
the same class as the sample stimulus. They felt that this apparently spontaneous 
behaviour was in fact listener behaviour engendered by the name.
On the basis of the account summarised here, Home and Lowe define naming as: 
"A higher order bi-directional relation that (i) combines conventional speaker and 
listener behaviours within the individual; (ii) does not require reinforcement of 
both speaker and listener behaviours for each new name to be established; and (iii) 
relates to classes of objects and events".
This definition of naming, and the use of naming as an explanation for "emergent" 
relations has implications for the idea o f "emergent" relations, such as those found 
in stimulus equivalence. According to Horne and Lowe these relations are 
established through naming, and as naming itself is a leamed behaviour these 
relations are not in fact derived. Rather they feel that these relations are a learned 
behaviour, established through the leamed behaviour of naming, the operations of 
which can be understood through behaviour analysis.
Another aspect of Horne and Lowe's naming hypothesis is that the role of naming 
in producing these emergent relations is enhanced through the development of the 
"intraverbal", another of the verbal units identified by Skinner (1957). This relation 
develops when the child begins to combine previously leamed single conventional 
verbal responses to form response pairs etc. One of the most important features of 
the intraverbal is that it may establish bi-directional relations between the child's 
verbal responses. Again, Home and Lowe suggest that this occurs through self- 
echoic repetition. For instance, one intraverbal a child might easily leam is "knife 
fork". Self-echoic repetition would produce "knife fork knife fork knife fork etc." 
so that fork may precede knife as well as vice versa, in this way establishing bi­
directional relations between the behavioural components.
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Another class of verbal behaviour identified by Skinner (1957) is “manding”. This 
is behaviour that is primarily under the control of it’s consequences; it is a class of 
utterances that make demands on the hearer and are reinforced by fulfilment of the 
demand. There is evidence that children learn to name objects before they learn to 
mand them. Home and Lowe suggest that manding comes about via nammg - 
names are established first and then extended to mand objects and events. In this 
way the child can now mand any object that she can name, and these mand 
relations incorporate naming “with all of the speaker/listener functions and bi­
directionality thereby entailed”.
Horne and Lowe have provided an account of how they believe a child’s behaviour 
with a single stimulus generalises to other physically distinct stimuli, and how that 
child, withm particular contexts can come to respond to different objects and 
events as interchangeable. It is features like these that are examined in the stimulus 
equivalence literature. However Horne and Lowe believe that these behaviours are 
established via naming, which they believe is itself a leamed behaviour and thus 
these “emergent” behaviours found in stimulus equivalence may be a consequence 
of the different stimuli being part o f the same name relation.
One way which Horne and Lowe suggest that naming may produce equivalence 
classes is through intraverbal naming. They illustrate this with a description of the 
subjects’ performances in the experiment by Lowe and Beasty (1987). The children 
were taught to match a vertical line sample to a green comparison (A lB l) and a 
horizontal line comparison to a red comparison (A2B2). Intraverbal echoing of the 
names of the stimuli could have produced the verbal repetitions “up green up green 
up green” (A lB l) and “down red down red down red” (A2B2). The subjects were 
then taught to match the vertical line sample to a triangle comparison (A lC l) and 
the horizontal line sample to a cross comparison (A2C2). This might have 
produced the verbal repetitions “up triangle up triangle up triangle” (A lC l) and 
“down cross down cross down cross” (A2C2). Thus the A1 stimulus, the vertical 
line, is equally likely to occasion the child saying “up green” or “up triangle”, and 
similarly the A2 stimulus, the horizontal line, is equally likely to occasion the child 
saying “down red” or “down cross”. These may then give rise to the three name 
intraverbals “up green triangle”/“up triangle green” and “down red cross”/“down 
cross red”. As a result, any of the stimulus names may come to occasion the other 
two that have been linked with it, and the names become interchangeable. It is at 
this point Horne and Lowe suggest an intraverbal “equivalence” class has been 
formed and subjects will pass formal tests of equivalence within the matching
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paradigm. For example, in the experiment by Lowe and Beasty (1987), having been 
taught the matching relations A-B and A-C the subjects would be tested on B-C 
and C-B tests of equivalence relations. So, given a C-B test trial. Home and Lowe 
suggest that if the triangle (C l) stimulus appears, the subject will name it as 
“triangle”, which will then occasion him/her saying “up” and “green”. Pressing the 
sample produces the green (B l) and red (B2) stimuli as comparisons. Having heard 
himself or herself say “green” the subject will then orient to, and select, the green 
comparison rather than the red. As similar relations should hold between the other 
C-B and B-C stimuli this behaviour would be seen as indicating the derivation of 
stimulus equivalence.
Another possible way that equivalence classes could be demonstrated is thiough 
coimnon naming. Home and Lowe suggest that this common naming may develop 
as the subjects leam the conditional relations. For example, when leaming A l-B l 
and A l-C l the subject may say the names “up-green” and “up-triangle”. As the 
name “up” is common to both discriminations the intraverbal name pair may 
contract to a common name “up” which will control responding to all the stimuli 
within that stimulus class. Similarly A2-B2 and A2-C2 may produce “down-red” 
and “down-cross” which will contract to the common name “down”, controlling 
responding to all the stimuli within that stimulus class. So Home and Lowe 
suggest that common naming may provide another explanation of how subjects 
may “derive” equivalence relations as a result of naming.
This paper by Home and Lowe has put forward an account o f how naming 
behaviour develops as a result of interactions between a very young child and that 
child’s principal caregivers. Home and Lowe believe that the verbal behaviour 
developed in these interactions produces bi-directional speaker-listener naming 
behaviour. This naming behaviour' then results in the development of stimulus 
classes in which the different stimuli become mutually substitutable as a result of 
the names established, whether through common naming or intraverbal naming, hi 
this way Home and Lowe explain the development of “emergent” relations such as 
those found in tests of stimulus equivalence. In fact, Horne and Lowe believe that 
equivalence relations are not derived but rather the direct result o f leamed naming 
behaviour. Nor, they feel should naming be seen as mediating equivalence class 
formation. Instead they believe that “naming is stimulus classifying behaviour” 
(italics in original).
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Home and Lowe feel that certain predictions can be made on the basis of their 
stated naming hypothesis and that tests of several of these predictions support 
naming as an explanation of equivalence class formation. The first prediction is 
that “because they are lacking in naming skills, non-human organisms will 
generally fail tests of stimulus equivalence”. It is true that it has been extremely 
difficult to demonstrate stimulus equivalence with non-human subjects (see chapter 
3), but Horne and Lowe go further, to predict that in fact there is no basis to predict 
that non-humans should be able to demonstrate stimulus equivalence, at least 
according to current accounts of non-human animal learning. Home and Lowe 
suggest that the three-term (discrimination learning) contingency involved in 
establishing the baseline relations may in fact preclude non-human success on tests 
for equivalence relations. As the direction o f the relation between the 
discriminative (sample) stimulus and the response is one way, the non-human 
subjects may become “locked” into this uni-dhectional relation with no mechanism 
to permit reversals to occur. According to Horne and Lowe’s theory however, 
human subjects are fieed of these constraints as they produce names which 
provide reversible links between their behaviour and the stimuli involved in the 
relation.
One problem with Home and Lowe’s theory is that Schusterman and Kastak (1993) 
appeared to have demonstrated equivalence relations with a sea-lion subject.
However Home and Lowe argue that this study had several distinctive features 
which may explain this animal’s apparent success. The sample and comparison 
stimuli were simultaneously visible to the sea lion before it was able to respond, 
and also no sample response was required, only an orientation to the left or right to 
select one of the comparison stimuli. The incorrect comparison stimuli changed on 
each trial and were randomly assigned, preventing S- control by particular 
comparison stimuli. The subject was also given symmetry and transitivity training 
with a subset of the stimuli, and reinforcement was available for correct responding 
thi'oughout testing. Home and Lowe suggest that the training procedure may have 
established each stimulus pair (e.g. AB or BC) as a compound stimulus and |
eventually established responding to the outer stimulus element of the compound i
(i.e. responding to the comparison). Correct responding on the AC and CA 
relations may have been produced by “associative transitivity” as several studies 
have shown that when AB and BC are explicitly trained AC is present when tested.
As the AC elements would have functioned as a compound stimulus, the animal 
respondmg to the outer element of the compound would produce successful 
performance on the CA equivalence test. Of course, this is just one interpretation of
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the results obtained by Schusterman and Kastak, and equally possible is 
Schusterman and Kastak’s explanation for the performance, that the animal was in 
fact demonstrating emergent equivalence relations.
Horne and Lowe’s second prediction was that “Humans who are lacking the 
prerequisite naming skills will generally fail tests of stimulus equivalence”. 
Unfortunately tlie amount of research with young children with limited naming 
skills on equivalence tasks is limited, but the studies by Devany et al (1986) and 
Barnes et al (1990) do seem to support this proposition, to some extent at least. The 
third prediction followed on from this and suggested that “teaching subjects 
particular' name relations for the stimuli used in match-to-sample procedures may 
be a powerful determinant of subsequent performance on equivalence tests”. The 
common naming interventions used by both Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and 
Eikeseth and Smith (1992) both seem to support this prediction. In both cases 
teaching a common name for the stimuli within an experimenter-defined 
equivalence class either facilitated or produced appropriate performance among the 
stimuli with young children. A study by Saunders, Saunders, Williams and 
Spradlin (1993) also found that giving names to the stimuli helped facilitate 
equivalence class formation with adults with mild leaming disabilities, while a 
study by Dickens, Bentall and Smith (1993) found that the usefulness of names 
depended on whether those names were consistent with the experimenter defined 
classes trained, or contradictory to those classes.
hi general then, Home and Lowe felt that there was good evidence that appropriate 
nammg behaviour was closely related to success on standard equivalence tests and 
thus supported their proposition that derived equivalence relations were a result of 
leamed naming behaviours, acquired as a result of the fusion of speaker and 
listener behaviour.
Sidman’s Theorv of Equivalence
Sidman (19861
Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and Home and Lowe (in press) have provided one 
explanation for the emergence of equivalence relations - that equivalence is a direct 
result of learned verbal behaviour; naming. Murray Sidman, however, has 
presented a very different explanation for the derivation of stimulus equivalence. 
Sidman (1990) suggested that it may not be possible to derive equivalence from 
something more basic; that stimulus equivalence may be a fundamental stimulus
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function. Sidman suggested that equivalence relations emerge at the level o f a four 
term contingency, a suggestion first described in his 1986 paper on functional 
analysis of emergent verbal classes. This paper considered the basic units of 
behaviour analysis and how the emergence of equivalence could be described in 
terms of these units. These basic units form an increasingly complex systematic 
firamework of two, three and four term contingencies.
The two-term contingencv 
Skinner (1935, 1938) proposed a response-stimulus relation as a basic unit for the 
analysis of behaviour - the two-term contingency. This contingency can be 
described in terms of a subject pressing a button and then receiving a coin as a 
consequence (see Fig.5:l). The behaviour o f pressing the button. Response 1 (Rl), 
is followed by a specific consequence, receiving a coin (Cl). This relation can be 
described as a contingency because any other behaviour (R2) will not produce a 
coin. The consequence of the behaviour determines the likelihood of that behaviour 
being displayed again. In this case delivery of the coin increases the probability that 
the coin pressing behaviour will be displayed again. Any other behaviour is less 
likely to be displayed in this situation as it will fail to produce the specified 
consequence. This contingency explains how behaviour can be controlled by its 
consequences, which after all are events that follow  the behaviour - the likelihood 
of a behaviour being displayed is determined by past contingencies.
The two-term contingency “specifies a causal relation between behaviour and 
environment” (Sidman, 1986, p. 127) and as such is veiy usefiil in identifying 
positive and negative reinforcers and the effect they will have on behaviour. 
However this contingency is insufficient to describe ordered behaviour as the two- 
term contingency only describes probabilities which are active at any given 
moment. A more detailed contingency is required to describe more complex 
behaviour.
The thiee-term contingencv.
Sidman refers to the three-term contingency as “the analytic unit that emerges 
when one considers the two-term contingency in relation to the changing 
environment” (p.219). The two-term contingency is brought under the control of a 
third element, stimulus SI (see Fig. 5:2). Continuing the example given, the 
behaviour of pressing a button will now only produce a coin if  the button has an 
appropriate shape on it (e.g. a square). Pressing a button with any other shape (e.g.
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a circle) or any other behaviour other than pressing a button will fail to produce a 
coin.
Skinner (1938) pointed out that this does not mean that the square now elicits the 
response. Rather, the two-term relation has been brought under discriminative 
control so that the square elicits the two-term contingency, increasing the 
likelihood that the subject will press the button to produce a coin. In this way, the 
environment establishes control over the two-term contingency by selectively 
altering the probability that the behaviour in the two-term contingency will be 
displayed. Thus Sidman refers to the three-term contingency as “the fundamental 
unit o f stimulus contror (p. 219, italics in original).
The thiee-term contingency introduces the process of conditioned reinforcement to 
behavioui' analysis. The third term SI is the initiating component o f that three term 
contingency. Therefore a response which produces SI as a consequence will then 
activate the three-term unit initiated by SI. Activating that three term unit in itself 
acts as a reinforcer and so SI will now alter the future probability of the behaviour 
that precedes it. Sidman suggests that the three-term contingency is also the basic 
analytic unit of cognition. He suggests that knowledge is inferred from 
obsei'vations of stimulus control and through three-term contingencies behaviour’ 
becomes related to both consequences and antecedents.
However, again, the three-term unit is not sufficient to fully describe complex 
behaviour. It is also necessary to be able to account for the enviromnent’s ability to 
select the particular thr ee-term units of stimulus control that are active at any 
moment.
The four-term contingencv 
The addition of one further term places the tlrree-term contingency under stimulus 
control. Continuing the example given, the subject still has two buttons available, 
with a square on one and a circle on the other, but a third button is now added, 
which is sometimes green (S3) and sometimes red (84) (see Fig. 5:3). Now the 
behaviour of pressing the button with a square will only produce a reinforcer if the 
new button is red. This establishes a four-term contingency; the three-term relation 
is true only in the presence of the green button (S3), not any other colour. Thus, the 
tluee term contingency is now under conditional control. The conditional control of 
the four-term unit is a different stimulus function to the discriminative control of 
the three term unit. In the three-term contingency the discriminative stimulus (SI)
Chapter 5: The Basis o f Stimulus Equivalence 119
is identified by reference to a differential response - the subject presses the button 
in the presence of the square but not in it’s absence. In the four term contingency 
the conditional stimulus does not require additional differential behaviour - even 
when the square is on the button, the subject presses it only in the presence of the 
green hue; the green hue activates the tliree-term contingency. There is no 
intervening response between S3 and SI.
The significance of the four-term unit is that the discriminative three-term unit is 
imder contextual control, “That is how the environment establishes higher-order 
priorities, selectively altering the probability of three-term relations that exist in 
one’s repertoire “ (p. 225).
The four term contingency detailed in Fig. 5:3 is somewhat unbalanced in that S3 
provides a context in which the subject can press the square to receive a coin but in 
the context of S4 no behaviour is effective. The four-term contingency shown in 
Fig. 5:4 has had this imbalance corrected in that now in the presence of S4 (red), 
pressing the button (R l) with the circle on (S2) will produce a com (Cl).
Sidman has suggested that it is at this level, the four-term conditional 
discrimination, that equivalence relations are established. The conditional 
discriminations established in baseline training in equivalence are the same in 
structure as those detailed in fig. 4. For instance, in standard A-B match-to-sample 
training S3 would be sample stimulus A l, and S4 would be sample stimulus A2.
SI and S2 would be comparison stimuli B l and B2 respectively. In the case of 
equivalence, new four-term conditional relations are established without direct 
training although the subject has never experienced the new contingencies before.
Sidman has pointed out that when equivalence relations are established it permits 
us to regard the stimuli as having the same meaning as each other.
“In this way semantic correspondence emerges from non-linguistic “i f . . .  then” 
relations. Expanding the analytic unit from three to four terms establishes the 
potential for verbal classes to emerge” (p.233).
One of the most important aspects of the derivation of equivalence in this way is 
that it provides an explanation for the establishment of simple semantic 
correspondences without having to provide an explicit reinforcement history for 
each case.
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However, while Sidman argues that stimulus equivalence emerges at the level of 
the four-term contingency, in the analysis o f basic units of behaviour, the four-term 
unit is not sufficient to explain fully some of the more complex behaviours.
“By itself, the four-term contingency provides only a unit for describing the 
contextual control of three-term contingencies, a level of analysis that does not 
encompass the role of context in determining semantic correspondence.. . .  By 
placing four-term contingencies themselves under environmental constraint, 
however, we can bring the emergence of meaning itself under contextual control” 
(p. 237).
By adding a fifth term it is possible to describe the enviromnent’s selection of 
conditional discriminations.
The five-term contingencv 
hi the four-term contingency described in fig. 4, in the presence of the green hue 
pressing the button with a square produced a coin, while in the presence of the red 
light pressing the button with a circle produced a coin, hi the five-term contingency 
this conditional discrimination is itself brought under conditional control by the 
addition of two further stimuli S5 and S6. In the presence of S5 (tone 1) the 
conditional discrimination outlined above remains true. However, in the presence 
of S6 (tone 2), these contingencies are reversed so that in the presence of the green 
hue, pressing the button with a circle now produces a coin while in the presence of 
the red hue pressing the button with a square produces a coin. Sidman states that as 
the original conditional discrimination is now under the conditional control of the 
tones; this five-term contingency is the unit of second-order conditional control.
This unit o f analysis may help describe how the equivalence relations described by 
the four-term unit function in a natural setting. In the four-term unit the 
equivalence relations established would be “green with square” and “red with 
circle”. The five term unit accounts for contextual control of these relations, in that 
in the context of tone 1, these stated relations hold true, but in the context of tone 2 
the equivalence relations would be “green with circle” and “red with square”. 
Therefore the context of tones 1 and 2 shifts elements of the environment from 
class to class and the stimuli can be members of several different equivalence 
classes, the class operating at any time being determined by context.
However, one problem with this account of five-term contingencies is describing 
the relation between the second-order conditional stimuli (the tone) and the other 
stimuli. For instance, it might be possible for tone 1 to become an element of two
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tluee-member equivalence classes - tone 1, green and square and tone 1, red and 
circle. As tone 1 would be common to both classes, this would mean that the green 
and red hues and the square and circle forms would also be equivalent to each 
other, thus wiping out both conditional and discriminative control of the relations. 
Tone 2 would also be a member o f two three-member classes, causing these classes 
to collapse into one large class. By this both tones would now be equivalent 
members of one large class, thus destroying the entire five-term contingency.
However, if the equivalence classes do not increase in size from two to three 
members in this way, then the problem does not arise. If the second order 
conditional stimuli, the tones, do not enter into equivalence relations with the other 
stimuli but instead maintain their conditional relations, then the contextual control 
over the units can be maintained without destroying the relations in the units. Thus 
Sidman seems to be suggesting that equivalence relations are established at the 
level of the four-term contingency, while the five term contingency exerts 
contextual control over three relations, selecting those which are appropriate in any 
given context.
Sidman (1990)
While this paper by Sidman (1986) considered the behavioural level at which 
equivalence relations emerged, a later paper, Sidman (1990) considered in more 
detail exactly how equivalence comes about. The two, three, and four term units of 
analysis described the stimulus functions of reinforcement, discrimination, 
conditioned reinforcement and conditional discrimination which represent 
“unanalysable primitives”; they cannot be derived from something more basic. 
Sidman suggested that equivalence might represent another of these unanalysable 
primitives; that it is a fundamental stimulus function.
One justification for this statement was that, as described previously, Sidman 
suggested that equivalence appears at the level of the four-term contingency. The 
fom-term unit is not just a larger three-term relation, instead the two, three and 
four-term relations are all fimdamentally different and as the unanalysable 
functions or reinforcement etc. appear at different levels of analysis, the function of 
equivalence, appearing at the four-term level is not derivable from smaller 
contingencies but represents an unanalysable primitive in itself.
A second justification for Sidman’s suggestion that equivalence represents a 
fundamental stimulus function was that he did not believe there was any evidence
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to show that equivalence could be derived from anything more basic. Logic might 
seem a reasonable basis for the derivation of equivalence relations, but Sidman 
showed that there was no logical necessity for relations between stimuli to 
demonstrate properties of reflexivity, symmetry or transitivity. “Logic does not 
demand that conditional relations be equivalence relations” (p. 105).
Similarly, Sidman was not convinced that verbal behaviour could be shown to be 
the cause of equivalence. He agreed that common naming was likely to facilitate 
equivalence class development but this does not mean that naming is necessary for 
the development of equivalence relations. There may also be a problem when a 
subject gives the same name to each member of an equivalence class when that 
subject has not explicitly been taught to do so. In this case Sidman suggests that 
equivalence classes may have produced the common names rather than naming 
producing equivalence classes. Another possibility was that equivalence might be a 
result of verbal rules, but again Sidman suggested it was not clear whether the 
verbal mle or the equivalence relation came first.
Sidman suggested that possibly the most effective way to disprove the suggestion 
that equivalence was a result of verbal behaviour was an unequivocal 
demonstration of stimulus equivalence with non-human subjects. At that time 
(1990) there had been no such demonstration of equivalence relations, but if 
Schusterman and Kastak’s subsequent experiment with a sea-lion subject is 
accepted as a demonstration of equivalence, then this would suggest that Sidman’s 
assertion that equivalence was not a product of verbal rules was correct.
Sidman (19941
In his 1994 book reviewing research on equivalence Sidman gave a comprehensive 
re-appraisal of his earlier suggestions that equivalence emerged at the level of the 
four-term unit and that equivalence could be viewed as a basic stimulus function. 
In this reappraisal he stated that he now felt that defining equivalence at the level 
of the four-term contingency was actually too restrictive and that in fact there was 
good evidence that three-term contingencies, simple rather than conditional 
discriminations, could in fact establish the pre-requisites for equivalence relations. 
However while his beliefs about equivalence and the four-term unit had changed 
somewhat, he also stated that he now believed even more strongly that equivalence 
was a basic stimulus function that could not be derived from anything more 
fundamental.
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Some developments in equivalence research persuaded Sidman that an expanded 
notion of the relations between equivalence and contingency defined units might be 
more appropriate than the previous formulation of equivalence at the level of the 
fom-term contingency. One such discovery was the finding that an equivalence 
relation could include not only the unit’s conditional (sample) and discriminative 
(comparison) stimuli but also the reinforcing stimulus (p. 368). This was shown 
using outcome-specific reinforcement contingencies. In this paradigm the defined 
response produces different reinforcers. For instance, in the presence of sample 
A 1, touching comparison B l will produce reinforcer SRI, while in the presence of 
sample A2, touching comparison B2 produces reinforcer SR2. Now on test trials 
the stimuli that had previously served to reinforce could also fimction as either 
samples or comparisons. In tests of this sort where SRI or SR2 function as samples 
and the comparisons are A l and A2 or B l and B2, it has been found that subjects 
will match SRI to A l and B l and SR2 to A2 and B2, thus suggesting that 
equivalence class membership also extends to the reinforcers (p.369)
With this evidence that equivalence relations include three of the four elements in 
the four-term contingency, the next question was whether equivalence relations 
also include the fourth element, the response. However, as Sidman has pointed out, 
it is likely to be very difficult to isolate the response for testing.
Sidman suggested a possible experiment that might evaluate if the response is 
involved in equivalence relations. This involves training another conditional 
discrimination (AB), but this time there is only one reinforcer SRI but two defined 
responses to the comparison stimuli R l and R2 (see Fig. 5:5, top section). These 
responses are two distinct patterns o f pressing. When the sample stimuli A l or A2 
are presented a single touch (R3) produces the comparison stimuli B l and B2. hi 
the presence of sample A l the subject has to press comparison B l using response 
R l to produce a remforcer, and in the presence of sample A2 the subject must 
touch comparison B2 using response R2 to produce the reinforcer. No 
reinforcement is delivered if the subject selects the wrong comparison or produces 
the wrong response. The subject is then taught a second conditional discrimination 
(BC) in the same way. This time the B stimuli function as samples, and so require 
only a single touch (R3) to produce the comparison stimuli C l and C2. Correct 
responding to the comparison stimuli requires response R l to C l and response R2 
to C2 (see Fig. 5:5, middle section).
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Having trained relations AB and BC, CA constitutes the test for equivalence. In 
this case the C stimuli function as samples requiring a single touch R3 to produce 
the comparison stimuli. The question then is whether the subject will select 
stimulus A l using response R l and stimulus A2 using response R2. If the subject 
does respond to the stimuli in this way it would suggest that R l belonged to the 
AIBICI class and R2 to the A2B2C2 class (see Fig.5:5, bottom section).
However, as Sidman pointed out, a more decisive test for the inclusion of 
responses in equivalence classes would be one where the responses themselves 
could function as samples. It was the difficulty of establishing a test like this that 
suggested there might be a closer connection between reinforcement and 
equivalence than Sidman had previously considered.
One way in which it might be possible to test the relation of the response to the 
equivalence classes might be to establish the AB conditional discrimination with 
two different responses as just described. Then the subject might be taught a 
simple discrimination - two three-term relations. In this case stimulus D1 is present 
on some trials and stimulus D2 on others. When D1 is present, response R l 
produces the reinforcer and when D2 is present R2 produces the reinforcer. The 
aim of this three-term relation is to establish a situation where R l and R2 will 
occur reliably and thus can function as samples. Having trained the AB relation, if 
R l and R2 have become members of the A lB l  and A2B2 classes, then on trials 
where R l is sample the subject should select A l and where R2 is sample, the 
subject should select A2. Thus, one test trial might involve presentation of D l, 
which should occasion response R l which would produce A l and A2 as 
comparison stimuli. If R l has become related by equivalence to A l and B l the 
subject should then select stimulus A l using response R l. A similar pattern of 
responding would be expected with D2, R2 and A2.
However, the problem with this experiment is being sure that selecting comparison 
A l or A2 is actually under the control of responses R l or R2 rather than stimuli D l 
or D2, even though the D and A stimuli have never been presented together before. 
The reason for this uncertainty stems from Sidman’s re-evaluation of the 
relationship between equivalence relations and the units of analysis. This was 
because several experiments had suggested that three-term contingencies could in 
fact establish the pre-requisites for equivalence relations (discussed in more detail 
later). This has implications for the experiment described above as it suggests that
Chapter 5: The Basis o f Stimulus Equivalence 125
“when two or more discrhninative stimuli control the same two-term 
contingencies (the same defined response and reinforcer) those stimuli can be 
shown to be related by equivalence” (p.375)
In the experiment described, there are two two-term contingencies - in one 
response R l produces the reinforcer SRI and in the other response R2 produces the 
same reinforcer. The baseline also contains four defined three-term contingencies 
with the discriminative stimuli B l, B2, D l and D2. Each two-term contingency is 
controlled by two discriminative stimuli, both B l and D l independently control 
R l, and B2 and D2 independently control R2. Thus according to the definition 
above, B l and D l will be related by equivalence, as will B2 and D2. The AB 
conditional discrimination has already established equivalence relations between 
the stimuli A l and B l and between A2 and B2. Thus, if the A lB l  and B lD l  pairs 
are members of the same equivalence relation then A l and D l must also be related 
by equivalence, and if A2B2 and B2D2 are members of another equivalence 
relation, die A2 and D2 stimuli will again be related by equivalence. In this case, 
when shown the D stimuli, it would be possible for the subject to select the 
appropriate A stimulus without the differential responses R l and R2. Therefore 
given the equivalence test, the D stimuli may be functioning as samples rather that 
the responses R l and R2. Thus it may not be possible to arrange an equivalence 
test where the differential responses function as the conditional (sample) stimuli as 
the responses will always be under the control of other stimuli.
Given this difficulty, Sidman then suggested the problem could then be viewed in a 
different way. As the responses cannot be separated from their controlling stimuli, 
then why not include both in the equivalence relation. The same reasoning can then 
be applied to the three-term relation;
“If a defined response that is controlled by a conditional stimulus can be 
included in the equivalence relation, why not also the defined response that is 
controlled by a discriminative stimulus ?” (p. 378)
This is a reasonable proposition as, although the derived responses R l and R2 
cannot satisfactorily be separated from the stimuli, as Sidman points out, the only 
way the D stimuli could become equivalent to the A stimuli was via the different 
responses. So although it is difficult to isolate the responses, “only by including 
those responses as elements of the event pairs that define the equivalence relation 
could we predict the emergent DA conditional discriminations” (p.380).
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One useful consequence of including differential responses as part of the 
equivalence relation is that it removes the need for response mediation theories of 
equivalence. If the defined relations are included as elements o f the event pairs 
comprising an equivalence relation then the equivalence relations will include all 
the directly taught and emergent stimulus-stimulus, stimulus-response, response- 
stimulus and response-response pairs. Therefore, Sidman suggests, to predict the 
emergent relations all that is needed is the behavioural definition of equivalence.
Sidman also suggests that if responses are included in equivalence relations, then in 
the context of an equivalence relation there is no need for a distinction between 
stimuli and responses. Rather, an equivalence relation should be seen as being 
made up of pairs o f events “with no restriction on the nature of the events that 
make up the pairs” (p. 384)
Analysis of the elements that make the equivalence relation in this way led Sidman 
to re-ajffirm his earlier suggestion that equivalence is a basic stimulus function. 
Wliile there is some evidence that the pre-requisites for equivalence relations may 
be established at the level of the tliree-term unit, evaluation of the defining 
properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity can only be done at the level of 
the four-term contingency. However, this is not particularly a problem as 
investigation at this level has shown just how useful the defining properties of 
equivalence are at predicting the development of equivalence relations. The 
experiments on responses and reinforcers have shown that all four elements of the 
four-term analytic must be included in the equivalence relation. The question then 
is, where does the unit come from; what is the basis of stimulus equivalence? 
Sidman believes that the establishment of equivalence relations is one of the 
outcomes of reinforcement contingencies. While reinforcement contingencies 
generate equivalence relations, reinforcement itself is a product of survival 
contingencies, thus supporting Sidman’s earlier proposal that we form equivalence 
relations because we are “built that way”. Thus, if equivalence is an outcome of 
reinforcement this confirms Sidman’s original (1990) suggestion that equivalence 
is a primitive function.
While the evidence above documents how Sidman's belief that equivalence was a 
basic stimulus function was strengthened by further analysis o f the behavioural 
units involved in equivalence relations, his other belief, that equivalence emerged 
only at the level of the four-term contingency, changed as a result o f further 
research. In his 1994 book on equivalence he stated that he now believed there was
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good evidence for the establishment of equivalence relations at the level of the 
three-term contingency. This requires considering behaviour at the level of simple 
rather than conditional discriminations.
As a result or re-evaluating research on equivalence relations and three-term 
contingencies Sidman (1994) published a retraction of conclusions in an earlier 
paper on this topic - Sidman, Wynne, Maguire and Barnes (1989). In that paper, 
Sidman et al argued that functional classes established by a series of simple 
discriminations (three-term contingencies) represented different behavioural 
processes to equivalence relations established by four-term conditional 
discriminations. Now however, Sidman believes that this conclusion is 
inappropriate and that, while the relations established in functional classes are 
defined and tested differently, they do imply equivalence relations in behaviour.
The issue of functional classes and equivalence relations arises mainly from 
consideration of the study by Vaughan (1988) investigating the possibility of 
equivalence relations with pigeon subjects (see chapter 3). The main point of 
theoretical debate centred on Vaughan's definition of equivalence. The behavioural 
definition of equivalence, proposed by Sidman and Tailby (1982), which requires 
the demonstration of the properties o f reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, was 
based on the mathematical formulation of equivalence. The demonstration of these 
properties requires the use of conditional discriminations (four-term 
contingencies). However, Vaughan pointed out that there is another way to view 
equivalence, also based on a mathematical definition, and that is as a "partition". 
Using a partition as the definition o f equivalence allows equivalence relations to be 
investigated using a series of simple discriminations (three-term contingencies) 
wliich then form "functional classes".
The principle of partition is that
"If R is an equivalence relation on a set S, then there exists a partition P of S 
such that [elements of the set] lie in the same class P if and only if aRb holds. 
Conversely, if  P is a partition of S, then the relation . . .  is an equivalence 
relation" (Gellert et al, 1977, p.324, cited in Sidman 1994, p.417) 
or as Sidman puts it "a partition implies an equivalence relation and an equivalence 
relation implies apaitition" (Sidman, 1994, p.417).
Initially Sidman was not convinced that a partition implies equivalence in the same 
way that equivalence is shown in a conditional discrimination paradigm. However,
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in his subsequent re-evaluation he states that not only does a partition definition of 
equivalence make intuitive sense, but also that a correspondence between the two 
proposed definitions of equivalence actually strengthens the behavioural definition 
of equivalence. The mathematical definition of an equivalence relation and a 
partition do integrate, so if the behavioural definitions did not integrate in the same 
way then the utility of the definitions would be weakened; what would be one 
process in mathematics would have to be dealt with separately behaviourally.
The partition definition of equivalence makes sense in that partition is another way 
of viewing classification. If a group of stimuli is partitioned/classified off from 
other stimuli, then there must be some basis for that separation. Therefore, the 
elements of the group will be equivalent with respect to the basis on which they 
were separated. For instance, if  a group of objects of differing shapes and sizes 
were classified according to colour, one group could be seen as equivalent because 
they were all red, another group would be equivalent on the basis of being green 
etc. Alternatively stimuli could be classified on the basis of their function. This is 
what happened in the study by Vaughan (1988). The stimuli were arbitrarily 
assigned to two groups. These groups formed functional classes depending on 
whether they did or did not produce reinforcement at any given time.
Sidman 11989)
The experiment by Sidman et al (1989) was based on the procedure developed by 
Vaughan (1988) which tested equivalence using a partition. In considering whether 
a partition (which established functional classes) was behaviourally the same as an 
equivalence relation (based on the defining properties of equivalence), one 
question was whether members of equivalence classes would also form functional 
classes. Several studies had already shown that this was true (e.g. Lazar 1977,
Lazar and Kotlarchyk 1986, Mackay 1985, Wulfert and Hayes 1988). What Sidman 
et al were asking in this experiment was whether members of a functional class 
would show equivalence relations based on the properties of reflexivity, symmetry 
and transitivity.
This experiment was carried out with three subjects, one normally able adult, DJK, 
and two teenagers who were students at the New England Centre for Autism, PJV 
and JDB. Subject DJK was taught using upper and lower case Greek letters as 
stimuli. Subjects PJV and JDB were taught using numerals as stimuli. Neither of 
these subjects were familiar with the concepts "odd" or "even" and so the stimuli 
were assigned to classes on this basis. One test of the procedure then would be to
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see if the subjects successfully assigned the stimuli used in training and testing to 
the appropriate classes at the end of the experiment.
The basic procedure was the same for all subjects. First, two functional classes 
were established using a series of simple discriminations. Two stimuli were 
presented to the subject; selection of one provided reinforcement (S+) and the other 
did not (S-). A series of simple discriminations were trained in this way to produce 
two flmctional classes; S+ and S-. When performance was stable on this task, the 
contingencies were reversed so that the class which had previously been associated 
with reinforcement, S+, now became S-, while the class which had functioned as S- 
now became S+. These reversals were continued until the subject made an error 
just at the beginning of each reversal. The subjects were then tested to see if  these 
functional classes had also established conditional relations among the stimuli 
within each class; given a stimulus from one class as a sample, the question was 
whether the subject would reliably match that sample with a comparison stimulus 
fr om the same class rather than selecting the comparison stimulus from the other 
class.
If these conditional relations between functional class members were demonstrated, 
the subjects were taught conditional relations between some of the functional class 
members and some new stimuli. The subjects were then tested to see if conditional 
relations had emerged between the new stimuli and the other members of the 
functional classes. If these relations had emerged it would suggest the 
establishment of equivalence relations. In the final test, the simple discrimination 
procedure was used again. This time the new stimuli were included in the stimulus 
pairs to see if they had become members of the same functional classes as the 
stimuli to which they had been shown to be related by equivalence.
All subjects demonstrated the emergence of functional classes following functional 
discrimination training. After each reversal of contingencies the subjects switched 
their selections to stimuli from the new S+ class, with only an error on the first 
trial. This demonstrated that the subjects had formed functional classes as reversing 
the contingencies for one pair of stimuli was sufficient to change responding to all 
the other pairs.
The next test was to see if the subjects would display conditional relations between 
the stimuli within each functional class. Before it was possible to test this the 
subject were given a baseline of reinforced identity-matching trials to ensure that
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they would respond to the probe trials as conditional rather than simple 
discriminations. In the conditional discrimination probes only two stimuli from 
each class were used, leaving the others free for later equivalence tests. All subjects 
demonstrated appropriate conditional discriminations among the stimuli, althougli 
with varying degrees of ease.
However, this is not a definitive test for equivalence as the stimuli had already 
been established as members of the same functional class; therefore appropriate 
matching relations were likely to be demonstrated on these tests. In the next test 
then, equivalence relations were tested by establishing conditional relations where 
the samples were new stimuli and the comparisons were members of the 
established functional classes. The subjects were then tested for the emergence of 
equivalence relations where the stimuli were different members of the functional 
classes and the comparisons were the new stimuli. Two of the subjects, DJK and 
PJV, clearly demonstrated equivalence relations, responding at a high level of 
accuracy on probe trials. The third subject, JDB, did not demonstrate these 
equivalence relations. On several occasions performance on he baseline relations 
deteriorated and performance on the probe trials was at chance level. Following 
retraining and verbal instructions the baseline was reinstated and performance 
remained stable. However, even when baseline performance was stable, 
performance on the probe trials was around chance level, so his failure to 
demonstrate equivalence relations did not appear to be due to a breakdown of the 
functional classes. It would seem that although JDB formed and maintained the 
functional classes, and leamed conditional relations between some class members 
and new stimuli, the new stimuli did not enter the established classes and 
equivalence relations could not be demonstrated. One explanation suggested for 
this was a breakdown of conditional relations between the members of the 
functional classes. Subject JDB was retested for conditional relations between the 
stimuli within each stimulus class, relations which he had previously demonstrated. 
However, when retested, JDB failed to demonstrate appropriate conditional 
discrimination relations.
The two subjects who had demonstrated appropriate equivalence relations were 
then given a slightly more stringent test for equivalence. In this test further new 
stimuli were related to the new stimuli from the previous equivalence test (former 
new stimuli). The subjects were given probes assessing relations between original 
functional class members and the most recently introduced stimuli. This test was 
more stringent as it meant that the relations between the former new stimuli and the
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original class members, and between the new stimuli and the former new stimuli 
must all have been equivalence relations to allow accurate performance on probes 
between the newest stimuli and the original class members. Both subjects DJK and 
PJV demonstrated appropriate equivalence relations.
The final test assessed whether the new stimuli which had been related to the 
original functional class members by conditional discriminations had actually 
become members of the functional classes. The new stimuli were thus included in 
simple discrimination tests to see if  subjects would respond to them in the same 
way they responded to the stimuli that comprised the original functional classes.
All responses consistent with the experimentally defined contingencies were 
reinforced. Both subjects responded appropriately on these trials, indicating that the 
new stimuli had indeed become members of the functional classes. Therefore, the 
conditional discrimination training had transferred functional class membership to 
the new stimuli.
In the conclusions of this paper, Sidman et al stated that the failure o f subject JDB 
to demonstrate equivalence relations showed that partitioning a set of stimuli into 
functional classes is not the same behavioural process as equivalence relations 
established by conditional discriminations. They felt that it was not surprising that 
they did not represent the same process as the behavioural definitions and 
behavioural tests differed so substantially. However, in the light of further research, 
Sidman (1994) retracted these conclusions. Sidman now believed that JDB's failure 
to demonstrate equivalence was a result of testing without reinforcement. This was 
not immediately obvious in that, even when performance on the baseline relations 
was stable, JDB still failed to demonstrate equivalence. It now seems likely that on 
the baseline relations, responding in the expected manner probably provided 
reinforcement in itself but this reinforcement was not available on test items. 
Without any indication of whether he was meeting expectations or not, JDB 
showed the usual effects of extinction. If this is accepted, the other two subjects' 
data provides support for the notion that the behavioural definition of a partition 
does in fact imply an equivalence class.
As the partition and the equivalence relation do not appear to be behaviourally 
distinct, the fact that their definitions and tests are so different becomes even more 
significant. As Sidman (1994) puts it, "a seemingly unlikely empirical confirmation 
of a relation marks a greater scientific advance than does a highly predictable 
confirmation" (p.421). As described previously, in mathematics a partition implies
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an equivalence relation and an equivalence relation implies a partition. Now, 
Sidman believes that behaviourally a partition and an equivalence relation are parts 
o f the same process, and this congruence between the behavioural and 
mathematical definitions of equivalence demonstrates the utility of the original 
mathematically derived definition of equivalence.
The evidence that the equivalence relation must include reinforcers and defined 
responses, and that fimctional classes establish equivalence relations and vice 
versa, led Sidman (1994) to conclude that:
"(a) Two or more discriminative stimuli that control the same two-term 
contingency will be related by equivalence; (b) discriminative stimuli that 
control different responses, even though correlated with the same reinforcer will 
partition themselves into different equivalence classes; (c) discriminative 
stimuli that are correlated with different reinforcers, even though controlling the 
same response, will partition themselves into different equivalence classes; and 
(d) equivalence relations can emerge fi*om these thiee-term units" (p.416)
There seems to be good evidence then that equivalence relations can, and do, 
emerge as a result o f simple discriminations; at the level o f the three-term 
contingency. One problem with this suggestion though, is that much of the research 
demonstrating this has included four-term contingencies in the training and test 
paradigms. While the results from these experiments can be predicted and 
accounted for at the level of the three term unit, it would still be preferable to have 
a demonstration of equivalence based solely on three-term units. Sidman (1994) 
reports that experiments by Kawashima (1993) and Manabe and Kawashima 
(1993) provide good evidence that experiments of this sort will indeed demonstrate 
equivalence based on three-term contingencies. However, these results have yet to 
be published in full and thus are not available for general scrutiny. Sidman himself 
has also described an experiment based solely on three-term units that might 
conclusively demonstrate equivalence relations. However this experiment has not 
yet been cairied out, although results from previous studies strongly suggest that it 
would indeed result in equivalence relations.
Sidman's theory of equivalence then is that equivalence is a basic stimulus 
function. It cannot be derived from any more basic functions, although it can be 
described at the level of the thi ee-term unit of analysis, and is a result of 
reinforcement.
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The Relational Frame Account of Equivalence
A third explanation for the emergence of equivalence relations has been put 
forward by Steven Hayes (1991). Hayes accounts for equivalence in terms of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding, or relational frames.
Haves (1991)
Hayes (1991) stated that there were several good reasons for interest in the 
phenomenon of stimulus equivalence. One reason is that there seems to be a 
correspondence between stimulus equivalence and various language phenomena. 
Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and Home and Lowe (in press) have argued that 
language results in equivalence, while Sidman (1990, 1992, 1994) suggests that 
equivalence may underlie language abilities.
A second reason for interest in equivalence is that Hayes suggests that equivalence 
is unexpected; "it would not be readily predicted from a three-term contingency 
formulation" (p.20). For instance, in a conditional discrimination the subject learns 
that there is a greater probability of reinforcement for selecting stimulus B l in the 
presence of A l than in the presence of A2. However, as Hayes points out, this does 
not necessitate there being a greater probability of reinforcement for selecting A l 
in the presence of B l than in it's absence. "In the natural environment the 
contingencies supporting conditional discriminations raiely seem to be 
symmetrically arranged in this sense" (p.20). The example Hayes gives is that, in 
the presence of a lion, a primate may learn to approach the cover of a thicket rather 
than open savannah. However, the reversal of this relation "Given thicket, 
approach lion" would not have adaptive value.
While symmetrical contingencies may not occur frequently in nature, human 
subjects do readily display equivalence relations when tested, and stimulus 
equivalence requires the demonstration of symmetry. Hayes suggests that this 
occurs because stimulus equivalence is just one example of a specific type of 
behaviour-environment interaction, arbitrarily applicable relational respondmg, and 
is the result of "prolonged exposure to the contingencies o f reinforcement 
operating in the verbal community" (Barnes, 1994, p.95).
Arbitrarily applicable relations are relations which are not based on formal 
characteristics of the stimuli, but rather on relations based on additional contextual 
cues or social convention. Relations which are based on formal characteristics of
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the stimuli (non-arbitrary relations) are relations such as "bigger than", "darker 
than" etc. Arbitrarily applicable relations are not based on these formal 
characteristics of the stimuli but are instead specified by the context. One example 
of an arbitrarily applicable relation is the relation between an object and it's name. 
The name "ball" is not related to a ball by virtue of the ball's physical form but 
rather by the conventions o f the verbal community.
Just as Sidman and Tailby's (1982) definition of stimulus equivalence required the 
demonstration of the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, Hayes too 
describes certain types of stimulus relation that will be shown in arbitrarily 
applicable relations. These relations are mutual entailment, combinatorial mutual 
entailment, and transfer of function. The definition of mutual entailment is that "a 
relation between two events mvolves responding to the one event in terms of the 
otlier and vice versa", (p.22). For instance, if  A is better than B, then B is worse 
tlian A. Symmetry would be one example of a relation of mutual entailment, where 
the relation is one of co-ordination or "sameness".
Combinatorial mutual entailment requires that if  there are relations between A and 
B, and between B and C, in a given context, the same sort of relation must be 
entailed between A and C. This relation is more than just a simple expansion of 
mutual entailment. "In mutual entailment the entailed aspect of the relation is 
always specified to the same degree as the specified aspect" (p.23). In other words, 
if  A is better than B, then B will be worse than A to the same degree. However, in 
combinatorial entailment, while the relations between A and B and between B and 
C must both be specified, these may not in themselves be sufficient to specify the 
relation between A and C. For instance, A may be faster than B, and B may be 
larger than C, but this does not specify the relation between A and C. However, a 
relation between A and C is entailed. Transitivity and equivalence relations are 
both special examples of combinatorial mutual entailment.
The third characteristic Hayes specifies is that of transfer of functions. Hayes' 
rationale for this characteristic is that "relations between stimulus events would be 
of little importance to psychologists if  the functions of these events could not in 
themselves be moderated by these relations" (p.23). For instance, relations might 
be established where A is smaller than B, and B is smaller than C. The properties 
of mutual entailment and combinatorial entailment specify the relations between A 
and C. Suppose then that stimulus A has a specific reinforcement function, relevant 
to the size o f the stimulus. Transfer of function would then predict that stimulus B
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and C would have ordinally more reinforcement value than stimulus A. Therefore a 
subject accustomed to being rewarded with stimulus A would be expected to work 
harder when promised a reward of stimulus C, despite not having direct experience 
of reward with that stimulus. Similarly, an aversive function may transfer to a new 
stimulus without the subject directly experiencing the aversive consequences.
Hayes suggests that relations o f arbitrarily applicable responding will display these 
properties, and that equivalence is just one example of these kinds of relations. To 
simplify discussion, Hayes has introduced the term "relational frame" to describe 
this kind of behaviour. The term "frame" is used to emphasise that this responding 
is not based on the specific stimuli involved; any kind of stimuli can be placed in 
the "frame". Instead, in the appropriate context arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding can be brought to bear on any set o f stimuli. Thus a relational frame can 
be defined as:
"(a) a form of responding that manifests the contextually controlled properties 
of mutual entailment, combinatorial entaihnent, and transfer of function, (b) is 
produced by a history of relational responding appropriate to the contextual cues 
involved, and (c) is not produced by explicitly trained nonrelational responding 
with regard to the specific stimuli involved, nor by their physical properties 
alone" (Barnes, 1994, p.99-100).
As stated before, stimulus equivalence can be seen as just one example of a 
relational frame or arbitrarily applicable relational responding. In this case the 
fr ame is one of co-ordination or "sameness". Other types of relational frame might 
be "opposition", "distinction" or "comparison". Because of the type of relation 
involved in these frames, different patterns of relations are established among the 
stimuli on which they act. For instance, if a relational frame acts on four stimuli. A, 
B, C and D, and the relations are known between A and B, A and C, and C and D, 
then it is possible to say what other relations are entailed between the stimuli, and 
in some cases, to specify the form of these relations, hi a frame of co-ordination A 
is the same as B and C, and C is the same as D. Therefore, A will be the same as 
D, and B and C will be the same as each other, and also the same as D. This 
describes a typical equivalence relation (see Fig.5:6). hi a frame of opposition, A is 
the opposite of B and the opposite of C, and C is the opposite of D. Mutual 
entailment will thus show that C and B are both the opposite of A, and D is the 
opposite of C. Combinatorial entailment shows that C and B must be the same 
(both are the opposite of A). A and D must be the same, as both are the opposite of 
B and C (see Fig.5:7). In both these frames, co-ordination and opposition, it is
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possible to specify the relation between the stimuli. This may not be possible in all 
relational frames. For example, two other relational frames might be "distinction" 
and "comparison". In a relation o f distinction the stated relations might be that A is 
different to C and different to D. While a relation is entailed between stimuli C and 
D it is not possible to specify this relationship; they might be the same as each 
other or different to each other. Similarly, in a frame of comparison, the stated 
relation might be that A is better than C and better than D. Again, although a 
relation is entailed between C and D, it is not possible to specify the value of C and 
D relative to each other,
Hayes also believes that relational classes can develop from a mixture of relational 
fr ames, and in this way entire relational classes can be related to other relational 
classes. "For example, if  one equivalence class is the opposite of another 
equivalence class, then each member of the first class is the opposite of all 
members of the second and vice versa" (p.35).
Steele and Haves (19911
Evidence for a relational control theory of responding comes from a study by 
Steele and Hayes (1991) where subjects (normally able teenagers) given an 
appropriate pre-training history responded on arbitrary matching to sample tasks in 
ways that appear to fit with frames of co-ordination, distinction and opposition. 
Unfamiliar visual forms were used as contextual cues for the subjects to relate 
stimuli according to relations of "sameness" (e.g. large square with a large square), 
"opposition" (e.g. large square with a small square), or "distinction" (e.g. square 
with a cross). The subjects then received conditional discrimination training, each 
discrimination being trained in the presence of one of the three contextual cues. For 
instance, the subject might be given the following training trials :
O A1 B l m
O A1 Cl Ç2
where O is the contextual cue for opposite, A1 is the sample and the B and C 
stimuli are the comparisons. The subjects were reinforced for choosing the 
underlined stimuli.
A test trial might then be:
O B2 Cl C2.
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If the subjects responded according to equivalence then they should select C2 as 
both C2 and B2 are associated with A l. Or, if responding was controlled by the O 
stimulus they should select C2 as selecting C2 had already been reinforced in the 
presence of the O stimulus. However, if  the subjects were responding according to 
a relational frame of opposition, they should select C l. This is because C2 and B2 
are both the opposite of A l, and therefore B2 and C2 are the same. Thus the 
subject should select Cl as the opposite of B2. This is what was found, providing 
evidence that the subjects were responding according to relational frame theory. 
Hayes (1991) sees this as evidence to support the proposition that stimulus 
equivalence is one example of a class of phenomena that can be derived based on 
relational fr ames. In the case of stimulus equivalence, responding is based on the 
frame of co-ordination.
Thus, relational frames are examples of arbitrarily applicable relational responding. 
This is responding which is not based on the form of the relatae but rather brought 
to bear buy other events, such as language or social convention.
Barnes 119941
A paper by Dermot Barnes (1994) reviewed Hayes' concept of relational frame, and 
considered some of the differences between this and Sidman's account of 
equivalence. Several of his comments are also applicable to the naming account of 
equivalence by Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and Horne and Lowe (in press).
Sidman views equivalence as a basic stimulus function which precedes language, 
although it requires some exposure to verbal contingencies before it can be 
measured procedurally. Relational frame sees equivalence and language as 
representing the same derived processes of arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding. A naming account sees equivalence as emerging as a result of verbal 
behaviour. Barnes has suggested that, at least between relational frame and 
Sidman's theory, these distinctions may effectively be unimportant. As both 
theories suggest some exposure to verbal contingencies is necessary before 
equivalence can be tested this distinction may be unimportant in terms of 
empirically examining the differences in the theories, a suggestion which would 
also seem applicable to the naming account of equivalence.
Another difference would seem to be that relational frame considers equivalence as 
one of a number of derived relations, while Sidman's account regards equivalence 
as the most important or fimdamental relation. However, again Barnes argues that
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the differences may be more apparent than real. While relational frame theory does 
not treat equivalence as unique it does regard it as possibly the most important 
relational fr ame as it is central to referential relations in natural language. Sidman 
also sees equivalence as important in the concept of reference. Barnes suggests 
then that:
"Both accounts consider equivalence (a) as one of a number of derived relations, 
(b) as the most important or frmdamental relation, and (c) to be critical for the 
development of referential relations in natural language". (Barnes, 1994, p. 103) 
Similarly, while Sidman's procedural definition of equivalence does not 
incorporate contextual control in the same way as Hayes' account, contextual 
control is fundamental to Sidman's account of equivalence.
Thus, Barnes shows that while there seem to be substantial conceptual differences 
between two of the accounts of equivalence, in several cases these differences are 
either not as substantial as they would seem, or difficult to test empirically. Barnes 
suggests that to differentiate between the accounts it is necessary to make a detailed 
examination of how each account would deal with certain anomalies found in 
equivalence testing. For instance, some studies have found superior equivalence 
performance following a multiple-sample single-comparison (many-to-one) 
training procedure than following a single-sample multiple-comparison (one-to- 
many) training procedure. Barnes suggests that relational frame theory may be 
better equipped to deal with this finding. Thus, the most profitable way of 
investigating the basis o f equivalence is not to compai e the theories on theoretical 
grounds, but rather to consider how well each theory copes with findings from 
ongoing equivalence research.
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Figure 5:1 The two-term (Reinforcement) contingency.
R = Response; C = Consequence.
From Sidman (1986)
R1 (PRESS) —^  Cl (COIN) 
R2 (OTHER) 01 (COIN)
Chapter 5: The Basis o f Stimulus Rgnivalence
Figure 5:2 The three-term (Discrimination) contingency.
S = Stimulus; R = Response; C = Consequence.
From Sidman (1986)
SI _ _
(square)
R1 (PRESS)
R2 (OTHER)
C l (COIN)
01 (COIN)
S2 
(circle)
R1 (PRESS)
R2 (OTHER)
01 (COIN)
01 (COIN)
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Figure 5:3 The four-term (Conditional Discrimination) contingency
S = Stimulus; R = Response; C = Consequence.
From Sidman (1986)
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Figure 5:4 A balanced four-terra (Conditional Discrimination) contingency.
S = Stimulus; R = Response; C = Consequence.
From Sidman (1986)
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Figure 5.5 A proposed test for the inclusion o f defined responses in the equivalence relation. 
From Sidman (1994)
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Figure 5:6 Archetypal Coordination Network 
From Hayes (1991)
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Figure 5:7 Archetypal Opposition Network 
From Hayes (1991)
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CHAPTER 6 
Experiment 1:
Investigation of the Role of Naming in Equivalence Performance
Investigations of performance on stimulus equivalence tasks has suggested that 
there may be some connection between language and equivalence. After all, one of 
the very first experiments into equivalence-like phenomena (before the formal 
definition of equivalence relations by Sidman and Tailby, 1982) was by Sidman 
(1971), which documented the emergence of 40 new untaught relations after a 
subject with learning disabilities was taught to match visual words and visual 
pictures to 20 dictated names. Even at this early stage in investigation into stimulus 
equivalence it seemed possible that the behaviour being observed might be similar 
to that in natural language acquisition.
While the defining feature of stimulus equivalence is the emergence of new 
untaught behaviours fi-om explicitly established relations, it has been noted 
repeatedly how closely these equivalence relations seem to correspond to language 
phenomena. The emergent relations between spoken or printed words and pictures 
or objects seems to relate to the natural learning of names for objects. Equivalence 
relations seem to closely match the relations implicated when we say that a symbol 
"stands for" an object or that a name "means" that object.
What is not clear is the exact nature of the relationship between stimulus 
equivalence and language. Sidman (1990; 1992; 1994) has proposed that 
equivalence is a basic stimulus function which cannot be derived from any more 
basic process. He suggests that language and verbal behaviour develop from the 
more basic equivalence relations. Other researchers (e.g. Dugdale and Lowe, 1990) 
have argued that in fact language underlies the development of stimulus 
equivalence and that the emergence of equivalence relations is a direct result of 
verbal behaviour. Most specifically, Dugdale and Lowe (1990) suggested that 
equivalence was a direct result of the establishment of bi-directional relations 
between stimuli and names.
One of the strongest sources of support for a verbal behaviour interpretation of 
equivalence has been the difficulty in demonstrating emergent equivalence 
relations with any non-human subject. Dugdale and Lowe had themselves tried to 
establish symmetrical responding with three chimpanzee subjects. All three
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chimpanzees had participated in an ape-language training programme, and had an 
extensive pre-history of training and testing on abstract relations. Despite this, the 
chimpanzees gave no indication of having derived symmetric BA responding as a 
result of being directly trained on an AB conditional discrimination. Other attempts 
to demonstrate equivalence relations with non-humans have shown a similar lack 
of success, although there is now some evidence that Schusterman and Kastak 
(1993) may have demonstrated equivalence with a sea-lion subject. However, the 
difficulty in demonstrating equivalence relations with any non-human subjects, 
compared to the frequency with which human subjects, even those with quite 
severe learning disabilities, display equivalence responding, has been seen as 
evidence for the importance of language in the formation of equivalence relations.
Another apparent source o f support for the importance of naming in equivalence 
has been the finding that subjects who initially fail to demonstrate equivalence 
relations will often demonstrate these relations after being taught to name the 
stimuli used in the baseline conditional discriminations, (e.g. Lowe and Beasty, 
1987; Dugdale and Lowe, 1990). However, several of these studies reported a 
correlation between language/naming and equivalence performance rather than 
demonstrating a causal relationship. One study which tried to examine the precise 
nature of the relationship between naming and equivalence performance was 
Eikeseth and Smith (1992). This study used a five-stage procedure to examine 
equivalence performance, with and without programmed naming, with four autistic 
children. In phase 1, the subjects were taught conditional discriminations without 
programmed naming. If the subject failed to demonstrate equivalence, in phase 2 
they were taught to name the stimuli while responding on the conditional 
discriminations, and tested once more for equivalence responding. In phase 3, the 
subjects were taught names for a new set of stimuli without establishing 
conditional relations between the stimuli. They were then tested for the 
development of conditional relations, and if necessary these relations were 
established before testing for equivalence. This assessed if naming alone was 
sufficient to establish equivalence responding. In phase 4, two new stimuli (without 
programmed naming) were related to the stimuli used in phase 3. The subjects were 
then tested to see if; (a) conditional relations would develop between the new 
unnamed stimuli and the named stimuli from phase 3, and (b) would conditional 
relations develop between the new unnamed stimuli. Phase 5 was the same as 
phase 1. Using a new set of stimuli conditional relations were trained, with no 
programmed naming, and the subjects were tested for the emergence of 
equivalence relations (see chapter 5 for a fuller description and discussion).
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One subject seemed to show a causal relation between naming and equivalence 
relations, consistently demonstrating equivalence relations when naming was 
programmed and failing to display equivalence when it was not. The other subjects’ 
performances were not as consistent in this respect, although they did appear to be 
more likely to display untrained conditional relations when naming was 
programmed compared to when it was not programmed. However, the results of 
this study were not conclusive and it is not clear whether naming causes 
equivalence as Dugdale and Lowe (among others) have suggested or whether 
equivalence results in naming as Sidman suggests.
The aim of this experiment is similar to that of Eikeseth & Smith (1992): to 
systematically investigate the role of naming in Stimulus Equivalence. This was to 
be done in two ways: (i) By measuring the amount of spontaneous naming 
behaviour shown, and (ii) If the subjects failed to demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence they were taught to name the stimuli and then retested for the 
emergence of stimulus equivalence.
If equivalence is a fundamental stimulus function as Sidman suggests, then 
subjects who show emergent stimulus equivalence relations need not necessarily 
display evidence of naming. If Dugdale and Lowe are correct, and the 
demonstration of equivalence requires naming, then subjects displaying stimulus 
equivalence should show good evidence of naming behaviour. Further, teaching 
subjects to name the stimuli should be sufficient to produce stimulus equivalence 
in subjects who have previously failed equivalence tests.
While this experiment has similarities to that by Eikeseth & Sm ith, there are 
certain unportant differences.
The subjects in the study by Eikeseth and Smith were high functioning autistic 
children. The authors suggested that as these subjects often display unusual 
learning characteristics there may be difficulties in generalising results from these 
subjects to a wider population. This study then used adults with learning 
disabilities as subjects. Adults with learning disabilities appear less likely to 
display emergent behaviours, such as stimulus equivalence, than normally able 
adults and therefore examination of their performance on tasks like these may give 
some idea of the processes underlying equivalence. Moreover, any effects on 
performance are likely to be due to experimental manipulation, rather than
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developmental factors as might be the case with normally developing young 
children.
Eikeseth and Smith had used a trial and error procedure to train the baseline 
conditional discriminations, but found that in the initial stages o f the study, 
hundreds of trials were required before the subjects mastered the discrimination. 
One subject required 1,546 trials to complete the AB and AC conditional 
discriminations in phase 1. Eikeseth and Smith had therefore suggested that a more 
efficient training procedure should be used in any subsequent studies. Research in 
transitive inference studies has shown that success on tests for transitive inference 
is in direct relation to retention of the relations trained (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). 
It is likely that stability of the training relations is equally important in stimulus 
equivalence. For this reason an errorless learning shaping procedure was used to 
train the baseline conditional discriminations in the present study. Ensuring 
stability of the training relations means that any failure to demonstrate stimulus 
equivalence is a genuine failure and not a result of incomplete training.
Method
Subjects
A total of seven adults with learning disabilities took part in a number of the 
experiments recorded in this thesis, several taking part in more than one 
experiment. Six of these subjects were recruited from a residential hostel in St. 
Andrews. Four of the subjects lived in the hostel itself, and two others lived semi- 
independently m a house attached to the hostel. Data was collected for these 
subjects, to try and get some idea of their cognitive and living abilities outside the 
experimental test situation. This data was collected fi'om a number of independent 
tests, such as the BURT word reading test and the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale, and fiom the care staff in the hostel. This data is summarised in Table 6:1.
The seventh subject, GT, had been recruited separately as he was already being 
tested on a number of independent clinical measures, and these had suggested that 
it might be interesting to examine GT's performance on a stimulus equivalence 
task. As a result GT was not tested on the same independent measures as the other 
subjects, but data is available on his performance on the Wechsler Adult 
hitellingence Scale (WAIS), and the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R;
J
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see Table 6:2). GT lived fairly independently in a house in a town near St.
Andrews. On the WAIS GT's verbal IQ was found to be 92, which falls in the 
normal range, while his performance IQ was lower - 74. On the WMS-R, GT 
scored in the bottom 10% of the population overall. On the paired associates task 
within the WMS-R, which may have particular relevance for equivalence relations, 
GT's verbal and visual scores were around chance level.
Independent Tests
The subjects were tested on the BURT Word Reading Test, the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) - short form, the British Abilities Scales (BAS) - 
matrices, and the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG). The BURT Word 
Reading Test was used to get some idea of whether the subjects were able to read. 
This might have been relevant as some of the stimuli were printed words that were 
assumed to be unfamiliar to the subjects. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
gives some idea of the subjects' ability to select the appropriate picture when given 
a dictated name. The sample words become increasingly difficult as testing 
continues. It was possible that this measure would be relevant to the subjects' 
naming abilities. The matrices test from the British abilities Scales was used to get 
some measure of the subjects' visual reasoning abilities. The Test for Reception of 
Gr ammar gives some measure of each subjects' language comprehension, assessing 
increasingly complex aspects of grammar. For instance, the first three blocks test 
comprehension of nouns, verbs and adjectives respectively., while later blocks test 
items such as negatives, "X but not Y", and "not only Z but also Y".
Assessment bv Care Staff 
The care staff gave an assessment of the amount of support each subject required in 
day to day living, rating each subject as high dependency, moderate dependency or 
low dependency. They also gave an indication of whether they felt the subject 
could read, could write, or could copy then own name, or whether they made a 
mark as a signature.
Subjects Taking Part in this Experiment 
Foui' adults took part in this experiment. There were subjects, JD, TD, NL (see 
Table 6:1), and subject, GT (see Table 6:2).
Stimuli
The stimuli used were eight Greek letters. These were used as it was unlikely that 
the subjects would be familiar with the stimuli, or would have any knowledge of
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the relations between the stimuli, prior to training. The upper-case and lower-case 
characters and printed names of each letter were used. This gave eight three- 
member stimulus classes (see Table 6:3). All 24 stimuli were used in naming tests 
given before and after training. Two classes of stimuli at a time were used for 
training and testing. The stimuli were presented on photographic cards, approx.
13cms X 9cms, covered with clear plastic. Each card represented one stimulus. As 
an errorless training procedure was used, six cards were prepared for each 
individual stimulus, at different levels of intensity. These were prepared 
photographically at different exposures so that each stimulus ranged fiom pale grey 
on white at the lowest intensity, to full black on white at full intensity.
Design
The study was carried out in two phases, each preceded and followed by a general 
naming test.
Phase 1
hi phase 1 the subjects were taught four conditional discriminations, A l-B l, A2- 
B2, A l-C l, A2-C2. They were then tested for the emergence of B-C and C-B 
relations which would be indicative of the formation of equivalence classes. This 
phase was designed to see if the subjects would display stimulus equivalence on 
the basis of the conditional discriminations trained alone, as no naming was 
programmed for this phase.
Phase 2
In phase 2, a new set of stimuli was used to teach another four conditional 
relations, A3-B3, A4-B4, A3-C3, A4-C4. This time the subjects were required to 
name the stimuli as they learned the conditional discriminations. The subjects were 
tlien tested on the B-C and C-B relations to see if naming facilitated the emergence 
of equivalence relations.
Procedure 
Pre and post training naming tests 
Before any training was given the subjects were tested for any evidence of 
spontaneous naming of the stimuli. The 24 (full intensity) stimulus cards (8 upper 
case, 8 lower case, 8 printed name) were presented one at a time to the subjects.
The subjects were asked to say if they thought that stimulus had a name or "should 
be called something". They were also permitted to say that they did not think any 
particular stimulus had a name, or if  they could not think of it. This naming test 
was repeated at the end of phase 1, and again at the end of phase 2 if  the subject 
took part in that phase. This was to see if the subject showed any consistent use of
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names from pre- to post- test or if  the subject was more likely to name the stimuli 
following training with or without naming. There were no "correct" or "incorrect" 
names for the stimuli. The test was to check if the subjects would spontaneously 
name the stimuli, and would they use these names consistently.
Training without naming 
An errorless learning shaping procedure was used to train the conditional 
discriminations, hi this procedure, one salient aspect of the test setting is enhanced 
and used to establish appropriate responding to the correct stimulus. The 
environment is then shaped back to the full test situation, hopefully while 
maintaining correct responding. (Aeschelman & Higgins, 1982; Jones & Cullen, 
1980; Luiselli & Donellon, 1980; Schilmoeller & Etzel, 1977). On each trial a 
sample stimulus was presented (e.g. A l), followed by two comparison stimuli (e.g. 
B l and B2). On each trial the sample and correct comparison stimuli (S+) appeared 
at full intensity black on white. The incorrect comparison (S-) initially appeared as 
pale grey on white. As correct responding to S+ was established, the incorrect 
comparison slowly darkened in colour until it too was at full intensity black on 
white. There were six different levels of intensity. Three consecutive correct 
responses were required at each level before the intensity was increased. An 
incorrect response at any level resulted in the intensity of the S- stimulus 
immediately being reduced by one level until performance was stable once more. 
Once both the correct and incorrect comparison stimuli were at full intensity six 
consecutive correct responses were required before the subject was said to have 
reached criterion on that discrimination.
On all trials the sample stimulus was placed in front of the subject and the subject 
was required to look at the stimulus and touch it. The two comparison stimuli were 
then presented side by side underneath the sample stimulus and the subject was 
asked to point to the stimulus they thought "went with" the sample stimulus. 
Following a correct selection the subject was told "Yes, that's right, well done". 
Following an incorrect selection the subject was told "No, that's wrong, it's this 
one" and the experimenter pointed to the correct comparison. The left/right 
position of the comparison stimuli varied randomly from trial to trial.
Initially the subjects were taught A I-B l and A2-B2 separately. Once the subject 
had reached criterion on both these tasks, they were combined to form the A-B 
mix. In this task the sample stimulus switched between A l and A2 in a pseudo­
random sequence, so that each stimulus appeared five times in a block of ten trials.
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The position of the comparison stimuli varied randomly from trial to trial. All 
stimuli were presented at full intensity. No feedback was given on these trials. 
Criterion on this task was set at 90% correct responding. After the A-B relations 
were trained, the A l-C l and A2-C2 relations were trained in the same way and the 
A-C mix was tested.
Testing
The same procedure was used for testing the A-B and A-C mixes as for the B-C 
and C-B equivalence relations. On these trials the sample stimuli varied in a 
pseudo random sequence so that each relation was tested equally often. The 
left/right position of the comparison stimuli varied randomly from trial to trial. 
Criterion on all tests was set at 90% correct responding. Before a test trial block, 
and before the A-B and A-C maintenance tests were given, the subject was told 
"This time I'm not going to tell you if you're right or wrong, but you've done very 
well, so just do your best".
Training with naming 
If the subjects did not demonstrate emergent equivalence relations following 
training on phase 1 they progiessed to phase 2 of the study. In phase 2, the subjects 
learned four more conditional relations with two new sets of stimuli, A3-B3, A4- 
B4, A3-C3, A4-C4. The basic training procedure was the same as in phase 1 but 
this time, when responding on the training trials, the subjects were required to label 
the stimuli. Thus, when training relation A3-B3, the subjects would be shown 
stimulus A3 - upper case Theta. The subject had to point to the sample and label it 
"theta". This would then produce the comparison stimuli B3 - lower case Theta and 
B4 - lower case lambda. For a response to be termed correct the subject had to 
point to B3 and label it "theta". If the subject selected the wrong comparison, or 
gave the wrong label, the response was scored as incorrect. Following an incorrect 
response the subject was told "No, this one [B3] goes with this one [A3], this one 
[B3] is called theta".
A similar procedure was used to teach the A4-B4, A3-C3 and A4-C4 relations. On 
test trials the subjects were not required to label the stimuli when responding, but 
were not prevented from doing so. Responses on test trials were scored as correct 
or incorrect based on the stimulus the subject pointed to, without reference to any 
name they may or may not have produced during responding.
Results
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The results for each subject will be presented individually 
Subject JD 
Phase 1
Subject JD learned the four baseline conditional discriminations easily, reaching 
criterion on the first training session of each discrimination. Responding on these 
discriminations was between 95% and 100% correct(see Fig. 6:1). JD also 
achieved criterion on the A-B and A-C mixes the first time they were tested. JD 
responded at 100% correct on the B-C and C-B tests for equivalence. Thus JD 
clearly demonstrated emergent equivalence performance.
Naming
On the pre-training naming test JD gave names for 5/16 Greek letters. Three of 
these stimuli were subsequently used in training and testing. JD did not give names 
for any of the printed words. On the post-test naming check JD gave names for 
14/16 Greek letters, although she had not seen 12 of these letters since the previous 
naming test. She also spelled out the letters of two of the printed words. Neither of 
these words had been used in training.
Subject TD 
Phase 1
Subject TD learned the baseline A-B and A-C conditional discriminations easily, 
responding at between 96% and 100% correct (see Fig. 6:2). Although TD was 
tested twice on the A-B mix she failed to reach criterion, scoring 63% correct on 
the first test and 45% correct on the second. As it was not possible to test for 
equivalence without accurate performance on the A-B and A-C mixes, TD 
progressed to phase 2 of the study.
Phase 2
hi phase 2 TD was able to learn the new baseline discriminations easily while 
labelling the stimuli correctly, responding at 100% correct on these trials (see Fig. 
6:3). Initially TD's performance on the A-B mix was around chance level (67%; 
40%). However when the A-C mix was tested, performance on this approached 
criterion (83%). The A-B mix was retested and performance on this eventually also 
approached criterion (50%, 88%). TD was then tested on the C-B equivalence test 
and demonstrated emergent equivalence relations, responding at 100% correct. TD 
terminated the test session immediately after the C-B test and so the B-C relations 
were not tested.
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Naming
In the pre-training naming test TD produced names for 6/16 of the letters, all fol­
lower case letters. She also tried to pronounce 5/8 names - e.g. "oba" for omega, 
"philip" for phi. Immediately after equivalence testing TD terminated the test 
session and it was not possible to give the post-test naming check.
Subject NL 
Phase 1
Subject NL seemed to have more difficulty than the other subjects in learning the 
conditional discriminations. Her performance on the A-B relations was good, 
reaching criterion on both A l-B l and A2-B2 on the first attempt (see Fig. 6:4). 
However when the A-B mix was tested, performance was at chance level. 
Performance on the A-C discriminations was poor. NL reached criterion on the 
first presentation of A l-C l, but subsequently failed to reach criterion on A2-C2. 
Performance was tested on several occasions and this pattern was repeated; 
accurate performance was shown on A l-B l, A2-B2 and A l-C l training trials, but 
NL never reached criterion at a level higher than stage 3 out of 6 of the errorless 
training procedure on A2-C2.
The A-C discrimination required the subjects to match an upper case Greek letter- 
sample to the printed name of that letter. As NL could not read it was possible she 
found it difficult to discriminate between the printed name comparisons, in this 
case sigma and omega. This seemed to be supported by her accurate performance 
on the A-B training trials. The original Cl and C2 printed word stimuli were 
therefore replaced with two different lower case Greek letters to form new A-C 
relations. NL reached criterion on both these A-C relations the first time they were 
presented (see Fig. 6:5). However NL never reached criterion on the A-B or A-C 
mixes. Performance on these relations remained at around chance level despite the 
fact that NL now had an extensive history of training on the A-B relations.
Rather than immediately progressing to phase 2 of the study, NL received testing 
on two of the components of stimulus equivalence; reflexivity and symmetry. This 
was to see if the conditional discrimination training had established any of the pre­
requisites for equivalence. All the stimuli were tested for reflexivity and the B l- 
A l, B2-A2, C l-A l, C2-A2 symmetrical counterparts of the training relations.
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Performance on these component relations was very inconsistent (see Fig. 6:6). NL 
appeared to display 100% correct reflexive matching relations on A2-A2, B l-B l 
and C l-C l, but also displayed 0% correct performance on the reflexive relations 
A l-A l, B2-B2, C2-C2. This would suggest that NL was not in fact reliably 
demonstrating reflexive performance on any relations. On the symmetrical 
relations NL displayed apparently perfect symmetry on B2-A2, chance-level 
performance on B l-A l and C2-A2 and responded at 10% correct on C l-A l, 
suggesting that she had formed inappropriate symmetrical relations. As NL's 
performance on the necessary components of stimulus equivalence was so 
inconsistent it would be safe to assume that she had not formed equivalence classes 
as the result of conditional discrimination training.
The training and testing of these relations had taken place on several occasions 
over a period of about 6 months. NL withdrew from the study at this point and did 
not receive phase 2 training.
Naming
On the pre-training naming test NL produced "names" for 22 of the 24 stimuli. 
However, only two of these were names. For 11 of the letters and all 8 printed 
names NL gave the stimulus a number, often using the same number for several 
different stimuli. On the post-test naming check NL gave names for 6 of the 24 
stimuli. She did not use numbers to name any of the stimuli.
Subject GT 
Phase 1
Subject GT was recruited separately to the other three subjects and initially 
received a slightly different training procedure. Results from some independent 
clinical tests had suggested that GT might not require an errorless learning 
procedure and so initially the A-B and A-C discriminations were taught using a 
trial and error procedure. In this procedure all stimuli appeared at full intensity 
black on white and GT was required to make five consecutive correct responses to 
reach criterion on a conditional discrimination. GT learned the A-B discriminations 
rapidly and displayed 100% correct responding on the A-B mix (see Fig. 6:7). GT 
was slower to reach criterion on the A-C discriminations and, although he did 
eventually display criterion responding on the A-C mix this performance was not 
as reliable as that on the A-B mix (63%).
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It was decided to retrain the conditional discriminations with a new set of stimuli 
using the errorless learning procedure to try and ensure accurate baseline 
performance before GT was given equivalence testing. GT rapidly reached 
criterion on the A-B and A-C relations with the new stimuli (see Fig. 6:8). He 
passed the A-B mix the second time it was presented. However, once again 
performance on the A-C mix was close to chance level. GT was given the C-B 
equivalence test anyway, but as expected, performance was around chance level.
Phase 2
GT therefore progressed to phase 2 of the study, again using the errorless learning 
technique. GT rapidly learned the A-B and A-C conditional discriminations while 
naming the stimuli (see Fig 6:9). Initially performance on the A-B mix was at 
chance level, but when retested both the A-B and A-C mixes approached criterion. 
GT was given the B-C and C-B equivalence tests. The B-C relations were tested 
first and performance was poor (60% correct). The C-B relations were tested next 
and GT showed 100% correct performance.
Naming
GT was not given the pre-training naming test. On the post-training test GT gave a 
name or description to all 24 stimuli. He also tried to pronounce all the printed 
words, making errors on xi and phi.
Discussion
Of the four subjects tested, one subject (JD) displayed equivalence relations in 
phase 1 when no naming was programmed. The other three subjects failed to 
display equivalence in phase 1, and two of the three subjects (TD and GT) 
proceeded to phase 2 of the study where they were required to name the stimuli 
while learning the baseline conditional discriminations. Both these subjects 
subsequently displayed emergent equivalence relations. luterestingly GT did not 
display equivalence when tested first on the B-C relations but only on the 
subsequent test of the C-B relations. This would suggest that the equivalence 
relations emerged during the course o f equivalence testing and were not fully 
established prior to testing.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the naming test data are quite limited. JD 
appeared more likely to name the stimuli at the end of the testing procedure than at 
the beginning. However, none of the names given at the beginning of testing
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corresponded with any names given at the end. Dur ing both training and testing JD 
responded extremely quickly and was inclined to talk about events other than the 
test setting during testing. This would suggest that her attention was not focused on 
using a naming procedure to control her responding. In fact, none of the subjects 
were inclined to overtly name the stimuli except when explicitly required to do so 
by the experimenter.
For two subjects the naming procedure did appear to facilitate emergent 
equivalence performance. However, with subject GT this performance emerged 
during testing, and as the subjects were not required to name the stimuli during 
testing, it is not clear that the naming caused the emergence of equivalence 
relations. For both TD and GT it would be possible for the derived equivalence 
performances to be due to additional experience of the training and test procedures 
rather than due to the naming itself.
Subject NL, did not display equivalence relations in phase 1, despite an extensive 
history of training and testing. Interestingly, on the pre-training naming test, NL 
was inclined to try and give a name to every stimulus. In this case NL might have 
been inclined to spontaneously try and label the stimuli during discrimination 
training. However, she certainly did not do this overtly, and any covert naming 
does not appear to have facilitated accurate performance on tests of equivalence 
relations.
Sidman (1994) pointed out that, for a number of reasons, “sometimes . . .  we see 
subjects - even highly intelligent subjects - failing completely to show evidence of 
equivalence relations after having mastered a baseline of four-term units” (p.407). 
Given that the same procedure can produce both successes and failures it is as 
important to consider why it might work as well as why it might fail.
When considering the results shown, it is important to consider both what is 
necessary to explain the results, and also what is sufficient. JD clearly 
demonstrated equivalence relations, but there is no clear evidence that she named 
the stimuli, let alone that her performance was dependent on naming. Certainly JD 
seemed more likely to name the stimuli in the post-test naming procedure than in 
the pre-test procedure. However, this was as true for stimuli not used in the 
experiment as for those used. This might as easily indicate a greater willingness to 
spontaneously name the stimuli as to indicate any naming process operating to 
produce equivalence. Also, JD did not produce names for any of the printed words.
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If the stimuli used in training and testing had become equivalent tlirough naming it 
would seem reasonable for these names to apply to all the stimuli used and there is 
no evidence that they did so. This would suggest that the increase in naming 
behaviour was coincidental rather than an indication of a causal process. While 
nammg might provide an explanation of JD’s performance, there is no clear reason 
to conclude that it does.
For GT and TD, the introduction of naming to the procedure did seem to facilitate 
the development of equivalence relations. However, this alone is not sufficient to 
identify naming as a necessary process for the development of equivalence 
relations. None of the subjects were inclined to overtly name the stimuli except 
when required to do so. Certainly none of them ever produced consistent group 
names for the two classes of stimuli, either dui'ing equivalence training and testing 
or during the naming checks. Thus, while some naming behaviour may have 
occurred, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude it was necessary or even 
important. Similar results were obtained by Eikeseth and Smith (1992). One 
subject did demonstrate equivalence relations while naming was programmed and 
failed to display equivalence when it was not. The other subjects did not show as 
clear a pattern although, overall, they were more likely to demonstrate equivalence 
when naming was programmed than when it was not. However, this general 
pattern is not sufficient to demonstrate naming is necessary for equivalence 
compared to possibly facilitating equivalence in some way.
It is woifh noting that the evidence from the naming tests is inconclusive and it is 
possible that these tests would not constitute a sufficiently sensitive test in any 
case. Dugdale and Lowe (1990) suggested that pre- and post- test naming checks 
may not be sensitive to naming that the subjects naturally use when responding on 
equivalence tests. They suggested that experiments in their laboratory by Hird 
(1989) showed that tire verbalisations made spontaneously during testing were 
quite often different to the names given during subsequent naming tests. Often 
subjects would give no evidence of using any names when tested with a post-test 
naming check. However, as none of the subjects in the present study showed any 
inclination to overtly name the stimuli, or verbalise about the stimuli in any way 
during training and testing, it is not clear that recording spontaneous verbalisations 
would have been informative in this case. It is possible that a more sensitive 
measure of naming behaviour might provide more useful information.
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Lloyd Morgan’s view that “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of 
the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of 
one which stands lower in the psychological scale” (Lloyd Morgan , 1909, p.56) 
seems relevant to the interpretation of these results. Naming behaviour might 
explain the emergence of equivalence, but there is no clear reason to assume that it 
does, hi that case, is there another “lower” process which could explain the results?
Sidman has suggested that equivalence is a frmdamental stimulus function - a 
product of survival contingencies; reinforcement, hi that case, the demonstration of 
stimulus equivalence would be a product of reinforcement contingencies. Would 
this be sufficient to explain the results obtained?
The training in this experiment was aimed at producing stable performance on the 
A-B and A-C conditional discriminations. To achieve this the subjects received 
reinforcement for selecting, for example, B l in the presence of A l, and B2 in the 
presence of A2. When reinforcement is contingent on a particular behaviour it 
increases the likelihood that the subject will show that behaviour again. Therefore, 
reinforcing the subjects on the baseline training relations was sufficient to produce 
stable performance on these relations. According to Sidman, these reinforcement 
contingencies are sufficient to also produce equivalence relations as stimulus 
equivalence, like reinforcement, is a fundamental stimulus function. “We form 
equivalence relations because we are built that way” (Sidman, 1994, p.389) and 
“The capacity for demonstrating equivalence relations can be regarded as a most 
useful gift from our inheritance” (Sidman, 1994, p.391).
The reinforcement contingencies m training establish the conditional 
discriminations. Research has shown that functions acquired by one element of an 
analytic unit are transferred to other elements o f that unit. “Thus, if  a conditional 
relation is also an equivalence relation and the sample stimulus in the equivalence 
class joins a syntactic class . . .  the comparison that is related to that sample will 
also join the syntactic class” (Sidman, 1994, p.392). In this case the contingencies 
arranged in trainmg would be sufficient to create classes of equivalent stimuli.
If you accept Sidman’s proposal of equivalence as a fundamental stimulus 
frinction, then the reinforcement contingencies arranged during training would be 
sufficient to explain the demonstration of equivalence in this experiment. This 
would be true both for JD and for subjects GT and TD. There would be no need to 
postulate naming as the cause of equivalence.
Chapter 6: Experiment 1 154
Why then did naming appear to facilitate the emergence of equivalence for GT and 
TD, and why did NL fail to show equivalence? Sidman has suggested that while 
language may not be necessary for equivalence it may help facilitate it. For 
mstance, labelling the stimuli requires differential responding to the samples and 
the comparisons. In this way it supports the establishment of the samples as a 
discriminative stimulus. This enhances the process established by the 
reinforcement contingencies, hi this way language may facilitate equivalence class 
development.
This may also explain why NL did not show any of the components of equivalence. 
For instance, even though NL learned the individual A-B relations, she did not 
reach criterion on the A-B mix. This would suggest that training had not securely 
established the samples as discriminative stimuli. This would then make it 
impossible for her to derive discriminative stimulus classes. If naming had been 
programmed it might have facilitated this process.
It is possible then to explain the results obtained in this experiment in terms of 
equivalence as a fundamental stimulus function. Naming might help establish 
discriminative stimulus classes but this need not imply a causal role for naming in 
the development of equivalence relations.
However, it should be remembered that the naming tests may not have been 
sufficiently sensitive to identify all naming behaviour and so it would be unwise to 
dismiss the possible role of naming in equivalence relations.
One frirther subject, AS, undeiivent a similar training and test procedure. This 
subject also had learning disabilities but had received teaching in ancient Greek 
over a period of several years. This gave him an unusual history of familiarity with 
the stimuli used for training and testing, and might have had implications for his 
performance on the equivalence test. AS seemed most likely to be able to name the 
stimuli spontaneously, and might in fact already “know” the stimulus classes to be 
derived. Would he then demonstrate appropriate performance on the stimulus 
equivalence tasks? If so, would he show any evidence of naming the stimuli/ If AS 
did show appropriate performance on the initial equivalence test, he would then 
receive training and testing with a novel set of stimuli (not Greek letters). Would 
he be able to show appropriate equivalence performance with the new stimuli?
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Whatever his performance would he show any evidence of naming, and if so, 
would it show any signs of influencing his performance?
AS received an extensive programme of training on the conditional discriminations 
used in this experiment, and testmg for any evidence of naming behaviour. The 
details of this training and testing are contained in Appendix I.
It proved difficult to establish stable A-B performance. Even when stable 
performance was achieved on both the A-B and B-C relations, performance on 
both the equivalence test, and any components tested, was around chance level. 
AS’s performance on the naming tests was similarly erratic. He gave no evidence 
of naming the stimuli consistently and if  this happened covertly it did not appear to 
facilitate performance during training or testing.
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Table 6:1 Independent assessment of subjects with learning disabilities taking part in 
experiments 1 ,2 ,4  and 5
Subject AB JD TD NL MM DP
Age 35 70 34 60 49 39
Sex male female female female male male
staff Dependency moderate moderate low moderate low low
assessment read/
write
mark good
reader
good
reader
copy
/mark
good
reader
good
reader
BURT
word
reading test
0 0 43 0 31 0
independent BPVS(short form)
6 17 17 10 19 14
tests BAS
(matrices)
0 2 3 0 2 2
TROG 2 blocks 7 blocks 7 blocks 2 blocks 10 blocks 4 blocks
Table 6:2 Subject GT: Independent assessments of ability
WAIS WMS-R
Subject Age Sex Dependency Read/
write
Verbal
IQ
Performance
IQ
overall verbal
and
visual
score
G T 6 5 male Low
(assumed)
good
reader
9 2 7 4 bottom 10% of 
population
chance
level
Table 6:3 Training and Test Stimuli
Stimulus
class
A B C
1 F Y gamma
2 A Ô delta
3 0 e theta
4 A lambda
5 H 1 .................... xi
6 0 phi
7 Z (j sigma
8 Q CO omega
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Fig 6:1 Subject JD - Phase 1 results
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I
A l- A2- A-B A l- A2- A-C B-C C-B
A-B rclntioiis 
A C relations 
equivalence tests
C l
Fig 6:2 Subject TD - Phase 1 results
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Fig 6:3 Subject TD - Phase 2 results
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Fig. 6:4 Subject NL - Phase 1 results
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Fig 6:5 Subject NL - Phase 1 results, new equivalence class
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Fig 6:6 Subject N1 - Tests for components of equivalence
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Fig 6:7 Subject GT - Phase 1, trial and error training
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Fig 6:8 Subject GT - Phase 1, errorless learning procedure
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Fig 6:9 Subject GT - Phase 2 results
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CHAPTER?
Experiment 2:
Investigation of Transitive Inference Performance
Stimulus equivalence provides one example of the emergence of untaught 
relations. Another paradigm which also demonstrates the emergence of new 
relations on the basis of previously learned relations is transitive inference. In 
transitive inference, if two stimuli, A and B, are related to each other by relation r, 
ArB, and stimuli B and C are also related by relation r, BrC, then it is possible to 
infer that A and C must also be related by relation r, ArC. It seems likely that 
proficiency on relations such as this underlies the ability to make judgements about 
the relative size and value of a range of objects and events.
For quite some time, one of the important questions in research on transitive 
inference was determining at what age normally developing young children are 
able to display transitive inference skills. Research by Piaget and his co-workers 
had suggested that children were unable to form transitive inferences until the age 
of about seven, when they passed the stage of logical pre-operations. Other 
researchers however, queried this finding on the basis that if  this was true, younger 
children should not be able to understand the most elementary principles of 
measurement, which would have important educational implications. As Halford 
(1984) suggested, limitations on children's comprehension of transitivity have 
implications for virtually all their quantitative thinking.
One possibility was that children were in fact able to make inferences at ages 
younger than seven, but demonstration of these abilities was confounded by the 
means with which they were tested. Piaget and his co-workers had tended to use 
tasks such as three-term transitive syllogisms to examine transitive inference 
responding, e.g.:
1. Edith is fairer than Suzanne
2. Edith is darker than Lili
3. Wlio is the darkest, Edith, Suzanne, or Lili ?.
This task requires quite complicated sentence encoding in order to co-ordinate the 
pieces of information and make an inference. Piaget also used transitive inference 
tests m which the task itself was not linguistically based. However, on these tasks 
the subject was required to give a correct verbal explanation of their solution to the 
problem before they were classed as having made a transitive inference. Thus it
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was possible that children younger than seven could in fact make transitive 
inferences but this was not being demonstrated because of the manner in which 
these abilities were tested.
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) devised a new procedure for testing transitive 
inference ability, which did not require complicated linguistic abilities. This 
involved training a series of four overlapping pair discriminations and then testing 
performance on untrained non-adjacent pairs of stimuli. This involved presenting a 
series of coloured wooden rods of different lengths, in pairs, and asking the subject 
which rod was longer. The rods were presented embedded in a wooden block so 
that the subjects could not see which rod was longer, but instead had to remember 
the feedback they were given and integrate the premise information in order to 
make a transitive inference.
Five rods were used to establish the relations A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E. The test for 
transitive inference was the derivation of B>D. Both stimuli B and D were 
involved in comparisons where they were sometimes longer than the other stimulus 
and sometimes shorter. This prevented the subjects from performing correctly on 
the transitive inference test by "parroting" absolute labels. It was also possible to 
derive B>D by co-ordinating the relational information from the stimulus pairs. 
Using this technique Bryant and Trabasso were able to demonstrate transitive 
inference responding with children as young as four years old (see chapter 4 for 
fiiller discussion).
A further advantage of Bryant and Trabasso's procedure was that it was easily 
adaptable for use with non-human subjects. Using adaptations of this procedure 
transitive inference has been demonstrated with squirrel monkeys (McGonigle and 
Chalmers, 1977), chimpanzees (Gillan, 1981), pigeons (Fersen, Wynne, Delius and 
Staddon, 1991; Higa and Staddon, 1993) and rats (Davis, 1992). (See chapter 3 for 
fuller discussion).
These findings of transitive inference with non-human subjects seemed to display a 
significant difference between the paradigms of stimulus equivalence and transitive 
inference. Both require the derivation of new relations on the basis o f explicitly 
established relations, but it would appear that non-humans will demonstrate 
transitive inference fairly readily, while it has proved veiy difficult to conclusively 
demonstrate stimulus equivalence with non-humans. This then seemed to suggest 
that behaviourally, transitive inference may be a less complex process than
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stimulus equivalence. The fact that non-humans display transitive inference 
responding suggests that it is not linguistically dependent, as it has been suggested 
stimulus equivalence may be.
In this case it is possible that subjects who fail to display transitive inference would 
also fail to demonstrate stimulus equivalence, while subjects who display stimulus 
equivalence would also be expected to pass tests of transitive inference ability. It 
would also be possible for a subject to fail a stimulus equivalence test but still pass 
a transitive inference test. Transitive inference then seemed to make a good 
comparison test when considering subjects' performances on stimulus equivalence 
tests. If the two paradigms do appear to be tapping into similar behavioural 
processes, transitive inference may give some insight into the processes underlying 
derived equivalence relations.
Two of the subjects who took part in this experiment had previously been given 
tests of stimulus equivalence. One had clearly demonstrated the formation of 
equivalence classes, while the other subject had failed to reliably demonstrate any 
of the properties of equivalence relations. The aim was to see how these subjects' 
performances on transitive inference tasks compared to their performance on 
stimulus equivalence tasks, and if this performance matched the predictions about 
the relation between equivalence and inference performances. It would be predicted 
that JD who had clearly demonstrated the emergence of equivalence relations 
would also demonstrate transitive inferences. Subject NL might be able to 
demonstrate transitive inference although she had failed to demonstrate reliable 
performance on the components of equivalence (see Chapter 6). According to 
Bryant and Trabasso (1971), performance by all subjects should be directly related 
to how securely they learned the baseline pair comparisons.
There were other reasons for carrying out this experiment with adults with learning 
disabilities as subjects. The majority of research into transitive inference had used 
normally developing young children, or non-humans as subjects. It is assumed that 
normally able adults make basic transitive inferences (such as those described) so 
easily that it is difficult to examine the processes operating fi'om their 
performances. It is expected that these abilities are less well developed with young 
children and non-human subjects, and that examining the performances of those on 
the borderline between success and failure on these tasks will give more insight 
into the processes operating. In many cases this assumption seems valid. Bryant 
and Trabasso had hypothesised that a major problem for young children in deriving
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transitive inferences was that they could not remember the relational information 
they needed to combine. Bryant and Trabasso believed that performance on 
transitive inference tasks was directly related to retention of the baseline 
comparisons. The results from Bryant and Trabasso (1971) supported this 
hypothesis. The performance of adults with learning disabilities seems relevant to 
this proposition.
There is an extensive research literature on the performance of adults with learning 
disabilities on stimulus equivalence training tasks. On numerous occasions, 
subjects have demonstrated accurate performance on the conditional discrimination 
baseline relations, yet still failed to demonstrate emergent equivalence relations, 
the demonstration of emergent relations such as transitive inference and stimulus 
equivalence may require more than simply secure acquisition o f the baseline 
relations. In this case it would be valuable to know more about transitive inference 
performances by subjects who may have specific difficulties in demonstrating these 
emergent relations.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were three adults with learning disabilities, two female subjects, JD 
and NL, and one male subject, MM. The subjects were aged between 49 and 70 
years old (see subject data, chapter 6). Subjects JD and NL had previously taken 
part in experiment 1, which tested performance on a stimulus equivalence task. JD 
had clearly demonstrated the formation of equivalence classes in phase 1 of the 
experiment. NL did not display equivalence responding, and when tested, did not 
show reliable performance on any of the properties of equivalence relations.
Stimuli
The stimuli used were similar to those used by Bryant and Trabasso (1971). Five 
wooden rods of differing lengths and colour s were used to teach the overlapping 
pair discriminations (see Table 7:1). These rods were presented to the subjects 
embedded in a round wooden block 18 cm's high. Additional pieces of wooden rod 
were inserted in the holes in this block so that each rod protruded fi'om the top by 3 
cm's.
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Procedure
The training and test procedure was based on the procedure used by Bryant and 
Trabasso (1971). The five wooden rods were used to teach a series o f four 
overlapping pair discriminations, A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E. The rods were presented 
to the subjects, embedded in the block, in pairs. The subject was told that one rod 
was longer than the other, although they couldn't see the difference as the rods were 
hidden in the block. The subject was told he or she had to try and guess which rod 
was longer, and to point to the one they thought was longer.
Initially the pairs were taught in order, i.e. A>B was trained first to a pre-set 
criterion, then B>C was tauglit to the same criterion, then C>D etc. On this first 
phase, the criterion was set at five consecutive correct responses on each pair.
When the subjects had reached criterion on all four pairs of this task in a single 
session, they moved on to the next phase of the training procedure. In this second 
phase, the four pair discriminations were presented to the subject mixed in a 
random order. Again, the subjects were asked to point to the rod which they 
thouglit was longest. Criterion on this task was set at 70% correct responding on 
each pair, in a single session where each pair was presented at least 10 times. On 
some occasions, when the subject was first trained on the random presentation of 
the pairs, the subject's performance deteriorated substantially. On these occasions, 
the pair discriminations were once again trained in order to try and re-establish 
stable performance on each pair. The mixed sequence was then reintroduced.
In these two training conditions, the subjects received feedback on their selections, 
either being told "Yes, that's right", or, "No, the other one is longer". At the same 
time, the rods were removed from the block and shown to the subject to provide 
visual feedback as well.
Once the subject had reached criterion on the second phase of the training 
procedure, the test trials were given. In these trials, the test pair B>D was presented 
mixed with the other training pairs in the random baseline sequence. Thus, 
responding on the test pair required the same manner of responding as on all the 
training pairs. The five training and test pairs were each presented to the subject 10 
times in the test session. The subjects received no feedback on the test trials, 
histead, they were told that this time they would not be told if  they were right or 
wrong, but they were just to try and point to the rod they thought was longer as 
well as they could.
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Results
Subject JD
JD reached criterion on the first session where the discriminations were presented 
in order (see Fig. 7:1). When the discriminations were presented mixed in a 
random sequence her performance was a little unstable so, after three sessions of 
random presentation, the discriminations were presented in order once more to try 
and stabilise performance (see Fig 7:2). After two more mixed sessions were 
perfoimance was slightly improved, there was an unavoidable break in testing for 
one week. Following this JD reached criterion in one session both when the 
discriminations were presented in order, and in the subsequent session when the 
mixed sequence was presented (see Fig 7:3). JD was then given the mixed 
sequence including test probes. JD maintained performance on the baseline 
relations and demonstrated perfect transitive inference performance on the B>D 
test pair.
Subject MM
MM reached criterion on tlie first session where the discriminations were presented 
in order (see Fig. 7:4). In the next two sessions when the mixed sequence was 
presented MM's performance was consistently better on the end pairs of A>B and 
D>E than on the middle pairs of B>C and C>D. The discriminations were then 
presented in order once more to try and improve performance on the middle pairs 
before the random sequence was presented once more.
This pattern was repeated several times (see Fig. 7:5); performance was good on all 
pairs while the discriminations were presented in order, but on the mixed 
sequences performance was consistently better on the end pairs than the middle 
pairs. This was probably exacerbated by two unavoidable one week breaks, 
between sessions 5 and 6 and between sessions 7 and 8.
In an attempt to remedy this, on session 13 the two middle pairs were trained in 
order without the end pairs (see Fig. 7:6). This was intended to selectively improve 
performance on these pairs before re-introducing the random sequence. This 
appeared to have some effect as performance on the mixed sequence in the 
following two sessions was much improved. MM actually reached criterion on the 
mixed sequence m the second of these two sessions (session 15). However, as 
MM's performance had been so unstable previously, one firrther mixed sequence 
was given to try and ensure performance was stable before testing for equivalence.
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On this session (session 16) MM again showed a marked deterioration of 
performance on C>D.
To try and correct this, the procedure of training the B>C and C>D relations 
separately and then reintroducing the mixed sequences was repeated twice more 
(sessions 17 to 20) (see Fig. 7:6 and Fig. 7:7). This resulted in stable performance 
on all pairs in a random sequence (sessions 20 and 21) and MM was given the test 
probes (see Fig. 7:7). During the test session, MM demonstrated substantial 
disruption of the B>C pair, with responding on this item seeming to reverse. MM 
also failed to display transitive inference responding. On the test pair B>D MM 
showed a preference for D over B, seeming to match the reversal on B>C.
Subject NL
It proved very difficult to achieve stable performance with subject NL (see Fig.
7:8). Even when the discriminations were presented in order NL did not reach 
criterion on all four pairs in one session until the fifth traming session. This was 
not helped by a two week break in testing between sessions 3 and 4. When tlie 
discrhninations were presented in a mixed sequence (session 6), NL showed 
disruption of performance on the last pair in the sequence D>E. On the next 
session, this disruption seemed to be affecting the adjacent C>D pair as well. To tiy 
and correct this the discriminations were presented in order again (session 8, see 
Fig. 7:9), and the random sequence was then reintroduced.
Performance remained poor on the D>E pair, with the discrimination almost 
reversing, even when performance on the other pairs was perfect (session 11). NL 
was then given training on D>E alone (session 12), and the mixed sequence was 
reintroduced. However, this appeared to move the disruption to the C>D pair. Over 
the next 12 sessions, NL was given training on the discriminations in a cycle of 
training, first in order, and then in a random sequence (see Fig. 7:10 and Fig 7:11). 
Despite this NL never maintained sufficiently stable performance to be tested for 
transitive inference. Typically performance was below criterion on the D>E pair, 
even when the discriminations were trained in order.
Discussion
Of the three subjects tested in this experiment, one subject (JD) clearly 
demonstrated transitive inference responding, while the other two subjects (MM 
and NL) did not. Subject MM failed to display transitive inference when given the
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test probes while NL never displayed sufficiently stable performance on the 
baseline relations to be tested for transitive inference respondmg.
MM's failure to demonstrate transitive inference is predictable given the 
deterioration of performance on one of the baseline relations during testing. Bryant 
and Trabasso (1971) had suggested that the failure of young children to display 
transitive inference may have been due to their failure to remember the 
comparisons they needed to combine. This is one reason why performance on the 
baseline relations is tested at the same time as the inferential B>D test pair. Bryant 
and Trabasso showed that the probability of making a correct inferential judgement 
on the test pair is the probability of jointly recalling the information for each of the 
training pairs. Therefore, disruption of performance on any of the training pairs 
makes it less likely that correct inferential performance will be demonstrated. In 
MM's case performance not only deteriorated but in fact seemed to reverse, making 
it even less likely that B>D performance would be demonstrated. As B>C had 
reversed, MM was no longer combining the information B>C, C>D, but rather 
C>B, C>D. Thus stimuli B and D had effectively equalised in value, making a true 
transitive inference impossible. MM may have consistently selected D rather than 
B on test trials, as he now had a history of selecting D in the pair D>E, while B was 
no longer preferred over any of the other stimuli - A>B, "C>B".
This deterioration in MM's performance may be due to the sudden withdrawal of 
feedback for responding. Until the final test trial MM had received feedback on all 
training tiials, but on the test block no feedback was given at all. Possibly, if 
remforcement had been gradually reduced over several training sessions MM 
would not have shown this disruption of baseline performance when given the test 
pair.
Subject JD not only demonstrated appropriate transitive inference performance, but 
actually showed superior performance on the B>D test pair than on the four 
baseline training relations. This sort of performance has been noted before in the 
inference literature and is known as the Symbolic Distance Effect. This implies that 
it is easier to judge the size or value of stimuli the further apart they lie on some 
form of relative scale. "Thus the time taken to judge the relative size of, e.g. "cat" 
vs. "whale" is faster than that required to determine the relative size of "cat" vs. 
"fox"" (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1984, p.525). It has been suggested that the 
training procedure used in this experiment establishes the linear series 
A>B>C>D>E, and that subjects make judgements about the relative value of
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stimuli in this series by "reading o f f  their relative positions on this line. If this is 
true, then B>D is separated by one stimulus (or node) while the baseline 
discriminations are all adjacent to each other. Thus superior performance on B>D 
would be predicted by virtue of the greater symbolic distance between the stimuli. 
Theoretically, performance on the test pair A>D would be expected to be even 
better than on B>D as A and D are separated by two stimuli. However, as selection 
of A is always correct compared to any of the other stimuli in the series, any results 
on this task would have been confounded by absolute responding.
The results from this experiment generally confirm the predictions about relative 
performances on stimulus equivalence and transitive inference tasks. NL failed to 
demonstrate transitive inference in this experiment and had previously failed to 
demonstrate stimulus equivalence. Conversely, JD had demonstrated stimulus 
equivalence in experiment 1 and, as expected, demonstrated appropriate inference 
performance in this experiment. However, as only tliree subjects took part in this 
experiment it is hard to conclusively confirm or disprove the predictions about 
equivalence and inference performance. The performance by JD is more instructive 
in this case than that of NL. JD clearly demonstrated both equivalence and 
inference performance in these experiments, but NL was never explicitly tested for 
either of these relations, histead NL is assumed not to have demonstrated either of 
these properties as she did not reach criterion on the baseline training relations in 
either experiment. However, as Bryant and Trabasso (1971) demonstrated, a 
subject camiot be expected to demonstrate relations of transitive inference if they 
cannot remember the necessary relational premises. It would still be interesting, 
though, to examine NL's performance if it was possible to find some way to 
reliably teach the baseline relations for either experiment. NL clearly has difficulty 
achieving stable performance on the baseline trials. If some way could be found to 
teach the necessary relational information, would NL then be able to use this 
information to make a transitive inference, or to derive equivalence classes.
A similar argument could be applied to the performance of MM on this task. It is 
not clear if MM is able to make transitive inferences or not. MM did fail the 
transitive inference test, but this is predictable due to the deterioration in his 
baseline performance. If gradual phasmg out of feedback over several sessions had 
served to maintain this baseline performance, it is possible that MM would have 
been able to derive B>D. As it appears that MM displays transitive inferences less 
reliably than JD, it would be interesting to see if MM could display stimulus
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equivalence if given conditional discrimination training, or if  the two paradigms 
are in fact at different points on a continuum of relational properties.
Sidman (1994) has suggested that the derivation of stimulus equivalence relations 
is a fimdamental stimulus function which results from reinforcement contingencies. 
A similar argument can be made for the relations demonstrated here. Several 
transitive inference studies (Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon, 1991; Gillan, 
1981; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977) have characterised the reinforcement given 
on the baseline training pairs as giving one stimulus a value o f 1, and the other 
stimulus a value of 0. For example, on B>C, B would acquire a value of 1 and C a 
value of 0. It is easy to see how the reinforcement contingencies in training could 
establish the stimulus series A>B>C>D>E and thus the relative values of the test 
pair B>D. Thus, the demonstration of transitive inference could be explained by 
reinforcement contingencies in the same way that Sidman suggests stimulus 
equivalence can be explained, this might also explain why the sudden withdrawal 
of reinforcement had such an effect on performance by MM.
If this is true, it would suggest even more strongly that the demonstration of both 
stimulus equivalence and transitive inference are part of a more general ability to 
derive emergent relations on the basis of previously learned information. This 
ability may be part of a fundamental stimulus function; a product o f survival 
contingencies as Sidman suggests. After all, it has been suggested that “the ability 
to rank objects on a hedonic scale and make judgements about the desirability of 
items that have never been encountered together must often have adaptive value” 
(Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon, 1991, p. 334).
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Table 7:1 Training and Test Stimuli
Stimulus A B C D E
Colour Blue Red White Yellow Green
Length (cms) 18 15 13 10 8
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Fig. 7:4 Subject MM - Training Sessions 1 to 5
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Fig. 7:6 Subject MM - Training Sessions 13 to 18
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Fig. 7:9 Subject NL - Training Sessions 8 to 13
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CHAPTER 8
Experiment 3 :
Disruption of Transitive Eiference Performance
One reason for studying performance on transitive inference tasks is that, like 
equivalence, it involves the emergence of untaught relations from previously 
established relations.
"Transitive Inference denotes the ability to infer relationships between items 
that have not been trained together" (Fersen, Wynne, Delius and Staddon, 1991)
Transitive Inference had been studied originally using tasks such as three term 
syllogisms (cf. Piaget, 1928). Bryant and Trabasso (1971) had argued that these 
tasks were too language dependent and had developed an alternative procedure. 
They used five wooden rods of differing lengths and colours to train foui’ 
overlapping pair discriminations, A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E, and tested for accurate 
performance on non-adjacent pairs, in particular B>D, the most stringent test for 
transitive inference. Using this procedure Biyant and Trabasso demonstrated 
transitive inference performance in children as young as four.
One advantage of this procedure developed by Bryant and Trabasso was that it was 
fairly easily adapted for use with non-human subjects. Ushig a procedure based on 
Bryant and Trabasso’s, McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) were able to demonstrate 
transitive inference with squirrel monkeys. This finding was subsequently 
replicated with a number of other non-human subjects (Davis, 1992, Fersen et al, 
1991, Gillan, 1981, Higa and Staddon, 1993; see Chapter 3 for fuller discussion).
Thus transitive inference requires the demonstration of emergent untaught 
relations, and has been demonstrated in a number of non-human species. Stimulus 
equivalence also requires tlie demonstration of emergent untaught relations, but has 
proved difficult to demonstrate with non-humans (Dugdale and Lowe, 1990,
Hayes, 1989, Mclntire, Cleary and Thompson, 1987, Schusterman and Kastak, 
1993, Vaughan, 1988; see Chapter 3 for fiiller discussion). By examining the 
differences between the two paradigms in this respect it might be possible to gain 
some insight into the processes underlying emergent relations.
One way of examining the necessary conditions for transitive inference might be to 
establish transitive inference responding, and then to disrupt one aspect of the
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baseline relations and see what effect this has on the other relations. The rationale 
for this comes from a study carried out by Gillan (1981) examining transitive 
inference with chimpanzees. Using a procedure based on Bryant and Trabasso's 
(1971) procedure, Gillan trained four overlapping pair discriminations, A<B, B<C,
C<D, D<E, and tested for the emergence of the transitive inference relation B<D.
Having established transitive inference, Gillan was able to extend the series by the 
addition of another training pair E<F, demonstrating transitive inference 
responding on two new test pairs, B<E and C<E. This transitive inference 
responding was destroyed by training a further relation, F<A, which closed the 
series by removing the end points. Transitive inference responding was restored by 
subsequently training A<F, which restored the end points of the series, making it 
consistent with the original training. These findings were subsequently replicated 
by Fersen et al (1991) with pigeons, and Davis (1992) with rats. From this work 
Gillan proposed that there were two necessary conditions for correct choice on 
transitive inference tasks:
1. Accurate performance on the adjacent training pairs.
2. The stimuli that form the series must be ordered on some uni-dimensional scale.
A study by Siemann and Delius (1994) carried out a similar manipulation. With 
normally able human adults they used 10 overlapping pair comparisons to establish 
stimulus sequences. For one group (GO) this sequence complied with a linear 
structure forming the series A>B>C>D>E>F. For another group (G l) one of the 
training pairs was inconsistent with this linear sequence, establishing an "odd" 
series, while for a third group (G3), thr ee of the pairs were inconsistent with the 
linear sequence, instead forming a circular series overall. Siemann and Delius 
found that all the subjects were able to respond on the pairs making up the series 
with much the same accuracy, but the response latencies for each group were 
significantly different, increasing from GO to G3. When a similar manipulation was 
carried out with pigeons, they showed increasing disruption of performance from 
GO to G3 (see Chapter 4).
These results seemed to replicate previous findings of disruption of transitive |
inference performances with non-human subjects. However, one important j
difference was that the human subjects were able to cope with even the most |
difficult task, G3, albeit at the expense of long reaction times. Non human subjects I
jtend to respond at around chance level, or cease responding altogether, when the I
linear series is disrupted. j
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This study by Siemann and Delius was the first to report a manipulation of tliis 
kind with human subjects. It seemed likely that the subjects they used, normally 
able adult humans, would be best able to maintain responding on a disrupted 
transitive inference series. However, it is not clear how well subjects such as 
normally developing young children, or adults with learning disabilities would 
cope with such a manipulation. While these subjects can demonstrate transitive 
inference responding, their performance may not be as robust as that of the subjects 
in Siemami and Delius (1994). Examination of how these subjects cope with such a 
manipulation might provide some insight into the conditions necessary for accurate 
transitive inference performance.
There is a considerable literature on performance by normally developing young 
children on standard transitive inference tasks. It is harder to predict how they 
would cope with a task which disrupts what appear to be the necessaiy 
preconditions for transitive inference. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) successfully 
demonstrated that children as young as four could make transitive inferences. 
However, Kuczaj and Donaldson (1982) demonstrated tliat there may be a 
developmental pattern to the way in which children learn to make these inferences. 
Thus, while young children may be able to make transitive inferences their 
inferences may not always be appropriate. The manipulation described in Gillan 
(1981) of disrupted the series by removing the end points. The normally able adults 
in the study by Siemann and Delius (1994) were able to cope with this 
manipulation, but the significantly increased response latencies suggests that they 
found it difficult. Young children who have not yet achieved a fiilly “adult” ability 
to make transitive inferences may not have the skills necessaiy to maintain 
responding. Testing young children on this task may give some insight into the 
developmental pattern of transitive inference ability and help clarify some of the 
conditions necessary for successful transitive inference performance.
Much less is known about performance on transitive inference tasks by adults with 
learning disabilities. Experiment 2 (Chapter 7) described one attempt to 
demonstrate transitive inference with this group. One subject clearly demonstrated 
transitive inference performance, another subject failed a transitive inference test 
while also showing loss of performance on the training pairs, and a third subject 
did not achieve sufficiently stable performance to be tested.
The ability to make transitive inferences is likely to be important when working 
with concepts such as quantity and relative value and for many of the skills
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involved in basic mathematics. However, these are things which many adults with 
learning disabilities have specific problems with. The normally able adults in the 
study by Siemann and Delius (1994) dealt with the manipulation of the training 
pairs. It is possible that adults with learnmg disabilities may not show such robust 
transitive inference performance. Just as Gillan's (1981) manipulation gave some 
idea of the basic pre-requisites for transitive inference performance, so a similar 
manipulation with learning disabilities may give some idea of the specific 
problems encountered as transitive inference tasks become increasingly complex. 
After all, it is most unlikely that all relational information forms a neatly ordered 
series such as that encountered in transitive inference tasks.
In this experiment, transitive inference performance was established with three 
different groups of human subjects, normally able adults, an adult with learning 
disabilities, and normally developing young children. Once transitive inference 
responding was established the training series was disrupted by training one 
inconsistent pair, and transitive inference responding was then reassessed.
Method
Subjects
Tlii’ee different groups of subjects were tested:
1. Normallv able adults.
These subjects were 10 undergraduate students recruited by means of a sign up 
sheet in the psychology department. Participation was limited to first year 
psychology students, or non-psychology students, to ensure that the subjects were 
not familiar with the research area. The subjects were paid £3 an hour for their 
participation.
2. Subject with learning disabilities
The subject was MM, a male aged 50. MM had previously taken part in an 
experiment on transitive inference (see chapter 7, and subject data chapter 6) but 
had failed to demonstrate transitive inference responding. MM was paid for his 
participation, receiving lOp every 5 trials.
3. Normallv developing voung children
These subjects were eight children aged between 5:1 and 5:8 (mean age 5:4; 
years:months). Four of these subjects did not have English as their first language.
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but all were competent in English and all the children were normally taught in 
English.
Stimuli
The stimuli used were the same for all subjects. These were five wooden rods of 
differing lengths and colours (see Table 8:1). These were presented to the subjects 
embedded in a wooden block so that only the top 2 cm's protruded. A screen was 
used to conceal the block and wooden rods while each trial was being prepared. 
Additional stimuli used only with the young children were a tray with 40 neuti al 
coloured wooden beads and a small glass jar.
Design
The basic design of the experiment was the same for all subjects, and consisted of 
two phases.
Phase 1
The aim of phase 1 was to establish stable transitive inference responding. The five 
wooden rods were used to train a series of four overlapping pair discriminations, 
A>B, B>C, O D , D>E.
hiitially these discriminations were trained in order, first A>B to criterion, then 
B>C etc. Wlien the subjects reached criterion on this task, the four discriminations 
were presented mixed in a random order. When the subjects reached criterion on 
this task they were given the test probes. In these trials the transitive inference test 
pair , B>D, was presented mixed with the baseline training pairs in the random 
baseline sequence. This tested for retention of the baseline relations and selection 
of B rather than D, the test for inference. Provided the subjects demonstrated 
appropriate transitive inference performance they progressed to phase 2 of the 
study.
Phase 2
The aim of phase 2 was to train one fiiither pair discrimination, E>A, which 
effectively made the baseline circular, desti'oying the linear order of the series. The 
subjects were then tested on three non-adjacent stimulus pairs.
As in phase 1, initially the discriminations were trained in order, i.e. A>B, then 
B>C, C>D, D<E, and then the new pair E>A. When the subjects reached criterion 
on this task, the five discriminations were presented mixed in a random sequence.
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It was possible that the addition of the E>A discrimination might cause disruption 
to previously stable performance on the other discriminations. For this reason a 
specific criterion was not set for this mixed baseline. Instead, the amount of 
training each subject received on this task was matched to the amount of training 
they had received on the equivalent task in phase 1. The subject was then given the 
test probes. This consisted of the five baseline discriminations and three non- 
adjacent test pairs. These were, the transitive inference test pair from phase 1,
B>D, and two other pairs B>E and A>D. The B>D test pair was retained to see if 
training of the inconsistent relation E>A would affect responding on this pair. The 
two new pairs were included to assess how the subjects would deal with non- 
adjacent pairs now that the stimuli no longer formed a linear series.
In both phases, feedback was given on the subjects' selections when the 
discriminations were trained in order, and on the mixed baseline training trials. On 
the test probes, no feedback was given on the baseline pairs or the test pairs.
Procedure
The procedure for training and testing varied slightly for each group of subjects:
1. Normallv able adults 
These subjects received the basic training procedure outlined above. Before 
training the subjects were told they would be shown a block with two rods inserted 
in it. They were told that the rods were different lengths, but that the differences 
were concealed by the block, and that their job was to try and decide which rod was 
longest. They were also told that sometimes they would be told if their selection 
was correct or incorrect, and that sometimes they would not, but that they should 
try and respond as best they could on all trials.
Phase 1 - Initially the rods were presented in order, to a criterion of five 
consecutive correct responses on each pair. They were then given the random 
baseline sequence. Criterion on this task was set at 80% correct responding on each 
pair, or if it took some time for performance to stabilise, the last five responses on 
each pair had to be correct. As long as one of these criteria were met, the subjects 
received the test probes. In the test probes, the subjects were tested on the four 
baseline discriminations and the B>D test pair. No feedback was given on this task.
Phase 2 - As in phase I , the five baseline discriminations were initially trained in 
order, to a criterion of five consecutive correct responses. The subjects were then
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trained on the random mixed baselme. No mastery criterion was set for this task, 
but instead each pair was presented 10 times, as in phase 1. The subjects then 
received the test probes. These consisted of the four baseline discriminations A>B, 
B>C, C>D, D>E, E>A, and three test pairs, B>D, B>E, and A>D. No feedback 
was given during testing.
Both phases 1 and 2 were carried out in one session, which lasted just over one 
hour. The subjects were paid for their participation.
2. Adult with learning disabilities.
The basic format of MM's training and testing was the same as for the normally 
able subjects, but the sessions were shorter and training and testing for both phases 
took place over a period of 10 days. Before training began, MM was given the 
same instructions as those given to the normally able adults.
Phase 1 - Initially MM was taught the four pair comparisons, in order, to a criterion 
of five consecutive correct responses on each pair. After this the four comparisons 
were presented in random order to a criterion of 80% correct responding on each 
pair in a single session. Two sessions were then spent gradually reducing the 
feedback given, in preparation for the test trials. MM had been given transitive 
inference training on a previous occasion, but had failed to demonstrate transitive 
inference (see Chapter 7). It is possible that this failure may have been due to the 
sudden absence of feedback when given the test trials. In this failed attempt, 
performance on the training relations had been at 100%, but in the absence of 
feedback MM showed disruption on these relations, as well as failure to 
demonstrate transitive inference. On this occasion, feedback was gradually reduced 
to occurring on 20%-25% of trials by the test session. MM was then given the test 
probes. Dining the test tiials feedback was maintained at 25% of training pairs, but 
no feedback occurred on the test items.
Phase 2 - In phase 2, the new pair E>A was intioduced to close the series. The five 
pairs A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E and E>A were trained, in order to a criterion of five 
consecutive correct responses. These five pairs were then presented in a random 
order. The amount of training on this task was matched to the amount of training 
given in the same task in phase 1. Once again, over several sessions, feedback was 
gradually reduced to 20%-25% of trials prior to testing. MM was then given the 
test probes of five baseline pairs and three test pairs. As in phase 1, feedback was 
maintained at 25% on the training pairs, but no feedback occurred on the test pairs.
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MM was paid for his participation in this experiment, receiving lOp every five 
trials. This occurred during both training and test trials and was not contingent on 
correct responding on that trial.
3. Normallv developing voung children.
The basic format of training and testing was the same as for the other two groups of 
subjects. The sessions were shorter than those for the normally able adult subjects 
and took place over several weeks.
Some additions were made to the procedure with regard to feedback and 
reinforcement. In both phases 1 and 2, before all training sessions, a container with 
40 wooden beads and a small glass jar were set on the table in fiont of the subject. 
Before the first training session the subject was told that they were going to play a 
game in which they could earn beads, and that every time they made a correct 
response they would earn one bead. When all the beads in the tray had been earned 
(put in the glass jar), the subject received a pre-selected back up reinforcer (a small 
picture). If, during a training session, the subject earned all the beads, the beads 
were exchanged for the pre-selected picture, the beads were emptied back into the 
container, and a new picture was selected. The training session then continued as 
before. Before test and maintenance sessions the subject was shown the glass jar 
with the beads earned during the previous session. Tlie jar and tray of beads were 
then removed from the table and the subject was told, "Now we are going to play 
the game without me telling you if  you are right or wrong. You will also not get 
any beads while we are playing, but I will keep a record of how many beads you 
earn and you will be given your beads at the end of the game. Do your best". At the 
end of the test session, the subject was given one bead for every trial completed.
Phase 1 - In phase 1 the subjects were taught the four overlapping pair 
discriminations, in order, to a criterion of five consecutive correct responses. The 
discriminations were then presented mixed in a random order in blocks of 20 trials. 
Criterion for this mixed block of trials was 80% correct responding on each 
discrimination in a single session. Once the subjects had reached criterion, they 
were given a session where a random baseline sequence was given, but without 
reinforcement. This was to ensure that the performance was maintained in the 
absence of feedback in preparation for testing. Provided the subjects maintained 
criterion performance they received the test probes. If performance on the mixed 
training block was particularly poor, with performance on all or most of the 
discriminations at chance level, the discriminations were once again trained in
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order. For some subjects who consistently failed to achieve stable performance on 
the mixed block of trials, the four discriminations were split into two mixed blocks 
of two discriminations. Thus, in one session the subject would receive training on a 
block of 20 trials of mixed A>B, B>C pairs. In the next session, that subject 
received training on a block of 20 trials of mixed O D , D>E training. When 
performance was above 80% correct on all four discrimmations on these "split" 
blocks, the mixed block was presented once more.
Phase 2 - Training in this phase was very similar to that in phase 1. The four 
baseline pairs, with the addition of the new E>A pair, were trained in order to a 
criterion of five consecutive correct responses. These five pairs were then 
presented in the random baseline sequence, training on this task being matched to 
training on the equivalent task in phase 1. For testing, the training and test pairs 
were presented mixed in a random sequence. The eight pairs were presented four 
times each in a block of 32 trials. These test probes were presented to each subject 
on thiee separate occasions, so that each training and test discrimination was tested 
a total of 12 times. A session of mixed baseline training was given between each 
test session.
Results
When assessing perfoimance on the test probes in phase 2, responding on the 
baseline pahs was deemed correct if  it was consistent with what had been 
established during training. There was no "correct" response for the test pairs in 
this phase, instead the subjects were assesses to see if  they responded consistently 
to one of the stimuli in each pair. The test stimuli have been written in the form 
B>D, A>D and B>E. As the series has effectively been made circular, this is not 
fully appropriate, but it preserves the notation from phase 1. It does not however 
imply that the subjects were expected to select stimulus A in preference to stimulus 
D for example.
1. Normallv able adults
hi phase 1 all subjects reached criterion when the discriminations were trained in 
order, and when presented in a random sequence (see Table 8:2). When given the 
test probes, most subjects maintained performance on the baseline discriminations 
at a very liigh level of accuracy. Subject 9 reversed the final D>E discrimination, 
always selecting E rather than D. All subjects showed perfect performance on the 
B>D test pair and progressed to phase 2.
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111 phase 2, all subjects reached criterion when the discriminations were trained in 
order (see Table 8:3). On the random baseline sequence, all subjects maintained 
highly accurate performance. When given the test probes, most subjects maintained 
performance on the baseline pairs. Subject 7 showed some disruption, respondmg 
at 30% correct on C>D and 70% correct on D>E. Subject 9 again appeared to 
reverse responding on D>E, scoring only 10% correct on this pair. Responding on 
the test pairs was generally characterised by consistent responding to one or other 
of the stimuli in each test pair. Only subject 7 showed some inconsistent 
responding. On the B>D test pair, this subject selected B 30% of the time and D 
70% of the time and on the B>E test pair, selected B 40% of the time and E 60%. 
Other than that, subjects responded to one or other of the stimuli in each test pair 
with an accuracy of 80% or above.
On the B>D test pair, 9 subjects consistently selected B rather than D. Subject 7 
had shown a slight preference for D over B. On the B>E test pair, 5 subjects 
consistently selected B over E, 4 subjects consistently selected E over B, with 
subject 7 showing no clear choice. On test pair A>D, 7 subjects consistently 
selected A over D and 3 consistently selected D over A (see Fig 8:1)
2. Adult with learning Disabilities
In phase 1 MM reached criterion on the first session when the five discriminations 
were presented in order (see Table 8:4). He also showed highly accurate 
performance on the random presentation of the baseline pairs, and maintained this 
performance as the rate of feedback was reduced. On the probe trials MM 
maintained performance on the baseline relations, and demonstrated perfect 
performance on the transitive inference test pah. MM then progressed to phase 2 
(see Fig 8:2)
MM reached criterion on all the phase 2 baseline pairs in the first session when 
they were presented in order (see Table 8:5). When the five pair discriminations 
were presented in a random sequence, MM showed disruption to previously stable 
performance. This disruption increased each time the random sequence was 
presented. During the final test session performance on the baseline pairs was at 
chance level for four of the five pairs, and MM showed no consistent choice on any 
of the test pairs (see Fig 8:3)
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3. Normallv Developing Young Children
The subjects required between 6 and 19 sessions to complete training and testing 
on phase 1. Thi'ee of the eight subjects, subjects 1,4 and 5, did not achieve stable 
performance on the mixed baseline sequences, despite considerable amounts of 
training (see Table 8:6). When tested, subject 4 failed to demonstrate B>D (20% 
correct), while subjects 1 and 5 did select B>D but showed inconsistent 
performance on the baseline pairs during testing. The other five subjects generally 
showed highly accuiate performance on the random baseline sequence. On the test 
probes, all five subjects maintained accurate performance on the baseline pairs and 
demonstrated accurate transitive inference performance. These subjects progressed 
to phase 2.
These subjects received between 7 and 11 training sessions and 3 test sessions in 
phase 2, This trainmg had been matched to that received in phase 1. All subjects 
reached criterion in one session when the five baseline relations were presented in 
order. Duiing training on the random baseline sequence, performance generally 
remained highly accurate. When given the test probes, performance on the baseline 
pairs again generally remained highly accurate (see Table 8:7). The only exception 
to this was subject 3, who failed to maintain performance on E>A during testing 
(58% correct) and who showed some disruption of performance on O D  (67% 
correct) and D>E (75% correct). Performance on the test probes was generally 
characterised by consistent responding to one or other of the stimuli in each pair, 
by each subject. An exception to this was subject 6 on test pair A>D where the 
subject showed no clear preference, selecting stimulus A 42% of the time and 
stimulus D 58% of the time. On the other two test pairs, this subject did show a 
clearer selection, on pair B>D selecting D 67% of the time and on B>E selecting E 
67% of the time, but this choice was not as clear as that shown by the other 
subjects. No overall preference was shown for either of the stimuli in any of the 
test pairs (see Fig 8:4). On test pair B>D, three subjects selected B and two 
selected D; on B>E two subjects selected B and three selected E; while on A>D, 
two subjects selected A, two selected D, and one subject showed no overall 
preference.
Reliabilitv
Reliability data were collected with this group of subjects. The experiment 
consisted of 4088 trials, 3408 training trials and 680 test trials. Reliability checks 
were made on 441 training trials (12.94%) and 203 test trials (29.85%). The 
experimenter and observers always agreed.
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Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to establish transitive inference and then examine 
the effects of disrupting the linear order of the baseline series. On the test probes in 
phase 2, the five baseline discriminations were deemed correct if  responding was in 
accordance with what had been reinforced in training. There was no "correct" 
answer to the three test probes B>D, B>E, A>D. What was important was whether 
the subjects would be able to maintain performance on the baseline relations, and 
would they be able to respond consistently to one or other of the stimuli in each test 
pair.
The normally able adults fulfilled both these criteria. Even after the introduction of 
the E>A inconsistent relation, performance on the baseline relations remained 
highly accuiate, and in almost every case the subjects showed 100% consistent 
responding to one stimulus in each test pair.
The subject with learning disabilities, MM showed a very different pattern of 
responding. In phase 1 his transitive inference performance was very stable, 
showing perfect performance on the B>D inference test. Following the introduction 
of the E>A inconsistent relation, this performance was seriously disrupted, and on 
tlie final test session MM displayed chance level performance on all test pairs and 
four of the five baseline pairs.
The normally developing young children showed a pattern of responding veiy 
similar to that of the normally able adults. The subjects that progressed to phase 2 
of the study, generally displayed accurate performance on the baseline pairs and 
consistent choice on the test pairs, even after the introduction of the inconsistent 
E>A relation.
This suggests that the normally able adults and children had some way of 
integrating the inconsistent relation into the previously established series that 
allowed them to mamtain responding. MM did not appear to be able to do this. In 
this respect the performance shown by MM is very similar to that typically 
displayed by non-human subjects on this task. Non-human subjects typically 
display chance level performance on all baseline and test pairs after the 
introduction of the inconsistent relation, or, in some cases, cease responding 
altogether. This was what was shown in the experiment by Siemann and Delius
Chapter 8: Experiment 3 178
(1994), the human subjects in all groups were able to maintain responding, 
although response latencies increased with increasing departure from the linear 
structure. The pigeon subjects showed increasing error rates with increasing 
departure from the linear structure, and two of the three subjects in group G3, 
trained on a circular structure ceased responding altogether.
Siemami and Delius gave their human subjects questionnaires and card sorting 
tasks after tlie main pair discrimination tasks. The subjects from the group with a 
linear structure reported that they dealt with the task by memorising the series order 
and referring back to it. However the group that was trained on a circular structure 
reported memorising the stimuli pairwise using verbal markers.
Something similar may have happened in this experiment. When the stimuli 
formed a linear series in phase 1, subjects in each group were able to respond 
accurately on all pairs. When the E>A relation made the series circular in phase 2, 
the normally able adults and children may have been able to bring in an alternative 
strategy, e.g. using verbal markers to remember individual comparisons, to 
override the now ineffective linear series. Subjects like MM and the non-human 
subjects may not be able to explicitly utilise an alternative strategy in the same 
way. If MM was still trying to respond according to a linear strategy, this would 
explain his chance level performance in phase 2.
Gillan (1981) had suggested that there were two conditions necessary for correct 
responses on a transitive inference task; accurate performance on the adjacent 
training pairs (also suggested by Bryant and Trabasso, 1971), and the stimuli that 
form the series must be ordered on some uni-dimensional scale. Gillan proposed 
these conditions on the basis of dismpted performance by a chimpanzee subject. 
The ability of human subjects to continue responding even on a non-linear series 
might suggest that the second condition is not entirely true. However, it might be 
more accurate to say that for a subject to respond transitively, the stimuli must 
form a linear series. The subjects trained on a linear series by Siemann and Delius 
(1994) used a transitive strategy for responding. While the subjects trained on the 
circular series were able to continue responding, the strategy they used was not a 
transitive one.
What this study may show then, is that both human and non-human subjects are 
able to make transitive inferences. However, when the baseline relations alter so 
that the series no longer makes transitive sense, normally able humans are able to
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respond because they can utilise a non-transitive strategy. This may just be a result 
of these subjects' greater experience of dealing with abstract or arbitrary relations.
The use of some sort of “strategy” to monitor responding is likely to be a normal 
part of dealing with these relations. This need not imply that it is consciously 
employed. In this experiment the value attached to each stimulus within a pair was 
constant. For example, given B>C, B is always correct and C is always incorrect. 
The training in phase 2 removed the end points within the series, making it difficult 
to ascertain values for non-adjacent pairs, but reinforcement had been given on 
each adjacent pair comparison, fixing the value for that pair. In a natural setting, 
the contingencies are unlikely to be arranged as neatly. Instead, situations are likely 
where one stimulus is correct in one context, while the other would be correct in a 
different context. The pair comparisons in the transitive inference task (e.g. B 
compared to C) constitute simple discriminations; three-term contingencies (see 
Figure 5:2). However, these discriminations will often come under the control of 
another element, e.g. context 1 or context 2, effectively becoming conditional 
discriminations; four-term contingencies (see Figuies 5:3 and 5:4) such as those 
described in stimulus equivalence research. Normally able adults generally handle 
these conditional discriminations with ease, developing complex networks of 
relations, such as emergent equivalence relations. Indeed, these relations can 
themselves come under contextual control (see Chapter 11, Experiment 6, for fuller 
discussion).
The switch ft-om a linear series in phase 1 to a circular series in phase 2 may have 
mimicked the establishment of contextual control of simple discriminations. As 
normally able adults are likely to have most experience with relations that change 
and develop across contexts they would most likely to be able to maintain 
responding on a series that no longer makes “sense”. The establishment of four- 
term conditional relations has been demonstrated in much younger children than 
those tested in this experiment (Lipkens, Hayes and Hayes, 1993). It is not 
smprising therefore that the children in this experiment were also able to maintain 
consistent responding if the procedure is mimicking the establishment of 
conditional relations.
The disruption of MM’s performance is clearly linked to the introduction of the 
E>A relations in phase 2. If switching from a linear to a circular series in phase 2 
does mimic the establishment of contextual control this may provide some 
explanation of MM’s difficulties. While MM might be able to cope with explicitly
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trained conditional discriminations, he may have more difficulty establishing these 
relations spontaneously himself. Thus, he may have continued to try and respond 
on the basis of simple discriminations even after the introduction o f E>A.
However, training this relation would have equalised the value for all the stimuli, 
making it impossible to respond on this basis. This pattern of responding would be 
similar to the perseveration errors shown by some adults with learning disabilities 
during stimulus equivalence training. For example, a subject might be taught to 
select B 1 in the presence of A1, and may then continue to respond to B1 once the 
sample has become A2. This is why an errorless learning procedure was used with 
the adults with learning disabilities in Experiments 1, 5 and 6 - to minimise the 
likelihood of these errors.
MM was able to manipulate a logical sequence of simple discriminations, which is 
necessary for transitive inference performance. This was also demonstrated by the 
normally able adults and normally developing young children. However, when the 
series was made circular, effectively putting the pair comparisons under contextual 
control, the normally able adults and normally developing young children were 
able to alter then performance to cope with this new task in a way that MM was 
not. This may suggest an area of particular difficulty for MM.
One result which requires some explanation is the apparent consistent choice 
shown by the normally able adults on test pair B>D in phase 2. As there was no 
logical "correct" stimulus in any of the phase 2 test pairs, it would have been 
expected that roughly half the subjects would select stimulus B and the other half 
would select stimulus D. This pattern was generally shown on the other two 
stimulus pairs. However, 9 out of 10 normally able adult subjects consistently 
selected B over D in the test probes in phase 2, and the other subject showed only a 
slight preference for D over B. It is likely that this is a direct result of B>D being 
the transitive inference test pair in phase 1. All the subjects had to select B in 
preference to D in order to progress to phase 2. Possibly the act of responding to 
B>D, even in the absence of reinforcement, was sufficient to add this pair to the 
trained baseline relations. As performance on these relations was maintained in 
phase 2, this may have resulted in the seeming preference for B>D. The subject 
who showed some slight preference for D over B was also the subject who had 
shown some disruption to the baseline relations in phase 2.
The normally developing young children did not appear to demonstrate this 
preference for B over D in phase 2; three subjects selected B over D, while two
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selected D over B. Possibly the number of subjects involved is too small to show 
any clear preference. What seems a more likely explanation is that, while training 
and testing for the adult subjects took place in one session lasting just over one 
hour, the training sessions for the children were much shorter and took place over 
an extended period of time, and thus it is more likely then that the adult subjects 
would remember responding to B in preference to D and still have tliis relation as 
part of their baseline.
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Table 8:1 Training and Test Stimuli
Stimulus A B C D E
Coloui* Blue Red White Yellow Green
Length (cms) 18 15 13 10 8
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Table 8:2 Results - Normally able adults, Training and Test Trials, Phase 1
Subject
s
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 8 9 10
In Order
A>B 80% 80% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 67% 75%
B>C 75% 75% 100% 66% 67% 100% 75% 75% 67% 75%
C>D 100% 100% 100% 75% 100% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100%
D>E 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75%
Random Sequence
A>B 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 60% 100%
B>C 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
O D 100% 100% 100% 80% 60% 100% 100% 100% 80% 100%
D>E 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Test Probes
A>B 100% 10M4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
B>C 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
O D 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
D>E 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100%
B>D 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 8:3 Results - Normally able adults, Training and Test Trials, Phase 2
Subjects
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
In Order
A>B 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
B>C 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
C>D 100% 100% 100% 10M4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
D>E 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 100%
E>A 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
Random Sequence
A>B 100% 100% 90% 100% 100% 90% 80% 100% 100% 100%
B>C 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100%
O D 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100%
D>E 100% 100% 90% 100% 90% 90% 70% 100% 100% 100%
E>A 10M4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 80% 100%
Test Probes
A>B 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
B>C 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
O D 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 30% 100% 100% 100%
D>E 10M4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 70% 100% 10% 100%
E>A 100% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100%
B>D B 100% 100% 100% 90% 80% 100% 30% 100% 100% 100%
D 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 0% 70% 0% 0% 0%
B>E B 0% 100% 0% 80% 90% 0% 40% 100% 0% 100%
E 100% 0% 100% 20% 10% 100% 60% 0% 100% 0%
A>D A 0% 100% 100% 20% 100% 100% 20% 100% 100% 100%
D 100% 0% 0% 80% 0% 0% 80% 0% 0% 0%
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Figure 8:1 Results from test pairs, Normally able adult subjects, phase 2
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Table 8:4 Adult with learning Disability, Subject MM, Training and Test Results, 
Phase 1
Trial Type A>B B>C O D D>E B>D
In Order 100 100 83 100
Random 100 100 80 100
Random 100 100 78 100
Random 100 80 100 100
Test Probes 100 83 100 100 100
Fig. 8:2 Test Probe Results, Subject MM, Phase 1
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Table 8:5 Adult with Learning Disabilities, Subject MM, Phase 2 Results
B > D B > E A > D
A>B B>C O D D>E E>A B D B E A D
In Order 100% 75% 75% 100% 75%
Random 100% 80% 83% 60% 75%
Random 75% 40% 80% 75% 75%
Random 38% 30% 50% 50% 67%
Test
Trials
40% 40% 80% 60% 60% 60% 40% 60% 40% 60% 40%
Fig 8:3 Test Probe Results, Subject MM, Phase 2
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Table 8:6 Test Probe Results, Normally Developing Young Children, Phase 1
Test Pairs A>B B>C O D D>E B>D
Subject 1 100% 100% 0% 40% 100%
Subject 2 100% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Subject 3 100% 100% 80% 100% 80%
Subject 4 0% 80% 40% 100% 20%
Subject 5 60% 20% 60% 80% 80%
Subject 6 100% 100% 100% 80% 100%
Subject 7 100% 100% 100% 100% 80%
Subject 8 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 8:7 Test Probe Results, Normally Developing Young Children, Phase 2
B > D B > E A > D
A>B B>C O D D>E E>A B D B E A D
2 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 75% 25% 92% 8% 25% 75%
3 100% 92% 67% 75% 58% 92% 8% 92% 8% 100% 0%
6 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 33% 67% 33% 67% 42% 58%
7 92% 100% 100% 100% 92% 25% 75% 17% 83% 33% 67%
8 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 8% 0% 100% 100% 0%
Figure 8:4 Results from test pairs, Normally Developing Young Children, phase 2
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CHAPTER 9
Experiment 4:
Disruption of Stimulus Equivalence Performance
Within Psychology it has been quite common to examine disrupted performance as 
a way of learning more about normal performance. For instance, much has been 
learned about language and perception from subjects who have suffered specific 
brain damage, possibly through stroke or traumatic injury. Alternatively, some 
studies have tested subjects whose abilities are unimpaired but have examined 
performance by using procedures designed to test the limits of normal responding.
One way of doing this is to disrupt what appears to be normal processing of 
information. For instance, a Stroop task might present the word RED, very briefly, 
in either blue or red ink. Subjects would be asked to say what colour the word was 
presented in. Typically, where the word and the colour are incongruent subjects 
will have more difficulty perceiving the colour because the actual printed word 
produces interfering information.
The point of experiments such as these is that it can be hard to perceive the 
processes operating in normal performance. By studying subjects whose 
performance is likely to be affected (e.g. as a result of learning disabilities or 
injury), or by selectively interfering with aspects of “normal” performance, it is 
possible to learn more about the basis of such skills. This is necessary for more 
than just academic interest. An inability to perform certain tasks can cause huge 
problems for an individual, whether the problem is an inability to recognise faces 
(prosopagnosia) or problems dealing with relational information (such as that seen 
in transitive inference and stimulus equivalence tasks). It can be very difficult to 
plan an appropriate intervention to deal with these problems when it is not known 
what the problem actually is.
Quite a lot is known about performance on standard stimulus equivalence tasks.
;For instance, it has been shown that stimulus equivalence can help to build j
complex networks of relational information (e.g. Sidman, Kirk & Willson-Morris, j
1985). Less investigation has taken place into what will happen when the relations 
presented are not all consistent, it is assumed that normally able adults will be able 
to cope with this - after all, the relational information encountered in real life is 
rarely as neat as that in an equivalence test. However, inconsistent relations might 
prove more of a problem for adults with learning disabilities or normally
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developing young children whose equivalence performance may not be as well 
established or adaptable. Selective disruption of one aspect of equivalence relations 
might give some indication of how inconsistent relations can be processed and 
integrated into existing relations.
Experiment 3 examined some of the conditions necessary for transitive inference 
responding by first establishing transitive inference performance, and then 
selectively altering one aspect of the baseline relations and seeing what effect this 
had on transitive inference performance. Following a disruption of this kind with a 
chimpanzee subject Gillan (1981) had suggested that appropriate transitive 
inference performance was based on accurate performance on the adjacent baseline 
relations, and that the stimuli making up the series must be ordered on some uni­
dimensional scale. The results from Siemann and Delius (1994), and experiment 4, 
suggested that normally able subjects could in fact continue to respond consistently 
on a circular series but they did not use an transitive strategy when they did so.
One reason that normally able humans, both adults and children, may be able to 
continue responding is that they may be used to tasks with abstract or arbitrary 
relations between stimuli. The transitive inference task used was based on a greater 
than/lesser than relation between the stimuli (A>B, B>D etc.). When the series was 
made circular it destroyed the basis for the relation between the stimuli. In stimulus 
equivalence however, the relations between the baseline relations are entirely 
arbitrary anyway. According to Hayes (1991), one of the defining characteristics of 
stimulus equivalence is that it is an example of arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding. In this case, would a disruption of the baseline relations cause similar 
disruption to equivalence responding in subjects who had previously displayed 
stable equivalence relations? The aim of this experiment was to establish 
equivalence responding and then selectively disrupt one of the derived relations, 
and investigate if this would affect the previously displayed equivalence relations.
Stimulus equivalence requires the demonstration of the properties of reflexivity, 
symmetry and transitivity. All of these properties must be present if  equivalence is 
demonstrated. For instance, if  a subject is taught the conditional relations A-B and 
B-C, then stimulus equivalence requires the demonstration of the emergent C-A 
relation. If this relation is demonstrated, then it can be assumed that the requisite 
symmetrical and transitive relations have also been derived. In this experiment, two 
baseline conditional discriminations were trained, e.g. A-B and B-C. The subjects 
were then tested for the emergence of the C-A relation. Provided this was
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demonstrated, the subject received training on the A-C transitive relation that was 
inconsistent with the relations that had previously been established. This 
transitivity relation had never been explicitly tested but can be assumed to be 
present as the equivalence relations had been demonstrated. Performance on the C- 
A equivalence relation was then reassessed to see if the inconsistencies between the 
derived transitivity relation, and the taught transitivity relation caused any 
disruption to equivalence performance.
This experiment was carried out with three groups of subjects, normally able 
adults, an adult with learning disabilities, and normally developing young children. 
The normally able adults were expected to be most likely to integrate the 
inconsistent relation and continue to respond consistently as this group of subjects 
demonstrates equivalence relations most reliably, and has most experience with 
arbitrary relations. In Experiment 3, the adult with learning disabilities had i^hown 
substantial disruption of performance following the introduction o f the inconsistent 
relation. However, in this experiment, for the subject to receive inconsistent 
transitivity training, the subject had first to demonstrate the arbitrary equivalence 
relations, and thus was clearly capable of responding on an arbitrary task, at least 
while all the taught relations were consistent.
It was also not entirely clear how well the normally developing children would 
cope with this task. Arbitrary equivalence relations have been demonstrated with 
children aged two and even slightly younger. Therefore young children clearly 
manipulate arbitrary relations. However, these children's' performance on 
equivalence tasks is unlikely to be as robust and well established as that of 
normally able adults, and thus may be more susceptible to disruption by the 
inconsistent transitivity relation.
If the subjects demonstrated equivalence relations in phase 1 and then received 
inconsistent transitivity training in phase 2, there seemed to be three likely 
outcomes when tested for equivalence once more. The subjects could demonstrate 
equivalence relations based on the training received in phase 1, effectively ignoring 
the inconsistent transitivity relations; they could demonstrate new equivalence 
relations based on these transitivity relations; or the inconsistent relations could 
cause general disruption o f performance, with no clear equivalence relations being 
demonstrated.
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Method
Subjects
Three different groups of subjects were tested:
1 ■ Normallv able adults.
Ten undergraduate students were recruited by means of a sign-up sheet in the 
Psychology department. Seven of these subjects had also taken part in experiment 
4. As before, participation was limited to first year psychology students or non­
psychology students to ensure the subjects were not familiar with the area of study. 
The subjects were paid for their participation.
2. Adult with leaimng disabilities.
The subject was JD, a female aged 71. JD had previously taken part in another 
experiment on equivalence (experiment 1). JD was paid for her participation, 
receiving 5 Op at the end of each session.
3. Normally developing voung children.
These subjects were nine pre-school children aged between 3:2 and 4:10 at the time 
each began testing (mean age 3:11; years:months), (see Table 9:1) All the children 
attended a pre-school playgroup attached to the School of Psychology.
Stimuli
The stimuli used for training and testing were upper and lower case Greek letters 
and their printed names (see Table 9:2). Two sets of stimuli were used, the letters 
gamma and delta were used with the normally able adults and the young children. 
As JD had previously received traming with these stimuli, she was trained using 
the letters xi and phi.
An errorless training procedure was used with subject JD. This meant that six cards 
were prepared for each individual stimulus at different levels of intensity, from 
pale grey on white to full black on white. For the normally able adults and young 
children one card was used for each stimulus, as all the stimuli always appeared at 
flill intensity black on wliite.
Additional stimuli used only with the young children were a container with 40 
wooden beads and a small glass jar.
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Design
The basic design of the experiment was the same for all subjects and was carried 
out in two phases.
Phase 1.
The aim of phase 1 was to establish stable equivalence relations. The subjects were 
taught four conditional discriminations, e.g. A l-B l, A2-B2, B l-C l and B2-C2. 
They were then tested for the emergence of equivalence relations e.g. Cl-A 1, C2- 
A2. Provided they demonstrated equivalence relations the subjects progressed to 
phase 2 of the study.
Phase 2.
hi phase 2, two further conditional relations were taught. These new relations were 
inconsistent with the transitivity relations assumed to have been derived in phase 1. 
The demonstration of equivalence in phase 1 would have required the emergence 
of the relations A l-C l and A2-C2. In phase 2 the subjects were taught the 
conditional relations A1-C2, A2-C1. The subjects were then tested once more on 
the C - A  equivalence relations to see if these new transitivity relations had caused 
any changes to the previous performance.
Procedure
The procedure used varied slightly for each group of subjects.
1. Normallv able adults.
In phase 1 these subjects were taught the conditional relations A l-B l, A2-B2 and 
A l-C l A2-C2, and tested on the equivalence relation C-B. These discriminations 
were trained using a trial and error procedure to a criterion of five consecutive 
correct responses on each discrimination. Initially the subject was taught the two 
A-B conditional discriminations. When they had reached criterion on these they 
were tested on the A-B mix, where either stimulus A1 or A2 could function as the 
sample stimulus, each being tested five times in a block of ten trials. Criterion for 
passing the mix was set at 90% correct. The A-C discriminations were then trained 
and the A-C mix tested in the same way. The subjects were then tested on the C-B 
equivalence relations. Once again criterion was set at 90% correct responding. 
Provided the subject demonstrated appropriate equivalence relations they 
progressed to phase 2 of the study. No feedback was given on either the tests of the 
A-B or A-C mixes or the equivalence test. On all trials the left/right position of the 
comparison stimuli varied randomly.
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In phase 2 the subjects were taught the conditional discriminations B1-C2, B2-C1, 
again to a criterion of five consecutive correct responses. The subjects were then 
tested once more on the C-B equivalence relations.
2. Adult with learning disabilities.
In phase 1 JD was taught the conditional discriminations A l-B l, A2-B2, B l-C l, 
B2-C2 and tested on the equivalence relation C-A. These discriminations were 
taught using an errorless learning procedure. On each trial a sample stimulus was 
presented (e.g. A l) followed by two comparison stimuli, e.g. B1 (S+) and B2 (S-). 
On each trial the sample and correct comparison (S+) stimuli appeared at full 
intensity black on white. The incorrect comparison (S-) initially appeared as pale 
grey on white. AS correct responding to S+ was established, the inconect 
comparison slowly darkened in colour until it too was at full intensity black on 
white. There were six different levels of intensity. Three consecutive correct 
responses were required at each level before the intensity was increased. An 
incorrect response at any level resulted in the intensity of the S- stimulus 
immediately being reduced by one level until performance was stable once more. 
Once both the correct and incorrect comparison stimuli were at full intensity six 
consecutive correct responses were required before the subject was said to have 
reached criterion on that discrimination.
Using this procedure JD was taught the relations A l-B l and A2-B2. She was then 
tested on the A-B mix. As with the normally able subjects, criterion was set at 90% 
correct responding. The errorless learning procedure was used to teach the relations 
B l-C l and B2-C2 and the B-C mix was tested. Once the A-B and B-C mixes were 
both at criterion JD was given the C-A equivalence test. Once again criterion was 
set at 90% correct.
In phase 2, the errorless learning procedure was used to teach the relations A1-C2, 
A2-C1. Once JD had reached criterion on both these relations she was tested once 
more on the C-A equivalence relations. After testing C-A equivalence, JD was 
tested once more on the previously stable A-B and B-C mixes.
3. Normallv developing voung children.
In phase 1 the subjects were taught the conditional discriminations A l-B l, A2-B2 
and B l-C l, B2-C2, and tested for the emergence of the C-A equivalence relations. 
These discriminations were taught using a trial and enor procedure. Initially the
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conditional discriminations A l-B l and A2-B2 were trained. For each conditional 
discrimination the criterion was 15 correct responses in a block of 16 trials. All 
correct responses were reinforced. When the children reached criterion on these 
discriminations individually, they were tested on the A-B mix. The A-B mix was 
presented in blocks of 10 trials and criterion was set at 9/10 trials correct. The 
children continued to receive reinforcement on the first block of 10 trials. If they 
reached criterion on that block, on the next block they were tested for the 
maintenance of the A-B relations in Üie absence of reinforcement.
Provided the children maintained criterion performance on this task, training was 
then given on the B-C relations B l-C l and B2-C2. These were trained in the same 
way as the A-B relations and criterion was again 15/16 trials correct. Once criterion 
was achieved on these relations the B-C mix was tested. As before, reinforcement 
was provided on the first block of 10 trials and, as long as criterion was reached, 
the subjects were tested for maintenance of this performance in the absence of 
reinforcement.
The subjects were then tested on the A-B and B-C mixes in a single session. This 
session consisted of 4 blocks of 10 trials. Blocks 1 and 2 tested the A-B mix and 
blocks 3 and 4 tested the B-C mix. In the first session of this type, reinforcement 
was provided on blocks 1 and 3 with no reinforcement on blocks 2 and 4. Provided 
the subjects reached criterion on both discriminations, the two discriminations 
were again tested in a single session, but this time no reinforcement occurred on 
blocks 1 and 3, reinforcement was provided on blocks 2 and 4. If the subjects 
maintained criterion responding on this session, they received C-A equivalence 
testing on the following session.
In the session testing for the emergence of C-A equivalence, the subjects were 
presented with 2 blocks of 4 trials, one of the A-B relations and one o f the B-C 
relations, both reinforced. They were then presented with one block of 10 C-A 
trials where either Cl or C2 fimctioned as sample on each trial, with A1 and A2 as 
the comparisons. No reinforcement was provided on this block. The criterion on 
this task was again 9/10 trials correct, and the subjects progressed to phase 2 of the 
study only if they achieved criterion on the C-A equivalence trials.
In phase 2 a similar training procedure was used to teach the relations A1-C2 and 
A2-C1. The relations were first taught individually to a criterion of 15/16 correct 
responses. They were then presented in the A-C mix. The mix was presented in 2 
blocks of 10 trials. The first block was reinforced and the second block tested for 
the maintenance of A-C performance in the absence of remforcement. provided the
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subjects reached criterion on this task they were given the C-A equivalence test for 
the second time on the next session.
In this session the subjects were given 3 blocks of 4 trials, one block of A-B 
relation, one of B-C relations and one of A-C relations. Reinforcement was 
provided on all 3 blocks. The subjects were then given one block of 10 trials 
testing the C-A equivalence relations. No reinforcement was provided on this 
block.
Some additions were made to the procedure with regard to feedback and 
reinforcement. In both phases 1 and 2, before all training sessions, a container with 
40 wooden beads and a small glass jar were set on the table in front of the subject. 
Before the first training session the subject was told that they were going to play a 
game in which they could earn beads, and that every time they made a correct 
response they would earn one bead. When all the beads in the tray had been earned 
(put in the glass jar), the subject received a pre-selected back up reinforcer (a small 
picture). If, during a training session, the subject earned all the beads, the beads 
were exchanged for the pre-selected picture, the beads were emptied back into the 
container, and a new picture was selected. The training session then continued as 
before. Before test and maintenance sessions the subject was shown the glass jar 
with the beads earned during the previous session. The jar and tray of beads were 
then removed from the table and the subject was told, "Now we are going to play 
the game without me telling you if you are right or wrong. You will also not get 
any beads while we are playing, but I will keep a record of how many beads you 
earn and you will be given your beads at the end of the game. Do your best". At the 
end of the test session, the subject was given one bead for every trial completed.
Results
The results from each group of subjects will be presented separately. Responding 
on the equivalence test in phase 2 is discussed in tenus of whether the subjects 
responded consistently according to the relations established in phase 1, e.g. C l- 
B l, C2-B2, or according to the relations established in phase 2, e.g. C1-B2, C2-B1, 
or whether the subjects failed to respond consistently on this test.
1. Normallv able adults
All the subjects learned the A-B and A-C discriminations in phase 1 easily, and 
performed accurately on the A-B and A-C mixes (see Table 9:3). When tested, 9 of 
the 10 subjects immediately demonstrated appropriate equivalence relations.
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Subject 9 initially selected stimulus B2 given sample Cl and stimulus B1 given 
sample C2. However, after six trials of equivalence testing, this subject said he 
thought he had made a mistake and wanted to change his response. He then began 
to select B1 given C l and B2 given C2. The subject was then given another block 
of 10 trials and demonstrated appropriate equivalence relations throughout this 
second block. All 10 subjects then progressed to phase 2.
In phase 2 all subjects made a "mistake" on the first trial o f B1-C2. This was 
expected as this relation is inconsistent with the relations derived in phase 1. 
However all the subjects then reached criterion on B1-C2 and all immediately 
demonstrated accurate performance on B2-C1. When retested on the C-B 
equivalence relations, all subjects responded consistently on this task to one or 
other of the sets of equivalence relations that had been established. Three subjects 
(subjects 1, 6 and 9) responded according to the relations established in phase 1, 
and the other 7 responded according to the equivalence relations established in 
phase 2.
2. Adult with learning disabilities
hi phase 1 JD reached criterion on both A l-B l and A2-B2 the first time each 
discrimination was presented. She also displayed perfect performance on the A-B 
mix (see Fig. 9:1). JD reached criterion on both B l-C l and B2-C2 the first time 
each was presented, but performance on the B-C mix was below criterion (70%). 
There was then an unavoidable break in testing for five days. Following that the A- 
B and B-C relations were retrained and performance on both the A-B and B-C 
mixes was perfect. JD was then tested for the emergence of C-A equivalence and 
performance on this relation was at criterion.
JD then received training on the inconsistent A-C relation. She reached criterion on 
both A1-C2 and A2-C1 the first time each was presented. JD was then tested on the 
C-A equivalence test once more but demonstrated chance level responding (50%; 
see Fig 9:2). JD was tested on the A-B and B-C mixes as established in phase 1, 
but showed considerable disruption on both of these; A-B mix - 30%, B-C mix - 
60%.
3. Normallv developing voung children
Nine subjects began training in phase 1. During the course of phase 1, four subjects 
were dropped from further participation in the study. Subjects 1 and 5 were 
dropped as they were only available for training and testing infrequently. Subject 7
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was dropped after 12 sessions as she consistently failed the A-B mix, despite 
repeated training. Subject 8 was dropped after 6 sessions as she was consistently 
unable to reach criterion on B l-C l. The other five subjects required between 5 and 
17 sessions to complete phase 1 training and testing. Subjects 2 ,4 , 6 and 9 all 
demonstrated appropriate C-A equivalence relations and progressed to phase 2 of 
the study (see Fig. 9:3). Subject 3 was tested twice for the emergence on C-A 
equivalence, but on both occasions performance was at chance level. This was 
despite an extensive history of training on the baseline discriminations, and 
accurate performance on both the A-B and B-C relations. As a result this subject 
was dropped from further participation in the study.
In phase 2, the four remaining subjects all learned the A1-C2 and A2-C1 relations. 
Subjects 2, 4 and 6 all showed appropriate performance on the A-C mix. Subject 9 
was slightly below criterion on the A-C mix (80%; see Table 9:4), but as the time 
available for testing was limited, and performance had been stable on the second 
half of the test these discriminations were not retrained. Subjects 2, 4 and 9 
received the final C-A equivalence test. Subject 6 was unavailable for this final 
test. Before the final C-A equivalence test the subjects were given a brief review of 
the relations that had been trained in phases 1 and 2 of the study. Four reinforced 
trials were given on each of the A-B, B-C and A-C relations. All the subjects 
showed rather variable performance on these relations. All three subjects showed 
rather unstable performance on the C-A equivalence relations. Subjects 2 and 4 
responded to the new equivalence relations 60% of the time and subject 9 
responded to the new equivalence relations 70% of the time (see Fig. 9:4). For 
subjects 4 and 9 the "errors" (responding to the original equivalence relations) 
were demonstrated randomly throughout the test performance. Subject 2 initially 
responded consistently to the equivalence class established in phase 1, but after 
four trials switched, and responded consistently to the equivalence class established 
in phase 2.
Discussion
In this experiment, all groups of subjects demonstrated the emergence of untaught 
equivalence relations at the end of phase 1. When the inconsistent transitivity 
relations were trained in phase 2, the ability of the subjects to deal with these 
relations differed substantially.
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The normally able adults seemed to be able to assimilate this information. After a 
maximum of two "errors" at the beginning of the B1-C2 training, the subjects were 
able to respond consistently in line with the new contingencies, even on the first 
trial o f the B2-C1 relations. When tested on the C-B equivalence relations for a 
second time these subjects responded consistently to the equivalence relations 
established in phase 1 (three subjects), or the equivalence relations established in 
phase 2 (seven subjects). None of the subjects showed intermediate responding. In 
contrast, the subject with learning disabilities, JD, showed substantial disruption of 
performance following the introduction of the inconsistent relation. JD's 
performance on the relations in phase 1 was highly accurate prior to testing, and 
her performance on the C-A equivalence test was at criterion. JD showed no 
difficulty in learning the inconsistent A-C transitivity relation, but when tested on 
the C-A relations once more, was unable to respond consistently to the relations 
established in phase 1 or phase 2, instead showing chance level responding. This 
suggests that although JD was able to learn both the consistent and inconsistent 
relations, she was unable to integrate the conflicting information. Alternatively, 
consistent responding in phase 2 may require the subject to be able to ignore one 
set of information, basing responding only on information fi*om phase 1 or phase 2. 
JD's performance suggests that she was not able to do this either. After being tested 
on the C-A equivalence relations for a second time, JD was tested once more on 
the A-B and B-C relations from phase 1. These relations both showed considerable 
disruption from their previously stable performance. This meant that not only was 
JD unable to respond consistently on the equivalence relations, but that the 
conflicting information was causing disruption to the other relations, suggesting 
that JD had tried to integrate the two sets of information but could not find a way to 
do this.
If this is true, it would have been interesting to see if the normally able adult 
subjects were able to maintain performance on the A-B and A-C relations. Three 
subjects responded consistently to the first set of equivalence relations, which 
would suggest they would be able to maintain these baseline A-B and A-C 
relations. In that case, would they then fail to maintain performance on the 
inconsistent A-C relations? Similarly, seven subjects responded consistently to the 
equivalence relations established in phase 2. Would they maintain A-C 
performance while showing disruption to the A-B and A-C relations, or are these 
subjects able to maintain performance on conflicting items of information and still 
respond consistently on the equivalence test?
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Like subject JD, the normally developing children seemed to have some difficulty 
integrating the inconsistent items of information. The three subjects who completed 
phase 2 of the experiment had all shown stable equivalence relations in phase 1, 
and appeared to have no difficulty learning the inconsistent A-C relations in phase
2. However, performance on the C-A equivalence relation appeared to be rather 
unstable for all three subjects. This may have been because these were the only 
subjects to receive a review of the trained relations from phases 1 and 2 
immediately prior to equivalence testing. Both the normally able adults and the 
learning disabled adult could have based performance on the either of the sets of 
trained relations, while ignoring the other set. The children were required to review 
the trained relations before testing and this may have made them more likely to 
show inconclusive equivalence performance. However, JD's inconsistent 
performance suggests that she was trying to integrate the trained relations from 
botli phases, and as thice of the normally able subjects responded consistently to 
the equivalence relations established in phase 1, this suggests that the subjects did 
not automatically base their responding on the most recently trained relations.
It may just be that the normally able adults will have had much more experience 
with arbitrary relations and handling seemingly incompatible items of information. 
Results from the experiment on transitive inference by Siemann and Delius (1994) 
suggested that when the relational information could no longer be ordered on a 
single premise, normally able adults are able to switch to an alternative strategy (in 
this case using verbal markers) to maintain responding. This may be what the 
normally able adults have done in this experiment. Subject JD is clearly able to co­
ordinate arbitrary relations as she demonstrated equivalence responding, but she 
may only be able to do this while these relations are consistent. As she is likely to 
have less experience with purely arbitrary relations, she may not have developed 
alternative strategies to deal with inconsistencies in the baseline relations.
This would also seem likely for the normally developing children as they also 
showed inconsistent equivalence relations in phase 2. In fact there is some 
evidence that subject 2 may have almost developed the ability to deal with 
inconsistent premises. On the final equivalence test, this subject's overall 
performance was around chance level (60%). However, this performance was made 
up of four consistent responses to the phase 1 equivalence relations, followed by 
six consistent responses to the phase 2 relations. This may mean that the subject 
was able to maintain consistent responding, but chose to switch classes in the 
middle of testing. Possibly further testing would have shown stable performance.
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(However, Saunders and Saunders, 1994, have warned of the dangers of continued 
testing until stable performance is demonstrated).
It should be noted however, that there are differences in the procedures used with 
the different groups, and these might have affected the results. At the very least 
they make it difficult to compare the results from the different groups with 
confidence. For instance, the normally developing children were given reviews of 
all the baseline relations trained, from both phases 1 and 2, before being retested on 
the equivalence relations. It would also be interesting to know how the introduction 
of the inconsistent transitivity relation affects performance on the other trained 
relations.
Another problem was that this experiment only presents data from one adult with 
learning disabilities. While JD’s results are important as she had shown such stable 
equivalence performance previously, it would be preferable to have results from a 
larger number of adults with learning disabilities.
In order to address these issues Experiment 4 was repeated, with a tighter training 
and test procedure, with two additional groups of normally able adults and adults 
with learning disabilities. The details o f this replication are contained in Chapter 
10: Experiment 5.
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Table 9:1 Cluonological ages of normally developing young children
Subject Number Age
(years :months)
Subject Number Age
(years: months)
1 4:4 6 3:10
2 4:7 7 3:7
3 3:8 8 3:2
4 3:7 9 4:10
5 4:0
Table 9:2 Training and Test Stimuli 
Stimulus Class || A B
1 r Y gamma2 A Ô delta
1 4 xi2 0 () phi
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Table 9:3 Results - Normally Able Adults, Training and Test Trials, Phases 1&2
Subjects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
Phase 1
A l- B l 83% 100% 100% 83% 88% 100% 100% 100% 86% 100%
A2-B2 100% 83% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
A-B
mix
90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
A l-C l 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 100% 100%
A2-C2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
A-C
mix
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
C-B
equiv.
90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60%
100%
100%
Phase 2
B1-C2 83% 83% 83% 71% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83%
C2-B1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
C-B
equiv.
20% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100%
Equiv.
Class
1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
The notation 1st or 2nd in phase 2 refers to whether the subjects responded on the 
C-B equivalence test in this phase, according to the relations established in the first 
phase of the experiment, or the relations established in the second phase of the 
experiment.
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Fig 9:1 Subject JD, Training and Test Results, Phase 1
too
70 ••
SO ■■
Î
20 ■■
10
A l-
01
A2- A-B B I-  B2- B-C A l-  A2- A-B B l-  B2- B-C C-A
B2 mix C l C2 mix B l  B2 mix C l C2 mix equiv
A-B relations 
B-C relations 
C-A equivalence lest
Fig 9:2 Subject JD, Training and Test Results, Phase 2
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Fig. 9:3 Normally Developing Young Children 
Results from Subjects Completing Phase 1
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Table 9:4 Normally Developing Young Children 
Results fr om Phase 2
Final Test Session
Subject A1-C2 A2-C1 A-C mix A-B mix B-C mix A-C mix C-A
equiv.
2 94% 100% 100% 100% 75% 50% 60%
4 94% 94% 100% 50% 75% 75% 60%
6 94% 88% 100%
9 94% 100% 80% 50% 100% 75% 70%
Fig 9:4 Normally Developing Young Children 
Results from Phase 2
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CHAPTER 10 
Experiment 5:
Replication of Experiment 4 - Disruption of Stimulus Equivalence Performance
This experiment is a replication and extension of the work carried out in 
Experiment 4. That experiment aimed to establish stable stimulus equivalence 
performance, and then selectively to disrupt one of the derived relations by training 
conditional relations incompatible with the stimulus classes already established. 
The effects of these incompatible relations on the derived equivalence relations 
was then examined.
This procedure was carried out with groups of normally able adults, normally able 
young children, and an adult with learning disabilities. The procedure caused 
substantial disruption to performance for the adult with learning disabilities. The 
normally able young children showed at least some disruption to performance (the 
amount of disruption varying for each subject). However, the normally able adults 
were able to maintain consistent responding to the relations established in either 
phase 1 or phase 2 of the experiment (see Chapter 9 for fuller discussion).
The normally able adults were the only subjects able to show consistent responding 
on the equivalence test following the introduction of the inconsistent relations. 
These subjects may have found a way to integrate tlie inconsistent pieces of 
information and thus show consistent responding. Alternatively, the subjects may 
have “chosen” to ignore one set of the conflicting relations and thus respond 
consistently by explicitly monitoring their responses.
The normally able children and the adult with learning disabilities did not appear to 
use either of these strategies. This may have been because they lacked skills or 
experience in dealing with arbitrary or conflicting relations.
However, differences in the procedures used may make it difficult to compare the 
results from the three groups of subjects. The aim of the experiment was to 
investigate the effects of introducing a new relation inconsistent with relations 
previously trained and derived. This assumes that the subjects will attempt to 
integrate the two sets of relations. However, only the procedure used with the 
normally able children explicitly required the subjects to attempt this.
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In the procedure used with the normally able adults and the adult with leamhig 
disabilities, phase 1 trained the baseline conditions necessary for the subjects to 
derive stimulus equivalence, and subsequently tested for the emergence of the 
equivalence relations. The inconsistent relation was introduced in phase 2 and 
equivalence performance was retested but this inconsistent relation was never 
presented with the baseline relations from phase 1. This might make it easier to 
“disregard” one set of relations and thus respond consistently either to the relations 
established in phase 1 or to the relations from phase 2. This would be one possible 
explanation for the results shown by the normally able adults.
It seems unlikely that this happened with JD, the adult with learning disabilities, 
whose training and testing followed the same procedure. JD showed appropriate 
equivalence responding in phase 1 of the experiment but chance level responding 
on the equivalence test following the introduction of the inconsistent relations.
The procedure used with the normally able children was more likely to cause the 
subjects to try and integrate the sets of conflictmg relations. The order of training 
and testing in phase 1 was the same as that used with the other subjects. The 
subjects were taught the A-B and B-C conditional discriminations and tested for 
the emergence of the C-A equivalence relations. However, in phase 2, after the 
introduction of the inconsistent A-C conditional relations the subjects were 
required to review the A-B and B-C relations from phase 1, as well as the A-C 
relations from phase 2, before the C-A equivalence relations were retested. This 
procedure makes it more likely that the subjects would try and integrate the 
inconsistent relations. As the aim of the experiment was to investigate the effects 
of training conflicting baseline relations, this was why the review session was 
introduced to phase 2 of the trainhig.
However, while the normally able children were the only subjects in this 
experiment explicitly required to review all the trained relations before the final 
equivalence test, it would be unwise to assume that the normally able adults and 
the adult with learning disabilities did not try and integrate the relations. One of the 
most striking features of stimulus equivalence is the potential for very large and 
complex equivalence classes to develop. Sidman, Kirk & Willson-Morris (1985) 
established thiee six-member equivalence classes (15 directly taught conditional 
relations, resulting in 60 new untaught relations). Even more complex sets of 
equivalence relations are thought to develop in everyday life. The study by 
Lipkens, Hayes & Hayes (1993) documented the demonstration of emergent
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equivalence relations in a human child from the age of 16 months 18 days to 27 
months 11 days and numerous studies have discussed stimulus equivalence as an 
example of a powerful natural learning process. Indeed, Sidman (1994) has 
suggested that initially all stimuli enter into equivalence relations and that it is 
experience which breaks these down into appropriate equivalence classes.
It is possible then, that the normally able adults in experiment 4 were able to 
maintain consistent responding as a result of experience in dealing with conflicting 
items of information. These subjects may indeed have tried to integrate the 
conditional discriminations trained, and were able to respond consistently as a 
result o f overt strategies developed through experience with conflicting items of 
information.
The aim of this follow-up experiment was to repeat the procedure used with the 
normally able children with normally able adults and adults with learning 
disabilities as subjects. It was assumed that the normally able adults in the previous 
experiment did attempt to integrate the conflicting relations but were able to 
maintain consistent responding, possibly by developing strategies to “monitor” 
their responding or by choosing to disregard one set of conflicting relations. If this 
is true, then programming a review of all the trained baseline relations should not 
affect performance. However, the normally able adults might have maihtained 
consistent responding by not integrating the conflicting relations, possibly by 
treating phase 1 and phase 2 of the experiment as essentially different tasks. In that 
case it is likely that the review of the inconsistent training relations in phase 2 
would cause disruption to performances on the final equivalence test by requiring 
the subject to try and integrate the inconsistent relations.
The rationale for repeating this experiment with more adults with learning 
disabilities is slightly different. It seems likely that JD who originally took part in 
this experiment did try to integrate the inconsistent relations and this caused 
considerable disruption to performance on the final equivalence test. JD had shown 
stable equivalence performance in phase 1 of the experiment but this was disrupted 
following the introduction of the inconsistent relations in phase 2 of the 
experiment. As the method of training and testing was the same in phase 2 as phase 
1 the most likely explanation for this disruption was that she had tried to integrate 
the training relations and had not found a way to deal with the inconsistencies. 
Moreover, JD had very clearly demonstrated equivalence on two previous
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occasions (experiment 1 and unpublished data) and so this disruption seems 
unlikely to be due to unstable performance on equivalence tasks.
However, while the effects of the manipulation on JD’s performance seem clear, it 
is still only data from one subject and the conclusions that can be drawn on the 
basis of that are limited. It would be preferable to have data from at least three or 
four more subjects to gain some idea of how typical this performance is. It was 
decided, therefore, to repeat the procedure with at least four more adults with 
learning disabilities. While it seems likely that JD did try and integrate the training 
relations, it cannot be assumed that all subjects given training and testing with the 
original procedure would do so. Thus, in this replication, the sequence of training 
and testing used in the original experiment with the normally able young children 
was used.
Method
Subjects
Two groups of subjects were tested
1. Normallv able adults
Four normally able adult subjects took part. Two were male, subjects 1 and 4 and 
two were female, subjects 2 and 3. All subjects were assistant psychologists or 
undergi'aduate volunteers in a clinical psychology department. None of the subjects 
were familial' with this area of psychology.
2. Adults with learning disabilities
Foui' adults with learning disabilities took part. Three were male, Subjects 5, 7 and 
8 and one was female, Subject 6.
Stimuli
The stimuli used for training and testing were upper and lower case Greek letters 
and their printed names. Two sets of stimuli were used (see Table 10:1). The letters 
xi and phi were used with the normally able adults and the letters gamma and delta 
with the adults with learning disabilities.
For the normally able adults one card was used for each stimulus, all stimuli 
appearing as full intensity black on white. An errorless learning training procedure 
was used with the adults with learning disabilities. This meant that six cards were
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prepared for each individual stimulus, at different levels of intensity, from pale 
grey on white to full intensity black on white.
Design
The basic design of the experiment was the same for all subjects and was carried 
out in two phases.
Phase 1
The aim of phase 1 was to establish stable equivalence performance. The subjects 
were taught the A-B conditional discriminations A l-B l and A2-B2, and the B-C 
conditional discriminations B l-C l and B2-C2. Performance on these relations was 
reviewed before testing for the emergence of the C-A equivalence relations C l-A l 
and C2-A2. Phase 1 was designed to ensure highly accur ate performance on the 
trained conditional discriminations and criterion for passing the C-A equivalence 
test was also high (90%) to ensure that derived equivalence performance was 
stable.
Phase 2
In phase 2, two further conditional relations were tauglit. These new relations were 
inconsistent with the A-C transitivity relations assumed to have been derived in 
phase 1. The demonstration of equivalence in phase 1 would have required the 
emergence of the relations A l-C l and A2-C2, In phase 2 the subjects were taught 
the conditional discriminations A2-C1 and A1-C2. The baseline A-B and B-C 
relations taught in phase 1 and the inconsistent A-c relations taught in phase 2 were 
then all reviewed prior to retesting the C-A equivalence relations. This review 
session was designed to require the subjects to treat the relations trained separately 
in phases 1 and 2 as part of the same ta sk , and not as separate tasks.
Procedure
The procedure used varied slightly for each group of subjects. In each case, the 
order of training and testing was designed to maintain performance on the baseline 
relations at as high a level as possible.
For both groups of subjects, throughout the procedure, the subjects were told 
before each set of trials whether they would or would not receive reinforcement. 
The order in which the discriminations were presented varied in a pseudo-random 
manner so that each discrimination (e.g. A l-B l or A2-B2) occurred the same
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number of times within each block of trials. On all trials the left/right position of 
the comparison stimuli varied randomly.
1. Normallv able adults 
In phase 1 these subjects were taught the conditional relations A l-B l, A2-B2, B l- 
Cl and B2-C2 using a trial and error procedure. Initially the subjects were taught 
the two A-B conditional discriminations together, with reinforcement, to a criterion 
of 90% correct. When the subjects reached criterion on the reinforced trials they 
were then given ten trials without reinforcement to test for maintenance of the 
relations, criterion again being 90% correct. The subjects were then taught the B-C 
relations and maintenance was checked in the same way. Performance on the A-B 
and B-C mixes was reviewed with subjects receiving first six trials with 
reinforcement and then six trials without reinforcement on each set of relations.
In the session testing for equivalence, maintenance of these relations was reviewed 
once more with subjects receiving four trials without reinforcement then four trials 
with reinforcement on each set of relations. This was followed by eight trials on the 
C-A equivalence relations with no reinforcement available. The aim of this 
procedure was to check that the trained relations would be maintained in the 
absence of reinforcement and the brief sets of reinforcement ensured that there was 
no extinction of the baseline relations prior to testing of the C-A equivalence 
relations.
In phase 2 the A-C relation were trained, and maintenance tested in the same way . 
The subjects were taught the conditional discriminations A1-C2 and A2-C1 
together, first with reinforcement, then presented without reinforcement as a 
maintenance check. The amount of training given on the A-C relations in phase 2 
was matched to that needed to train the A-B and B-C relations in phase 1. As the 
A-C relations were incompatible with the relations trained previously, this might 
have affected the amount of training required to achieve a set criterion on the A-C 
task. Indeed, it was possible that the subjects might fail to learn the A-C relations at 
all. This was why training was matched to that required to establish stable A-B and 
B-C performance in phase 1.
Following training on the A-C relations, the A-B and B-C relations were reviewed, 
subjects receiving first six trials with reinforcement, then six trials without 
reinforcement on each set of relations. As in phase 1, in the sessions testing for C-
Chapter 10: Experiment 5 201
A equivalence, maintenance of all baseline relations was tested once more.
Subjects received four trials without reinforcement followed by four trials with 
reinforcement on each set of relations. This tested to see if any disruption would be 
shown to performance on the trained baseline relations while ensuring that any 
disruption to performance on the final equivalence test was not due to extinction in 
the absence of reinforcement. Following this review the subjects received eight 
trials without reinforcement, retesting performance on the C-A equivalence 
relations.
2. Adults with learning disabilities 
The order of training and testing used with these subjects was the same as that used 
with the normally able adults. The procedure differed in that an errorless learning 
training procedure was used to teach the A l-B l, A2-B2, B l-C l, B2-C2, A1-C2 
and A2-C1 conditional discriminations. On each trial a sample stimulus was 
presented, e.g. A l, followed by two comparison stimuli, e.g. B l (S+) and B2 (S-). 
On each trial the sample and comparison (S+) stimuli appeared at full intensity 
black on white. The incorrect comparison (S-) initially appeared as pale grey on 
white. As correct responding to S+ was established, the incorrect comparison 
slowly darkened in colour until it too was at full intensity black on white. There 
were six different levels of intensity. Three consecutive correct responses were 
required at each level before the intensity was increased. An incorrect response at 
any level resulted in the intensity of the S- stimulus immediately being reduced by 
one level until performance was stable once more. Once both the correct and 
incorrect comparison stimuli were at full intensity, six consecutive correct 
responses were required before the subject was said to have reached criterion on 
that discrimination.
In phase 1, the subjects were taught the relations A l-B l and A2-B2 using the 
errorless learning procedure. Performance was then tested on the A-B mix where 
both discriminations appeared together within a block of trials, with both the 
sample and both comparison stimuli appearing at full intensity. The subjects 
received ten trials on the A-B mix with reinforcement, followed by ten trials 
without reinforcement. The relations B l-C l and B2-C2 and the B-C mix were then 
trained and tested in the same way.
Following this, performance on the A-B and B-C relations was reviewed with 
subjects receiving first six trials with reinforcement and then six trials without 
reinforcement on each set of relations. In the session testing for equivalence,
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maintenance of these relations was reviewed with subjects receiving four trials 
without reinforcement followed by four trials with reinforcement on each set of 
relations. This was followed by eight trials on the C-A equivalence relations with 
no reinforcement available. As with the normally able adults, the aim of this 
procedure was to establish stable equivalence relations while ensuring that the 
baseline relations were maintained in the absence of reinforcement.
In phase 2 the relations A1-C2 and A2-C1 were trained using the errorless learning 
procedure and performance on the A-C mix was tested in the same way as in phase 
1. Once again training and testing on the A-C relations and the A-C mix was 
matched to that required to establish stable performance on the A-B and B-C 
relations in phase 1.
Performance was then reviewed on all A-B, B-C and A-C relations, with subjects 
receiving six trials with reinforcement followed by six trials without reinforcement 
on each set of relations. In the session retesting performance on the C-A 
equivalence relations, maintenance of each set of relations was tested once more. 
Subjects received four trials without reinforcement followed by four trials with 
reinforcement on each set of relations, followed by eight trials without 
reinforcement on the C-A equivalence relations. This tested for any disruption of 
the trained baseline conditional discriminations while still ensuring that any 
disruption to performance on the C-A equivalence relation was not due to 
extinction in the absence of reinforcement.
Results
1. Normallv able adults
The performances shown by the normally able adults are all very similar. All four 
subjects rapidly reached criterion on the A-B and B-C relations in phase 1. All the 
subjects maintained high accuracy on these relations in the absence of 
reinforcement and subsequently demonstrated 100% correct performance on the C- 
A equivalence relations at the end of phase 1. (See Fig. 10:1; Fig 10:3; Fig. 10:5; 
Fig. 10:7)
All four subjects made at least one error on the first presentation of the inconsistent 
A-C relations in phase 2. (See Fig. 10:2; Fig. 10:4; Fig. 10:6; Fig. 10:8). These 
eiTors were in keeping with the relations established in phase 1. All subjects then 
rapidly learned the inconsistent A-C relations and maintained this performance in
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the absence of reinforcement. In the session following A-C training which 
reviewed the A-B, B-C and A-C relations (reinforced trials followed by 
unreinforced trials) performance was generally highly accurate although two 
subjects (subjects 3 and 4) made errors on presentations of the B-C or A-C 
relations (see Fig 10:6; Fig 10:8). In both cases these errors occurred on reinforced 
trials and both subjects subsequently maintained performance on unreinforced 
trials, hi the unreinforced maintenance check in the session testing for 
equivalence, tluee of the subjects showed at least some disruption on the trained 
relations. Subjects 1 and 4 showed disruption on the A-B, and A-B and B-C 
relations respectively (see Fig. 10:2; Fig. 10:8). Subject 2’s performance on the B- 
C relations was at chance level while performance on the A-C relations had 
reversed from that trained so that the subject matched A l-C l and A2-C2 (see Fig. 
10:4). These reversed relations were in accordance with A-C transitivity relations 
assumed to have been derived in phase 1. All four subjects scored 0% correct on 
the C-A equivalence retest. As correct performance was taken as C l-A l, C2-A2 as 
demonstrated at the end of phase 1, this means that all subjects matched C1-A2 and 
C2-A1. This performance on the C-A equivalence retest is the symmetrical 
counterpart of the A-C relations trained at the beginning of phase 2.
2. Adults with learning disabilities 
Phase 1
All four subjects learned the A-B and B-C relations easily using the errorless 
learning procedure. Three subjects immediately showed accurate performance on 
the A-B and B-C mixes (See Fig. 10:11; Fig. 10:13; Fig. 10:15). Subject 5 initially 
showed very unstable performance on both reinforced and unreinforced 
presentations of the mixes (see Fig. 10:9) . This may have been due to the shift 
from presenting the relations one at a time (e.g. A l-B l) in the errorless learning 
procedure, to both relations together (e.g. A l-B l, A2-B2) in the mixes as 
subsequent performance on these relations was good.
In the session reviewing the A-B and B-C relations performance by all four 
subjects was highly accurate. In the maintenance check preceding equivalence 
testing all four subjects showed accurate responding on the A-B and B-C relations. 
When tested for the emergence of C-A equivalence three subjects immediately 
showed 100% correct equivalence performance (See Fig. 10:9; Fig. 10:13; Fig 
10:15). Subject 6 however, scored 0% on this test, indicating that she had derived 
the relations C1-A2, C2-A1 and responded consistently on these relations (see Fig. 
10:11).
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Phase 2
Subject 5 easily learned the A-C relations using the errorless learning procedure.
On the first presentation of the A-C mix performance was somewhat unstable 
(70%) but on the second presentation Subject 5 showed 100% correct responding. 
In the session reviewing the A-B, B-C and A-C relations subject 5 showed chance 
level performance on the reinforced trials of the A-B relations and 0% correct 
performance on the unreinforced relations. His performance on the B-C and A-C 
relations was generally stable. In the maintenance check preceding equivalence 
testing performance on the A-B relations was at chance level while performance on 
the B-C and A-C relations was generally highly accurate. On the C-A retest of 
equivalence Subject 5 scored 0% correct. As correct performance was defined as 
the c l-A l, C2-A2 equivalence relations shown in phase 1, Subject 5 matched C l- 
A2, C2-A1, the symmetrical counterparts of the A-C relations trained in phase 2 
(see Fig. 10:10).
Subject 7 also easily learned the A-C relations. Performance on the first 
presentation of the A-C mix was generally good (80%) and 100% correct on the 
second presentation. In the session reviewing performance on the a-B, B-C and A- 
C relations performance was 100% correct on all relations. In the maintenance 
check preceding equivalence testing subject 7 showed some disruption of 
performance, performance on the A-B and A-C relations was 100% correct. On the 
um'einforced B-C relations subject 7 scored 0% correct, indicating that he had in 
fact reversed the relations taught, selecting B1-C2, B2-C1. On the reinforced trials, 
performance was 50%, chance level. On the C-A equivalence retest, subject 7 
scored 0% correct, indicating that he was selecting C1-A2, C2-A1, the counterpart 
of the A-C relations trained in phase 2 (see Fig. 10:14),
Subject 8 easily learned the A-C relations. Initially performance on the a-C mix 
was unstable (60%) but improved on the second presentation (100%). In the 
session reviewing the A-B, B-C and A-C relations performance was quite unstable, 
performance on the A-B mix was 100% correct. Initially performance on the B-C 
relations was 50% correct (chance level) but this improved to 100% correct, 
performance on the A-C relations was very unstable. Subject 8 initially scored 17% 
correct on the A-C relations, indicating that subject 8 tended to reverse the trained 
A-C relations and select A l-C l, A2-C2. On the maintenance check preceding 
equivalence performance was generally highly accurate with the only errors 
occurring on the A-C relations (75% correct). On the C-A equivalence retest
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subject 8 scored 88% correct, indicating that he almost always responded in 
accordance with the C-A relations derived in phase l(see Fig 10:16).
Subject 6 had failed to show appropriate C-A equivalence relations in phase 1, 
instead matching C1-A2, C2-A1. She easily learned the A-C relations in phase 2 
and displayed generally accurate performance on the A-C mix. In the session 
reviewing the A-B, B-C and A-C relations performance was generally highly 
accurate. Subject 6 showed some disruption of performance on the maintenance 
check preceding the equivalence retest, performance on the A-B mix was 100% 
correct but on the first, unreinforced presentation of the B-C relations performance 
was 0% correct, indicating that Subject 6 had reversed the B-C relations, selecting 
B1-C2, B2-C1. However, on the reinforced B-C trials. Subject 6 reversed this 
perfoiinance, scoring 100% correct. Performance on the unreinforced A-C relations 
was 50% correct but this also improved to 100% correct during the reinforced 
trials. On the C-A equivalence retest subject 6’s performance was 0% correct, 
matching C2-A1, C1-A2. This was consistent with the inappropriate equivalence 
relations she had displayed in phase 1 (see Fig. 10:12).
As subject 6 failed to demonstrate appropriate equivalence relations in phase 1 her 
results will not be included in the discussion of performance in this experiment. 
However, they indicated that she showed some disruption o f performance while 
trying to integrate the three sets of relations.
Discussion
In this replication of Experiment 4 all the subjects, both normally able and with 
learning disabilities, were able to respond consistently on the final C-A equivalence 
retest. This is in contrast to the original experiment where the adult with learning 
disabilities showed random performance on the equivalence retest.
It was possible that in the original experiment the normally able adults were able to 
maintain consistent responding by treating the relations trained in phase 1 and the 
inconsistent relations trained in phase 2 as essentially separate tasks. By not 
attempting to integrate the two sets of relations it would easily be possible to 
maintain consistent responding. The procedure in this experiment eliminated this 
possibility by presenting a review of all trained relations (both phase 1 and phase 2) 
before retesting equivalence. Even with this procedure the normally able adults 
were able to maintain consistent responding on the C-A equivalence retest. This
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suggests that normally able adults are able to deal with conflicting items of 
relational information, possibly by developing overt strategies to monitor their 
responding and maintain performance.
This does not mean that the normally able adults were in any sense able to “solve” 
the problem of the conflicting information. The relations trained in phases 1 and 2 
remain inconsistent, and there is some evidence that the normally able adults 
experienced difficulty in trying to reconcile these inconsistencies. Three of the 
normally able adults showed at least some disruption to performance on the 
maintenance check preceding equivalence retesting, yet none of the subjects 
showed anything other than 100% correct responding prior to equivalence testing 
in phase 1.
In this replication, the adults with learning disabilities were also able to maintain 
consistent responding on the final equivalence test. As the sequence of training and 
testing was the same as that used with the normally able adults it seems reasonable 
to conclude that these subjects were also able to develop some overt strategy to 
monitor their responding and maintain consistent performance. The adults with 
learning disabilities showed slightly more disruption to performance on the 
maintenance check prior to retesting equivalence in phase 2. This would suggest 
that while they were able to deal with the inconsistencies between the relations, 
they may have found it harder initially to reconcile tlie inconsistencies.
Only one subject responded according to the equivalence relations derived in phase 
1 when retested at the end of phase 2. All the other subjects, both normally able 
and with learning disabilities matched C1-A2, C2-A1.
It is likely that the ability to cope with inconsistent relations is part of 
enviromnental control o f equivalence relations. In his 1986 paper Sidman 
described contextual control of equivalence relations in terms of five-term 
contingencies. The relations trained and tested in this experiment are all 
conditional discriminations - four-term contingencies. In this 1986 paper Sidman 
had suggested that the four-term contingency was the level at which stimulus 
equivalence emerged. Sidman’s 1994 book revised this suggestion, proposing 
instead that equivalence emerged at the level of the three term contingency, or 
simple discrimination. (See Chapter 5 for fuller discussion). This reassessment 
describes the most basic level at which stimulus equivalence may emerge and 
considers the possibility of including responses and reinforcers within equivalence
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relations. However environmental control of equivalence relation emerges at the 
level of the five-term contingency and can be described in that context.
Possibly the most important feature of these results is that so many of the subjects 
were able to produce consistent responses on the final C-A equivalence retest. In 
many ways the random responses shown by JD in the original experiment were the 
most reasonable. The A-B and B-C relations trained in phase 1 and the A-C 
relations trained in phase 2 are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled. In this case 
the random responses shown by JD make sense as there is no “correct” solution, 
one way to deal with this problem would be to treat the relations trained in each 
phase as separate tasks. However, the review session in phase 2 was designed to 
prevent this and require the subjects to treat the tliree sets of relations as connected, 
hi that case it seems likely that the subjects performances can be accounted for in 
terms of contextual control of the equivalence relations, or five-term contingencies.
Sidman (1986) described how the four-term conditional discrimination established 
in phase 1 could be placed under control by allowing an additional element of the 
experimental environment to vary. This is described in terms of the balanced four- 
term contingency depicted in Fig 5:4 (chapter 5). Fig. 10:17 shows this contingency 
placed under the contextual control of two further elements, 85 (tone 1) and 86 
(tone 2). If tone 1 is sounding then the original contingencies hold true and the 
subject can get a reward by pressing the square in the presence of the green hue, 
and by pressing the circle in the presence of the red hue. However, 86 (tone 2) 
causes these contingencies to reverse, so that a reward is obtained for pressing the 
circle in the presence of the green hue and the square in the presence of the red hue. 
The tones assume contextual control over the original conditional discrimination.
It is likely that a similar process operated in this experiment. Phase 1 training 
established a balanced conditional discrimination, through stimulus equivalence, 
so that on the final equivalence test the subjects selected A 1 in the presence of C l, 
and A2 in the presence of C2. The phase 2 training introduced inconsistent 
conditional discriminations which the subjects were required to try and reconcile 
with the original discrimination. The “strategies” which allowed consistent 
responding on the final C-A equivalence retest may be due to the development of 
contextual control.
All three sets of trained relations were reviewed in phase 2 and there is some 
evidence that the subjects tried to integrate them. For instance, subjects 2, 5, 7 and
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8 all reversed one of the trained relations at one stage within phase 2. Reversing 
one set of relations would allow the subject to integrate the three sets of trained 
relations. For instance, subject 7 reversed the B-C relations on the unreinforced B- 
C maintenance check prior to retesting C-A equivalence, thus selecting B1-C2, B2- 
C l. This would have produced the equivalence classes A1B1C2, A2B2C1 and in 
this way reconciled the relations trained. However, these unreinforced trials were 
followed by reinforced trials where the subject was reinforced for selecting the 
relations B l-C l, B2-C2, thus preventing this way of reconciling the inconsistent 
relations. What may have happened is that contextual control based on the phase 1 
or phase 2 relations may have developed. Thus, if  the C-A equivalence test was 
preceded by trials of the relations trained in phase 1 then the subjects might have 
matched C l-A l, C2-A2 on the equivalence test. However, if the equivalence test 
was preceded by trials of the relations trained in phase 2 then the subjects might 
have matched C1-A2, C2-A1.
hi this experiment the C-A equivalence retest was always preceded by reinforced 
trials of the A-C relations trained in phase 2. All but one o f the subjects tested 
matched C1-A2, C2-A1, suggesting that these A-C trials had established contextual 
control determined by the relations trained in phase 2. However, one subject 
(subject 8) almost always matched c l-A l, C2-A2 when C-A equivalence was 
retested. It is still possible though, that this subject’s responding was also under 
contextual control. The only time the C stimuli had functioned as samples and the 
A stimuli as comparisons was in the context of the equivalence test at the end of 
phase 1. Thus, the stimuli appearing in this arrangement may have been sufficient 
to establish contextual control according to the contingencies established in phase 
1, and so the subject matched C l-A l, C2-A2.
The five term contingency described by Sidman (see Fig. 10:17) clearly defines the 
stimuli established as contextual control (S5 - tone 1; 86 - tone 2). However, no 
contextual cue was clearly defined for this experiment, and so the context would 
have depended on the cue which appeared most salient for each subject. For most 
subjects this appeared to be the phase 2 A-C relations immediately preceding 
testing but for subject 8 it appears to have been the C-A equivalence test itself.
There are several ways in which it might be possible to test this proposition. For 
instance, it would be possible to vary the order in which the training relations are 
presented prior to the retestmg of C-A equivalence. Thus, if  trials on the phase 1 
relations preceded testing for some subjects, and phase 2 relations preceded testing
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for others, this might establish different contextual cues for performance on the C- 
A equivalence retest. Alternatively, it would be possible to provide explicit 
contextual cues, such as the tones suggested by Sidman, while training the phase 1 
and phase 2 relations. The presentation of one of these cues while retesting C-A 
equivalence might be sufficient to determine performance regardless of the order of 
training and testing.
The process of establishing contextual control, as suggested here , seems likely to 
be an important part of human behaviour. Sidman (1994) pointed out that “Without 
second-order conditional control we would be seriously handicapped in adapting to 
the complex environment in which we live” (p.409). Conditional discriminations in 
the natural environment do not often fall into neat, consistent equivalence relations, 
and a relation which holds true in one context may not hold true in another.
Thus, while the relations presented cannot be resolved neatly, and random 
responding may make logical sense, the establishment of contextual control can be 
seen as an adaptive response. “Given that reinforcement contingencies do create 
five-term units, we have to conclude that the incompatibility is usually resolved in 
favor of differential control” (Sidman, 1994, p.409).
Given this explanation of the results obtained, the failure of JD to show consistent 
responding in the original experiment also makes sense. The training and test 
procedure does not appear to have been sufficient to establish contextual control 
over her responding. Given that there is evidence that she tried to integrate tlie 
inconsistent relations, this would explain her random performance on the final test. 
Without a “strategy” such as contextual control to govern performance it would be 
extremely difficult to produce a consistent response. Therefore, while JD appears 
able to derive equivalence relations appropriately, she may find difficulty in 
manipulating these relations according to context.
Similarly, the failure of the normally able children to respond consistently on the 
equivalence retest during the original experiment may be due to a lack of 
experience of contextual control. The children were all able to demonstrate 
appropriate equivalence class formation but, to respond consistently on the final 
retest would have required them to establish contextual control by themselves.
They may simply have lacked sufficient experience of equivalence relations 
switching according to context to establish this control themselves.
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Table 10:1 Training and Test Stimuli
Stimulus Class A B c
Noiinally able adults and young children
1 H xi
2 0 4) phi
Adult with learning disabilities
1 r Y gamma2 A Ô delta
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Fig. 10:1 Subject 1- Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:3 Subject 2 - Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:4 Subject 2 Phase 2 results
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Fig 10: 5 Subject 3 - Phase 1 results
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Fig 10:7 Subject 4 - Phase 1 results
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Fig 10:8 Subject 4 - Phase 2 results
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Fig. 10:9 Subject 5 - Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:10 Subject 5 - Phase 2 results
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Fig. 10:11 Subject 6 - Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:12 Subject 6 - Phase 2 results
so
8
Q.S
Al -  A2-  A- C A- C A- C A- C A-B A-B B- C B- C A- C A- C A- B A- B B- C B- C A- C A- C C- A
A-C relations 
HIH— A-C mix 
- A — A-C mix
- X —  A-B, B-C & A-C mix 
- X —  A-B, B-C & A-C mix 
- # —  C-A equiv test
C2 C l mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix mix cqiii 
R N R N R R  R N R R N R R N R N R R N R R N R R  v
R - denotes reinforced trials 
NR - denotes no reinforcement
Chapter 10: Experiment 5
Fig 10:13 Subject 7 - Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:14 Subject 7 - Phase 2 results
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Fig. 10:15 Subject 8 - Phase 1 results
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Fig. 10:16 Subject 8 - Phase 2 results
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Fig. 10:17 The five-term contingency (Second-Order Conditional Discrimination)
S = Stimulus; R = Response; C = Consequence 
From Sidman (1986)
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CHAPTER 11 
Discussion
The five experiments presented in this thesis describe investigations of specific 
aspects of stimulus equivalence and transitive inference with several groups of 
subjects. The question then, is what do the results from these experiments show 
about the establishment of emergent relations in general, and specifically, their 
establishment with subjects with learning disabilities ?
Emergent Relations Require the Establishment of 
More Than the Baseline Relations
One feature which was particularly notable from experiments 1 and 2 is that, for 
the emergence of both stimulus equivalence and transitive inference, it is not 
sufficient merely to teach the baseline relations to criterion. For instance, in 
experiment 1, four subjects received training on the stimulus relations A l-B l, A2- 
B2, A l-C l and A2-C2, and were tested for the emergence of B-C and C-B 
equivalence relations. While three out of four* subjects reached criterion on these 
baseline A-B and A-C relations, only one subject, JD, immediately demonstrated 
equivalence relations. Subject NL received extensive training on the baseline 
conditional discriminations but failed to display any of the components of 
equivalence. Similarly, subject AS (case study: Appendix I) reached criterion on 
the A-B and B-C relations, but failed to demonstrate equivalence on two occasions. 
It was also clear that AS had not derived any of the properties of equivalence, as 
even when the A-B baseline relations were at criterion, performance on the B-A 
test of symmetry was at chance level.
In experiment 2, subject MM failed to demonstrate transitive inference responding 
even though he had reached criterion on the baseline training pairs. However, it 
does seem likely that this failure to demonstrate transitive inference may be due to 
MM’s failure to maintain performance on these baseline relations in the absence of 
reinforcement as he did demonstrate transitive inference responding in experiment 
4 when performance on the baseline relations was maintained. Nevertheless, it 
would appear that merely accurate performance on the baseline relations is not 
sufficient for the emergence of untaught behaviour. These new emergent relations 
have never been directly involved in any reinforcement contingency when 
demonstrated in an experimental setting, yet with some subjects these relations are 
demonstrated as positively as the directly reinforced baseline relations.
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The question of precisely what it is that causes these relations to emerge has been 
strongly debated within the context of equivalence research. In this thesis, 
performance by adults with learning disabilities on an equivalence task was 
compai ed to performance on an inference task. The aim was to see if the 
comparison with another example of emergent relations would give some 
indication of the processes underlying stimulus equivalence. It was hypothesised 
that if a subject demonstrated stimulus equivalence, that subject should also be able 
to demonstrate transitive inference, as there seemed to be some evidence that 
equivalence relations were more difficult to derive than inference relations. This 
was based on the greater difficulty of demonstrating equivalence, compared to 
inference, with non-humans. This hypothesis was supported by the fact that JD 
who immediately demonstrated equivalence relations in experiment 1, also clearly 
demonstrated transitive inference in experiment 2.
It was also hypothesised that subjects who failed to demonstrate transitive 
inference would consequently also fail to demonstrate stimulus equivalence, and 
that subjects who did demonstrate transitive inference would not necessarily also 
be able to demonstrate stimulus equivalence. Again, this was because it appears 
easier to demonstrate transitive inference than stimulus equivalence with non­
human subjects, suggesting that transitive inference may be a more basic skill. 
Unfortunately it is not clear that these hypotheses were supported as neither 
subjects GT or TD who demonstrated stimulus equivalence in experiment 1 were 
available for transitive inference testing, and subject MM who participated in the 
study of transitive inference performance in experiment 2 was not tested on 
stimulus equivalence.
Possible Concrete vs. Abstract Relations Distinction
Experiments 3 ,4  and 5 took a different approach to examining the processes 
operating in inference and equivalence. Each experiment established stable 
performance on one of the paradigms and then tested the effects of a disruption of 
the baseline relations, and how this affected the performance of three groups of 
subjects, normally able adults, adults with learning disabilities, and normally 
developing young children. In both experiments 3 and 4 the normally able adults 
were able to maintain consistent responding after the baseline relations were 
disrupted, while the adults with learning disabilities showed considerable 
disruption of performance following the introduction of the inconsistent relation.
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On the transitive inference task, the normally developing young children were 
generally able to maintain consistent responding, while the young children given 
the disrupted equivalence task did not. In experiment 5, both the normally able 
adults and the adults with learning disabilities were able to maintain consistent 
responding, hi all these experiments, when the inconsistent relation was 
introduced, the original baseline relations no longer made logical sense. This may 
explain why the normally able adults were able to maintain responding while some 
of the adults with learning disabilities were not. In a similar manipulation of a 
transitive inference task, Siemann and Delius (1994) had found that normally able 
adults were able to maintain responding, but that they used a non-transitive strategy 
when they did so. It is possible that the major difference between the transitive 
inference and stimulus equivalence paradigms is that the relations in transitive 
inference are based on some concrete dimension (e.g. “greater than” vs. “lesser 
than”) while the relations in stimulus equivalence are completely arbitraiy (“goes 
with”). [A.C. Catania (personal communication, December 1993)]
Another way of looking at this is that in both these paradigms (transitive inference 
- experiment 3 and stimulus equivalence - experiments 4 and 5) the introduction of 
an inconsistent relation in phase 2 added another dimension to the training already 
given and the subjects with learning disabilities may have had more difficulty 
coping with this shift in complexity. In effect it turned the baseline relations from 
thiee-term to four-term contingencies in transitive inference, and fi:om four-term to 
five-term contingencies in stimulus equivalence. Both MM and JD, who showed 
disruption to their established performance, might have been able to cope with 
these contingencies if they had been present from the start of training but may have 
had difficulty coping with this development within the experiment.
hi experiment 3, the phase 1 training established a consistent transitive inference 
series, but introducing the inconsistent relation in phase 2 destroyed this, 
effectively removing the concrete dimension and making the relations arbitrary. In 
effect turning the pair comparisons Jfrom three-term simple discriminations to four- 
term conditional discriminations. The normally able adults are likely to have much 
more experience with arbitrary/abstract relations, and thus be able to bring in non­
transitive strategies to deal with the alteration to relations. However, the subjects 
with learning disabilities will probably have much less experience with relations of 
this type, and therefore may not have strategies available to deal with these 
relations, or at least may find it difficult to switch strategies during testing.
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In experiments 4 and 5, while the relations between the stimuli in phase 1 were 
arbitrary equivalence relations, they were also logical and consistent. The training 
in phase 2 then established relations inconsistent with the previous training and the 
relations, as presented, stopped making logical sense. The normally able adults in 
both experiments 4 and 5 and the adults with learning disabilities in experiment 5 
were able to deal with this shift in complexity. The training in phase 2 of the 
experiments seemed to cause the relations already established to come under 
contextual control - the two contexts being either phase 1 or phase 2 training. 
Subject JD in experiment 4 did not appear to develop this contextual control of 
responding. Possibly her level of learning disability was more severe than that of 
the adults with learning disabilities in experiment 5. She may have had less 
experience of conditional discriminations coming under contextual control and thus 
not been able to derive this for herself, or possibly the training procedure in 
experiment 5, with it’s frequent reviews of the relations presented in phases 1 and 
2, was more likely to produce contextual control of the conditional discriminations. 
JD, the subject with learning disabilities in experiment 4, was clearly able to deal 
with arbitrary relations, as she had demonstrated stimulus equivalence on two 
occasions. However, for whatever reason, it seems that it was more important for 
her than for the other adult subjects that the trained relations preserved their logical 
structure.
The normally developing children in experiment 3 were able to maintain 
responding on the transitive inference test pairs even after the introduction of the 
inconsistent relation. The children in this experiment had a mean age of 5 years and 
4 months, had all experienced at least one year of formal schooling, and were able 
to read and write at levels consistent with their chronological ages. Artman and 
Cahan (1993) had suggested that schooling is one of the major influences on the 
development of transitive inference skills, and Bryant and Trabasso (1971) had 
demonstrated reliable transitive inference performance with children at least a year 
younger than those tested in this experiment. It was likely then that these children 
would have well developed transitive inference skills and would have experience 
o f quite abstract tasks. This would fit with their ability to maintain responding on 
the inconsistent transitive inference series.
The normally developing young children in experiment 4 were considerably 
younger than those in experiment 3, with a difference of nearly 15 months in the 
mean ages between the two groups. None of these children had received formal 
schooling at the time of testing. The subjects were clearly able to cope with
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arbitrary relations between the stimuli as they demonstrated equivalence relations 
in phase 1 of the study. However none of these subjects were able to maintain 
consistent responding after the introduction of the inconsistent relation, although 
the performance of subject 2 gave some indication that he might be able to respond 
consistently. As with JD, the subject with learning disabilities in this experiment, 
this may be because the subjects had little experience with very abstract relations, 
and thus either did not have alternative strategies available to deal with tliis task, or 
were unable to switch strategies during the experiment.
Thus, transitive inference and stimulus equivalence may just describe concrete and 
arbitrary forms of general emergent behaviour, the relations in transitive inference 
varying on some sort of scale, while the relations in stimulus equivalence describe 
an arbitraiy “goes with” relation. It may be that experience with either of these 
paradigms would influence the development of the performance on the other 
paradigm if both are examples of general emergent relations. Therefore, if a subject 
appears to have difficulty in deriving these emergent relations, then the transitive 
inference task which appears to be based on a concrete dimension may provide a 
useful way of giving experience with these relations, and thus facilitate the 
emergence of more abstract relations of equivalence. This does not mean that 
transitive inference relations are a necessary pre-requisite for emergence relations, 
just that they may provide an accessible way of giving experience with relations 
from which further relations can be derived.
Applications of This Research
If a subject does have difficulty in demonstrating emergent relations, of whatever 
type, it is surely valuable to try and find some way of facilitating the emergence of 
these relations. In the final chapter of his book on equivalence relations, Murray 
Sidman (1994) commented that one of the disappointments of equivalence research 
is that it has appeared to have little effect on general education methods.
“Techniques that succeed in teaching so much even to supposedly unteachable 
people have become standard in the laboratory but have not been adapted by 
those whose major responsibility is to carry out instruction outside the 
laboratory” (p.532).
It is disappointing that the training procedures for stimulus equivalence have not 
been more widely adopted, as numerous experiments have demonstrated the 
potential power of this teaching paradigm. Even a standard equivalence task which 
directly trains the relations A-B and B-C results in the emergence of seven further
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untaught relations; three of reflexivity, A-A, B-B, C-C, two of symmetry, B-A, C- 
B, one of transitivity, A-C, and one of equivalence C-A. Many of the early 
equivalence experiments described the emergence of these relations with subjects 
with quite severe learning disabilities. These experhnents described the emergence 
of quite complicated relations, of which the subject did not appear to be capable 
prior to training, yet following equivalence training could demonstrate reliably. If 
relations of the type described by stimulus equivalence are shown to be crucial to 
natur al learning processes, then it is particularly important that ways are found to 
establish these relations effectively with subjects who do not appear to demonstrate 
them spontaneously. As Sidman (1994) pointed out, this paradigm could be even 
more powerful in a teaching situation than in a laboratory situation. In a teaching 
situation it is not necessary to demonstrate that the relations would be derived 
solely as a result of the baseline relations trained. The baseline relations would not 
require such a rigorous learning criterion, the training and test tasks could be mixed 
tliroughout teaching, and reinforcement could be provided on both training and test 
trials, hr a teaching situation the focus is on reliably establishing equivalence 
relations rather than examining the precise means by which they are derived.
In this context, the question of whether equivalence is a fundamental stimulus 
function (cf. Sidman 1990, 1994), a product o f naming (cf. Dugdale and Lowe 
1990, Horne and Lowe, in press), or an example of arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding (cf. Hayes 1991), becomes of secondary importance, although it would 
probably be easier to develop appropriate training procedures if  the basis of 
stimulus equivalence was clear. However, this is not a necessity in order for 
stimulus equivalence to be a useful training procedure. In experiment 1, two 
subjects, TD and GT did not initially demonstrate equivalence relations, despite 
reaching criterion on the baseline training relations. After being taught to name the 
stimuli during conditional discrimination training both subjects demonstrated 
appropriate equivalence responding. It may be that equivalence emerges as a result 
of naming as Dugdale and Lowe (1990) and Home and Lowe (in press) have 
suggested, and that this explains why teaching naming resulted in equivalence class 
formation with these two subjects. Or, it may be that naming is not the natural basis 
of stimulus equivalence in normally able subjects, but does constitute an effective 
method of establishing equivalence relations with subjects who have difficulty 
displaying these relations spontaneously. While naming may not be the basis of 
stimulus equivalence it may provide a useful tool for establishing equivalence 
relations.
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In people with physical disabilities, many of the physical aids used do not precisely 
mimic the natural physical processes they support. A wheelchair after all provides a 
very different way of getting around compared to walking, but the aim is to provide 
a functional alternative when the natural physical process is not possible. Similarly, 
with subjects with learning disabilities, it may be more appropriate to focus on the 
most effective ways of helping the subject derive emergent relations, rather than 
trying to precisely reproduce these relations as they would normally be derived.
Clearly it is helpful if the procedures used to establish equivalence relations are 
close to those found naturally, as this increases the likelihood of bringing into 
action as many as possible of the subject’s natural learning abilities. However, as 
equivalence has been shown to be such a potentially powerful teaching tool, the 
focus should be on establishing these relations in the most effective way possible.
General Conclusions
It is in this context that a theoretical analysis of equivalence relations and an 
applied analysis of these relations can provide insight into equivalence relations 
and emergent behaviour in general. A clearer understanding of the processes 
operating in equivalence can help in the development of effective ways of 
establishing those relations. Similarly, description of effective ways of establishing 
these relations may provide useful information on processes operating in 
equivalence class formation. These investigations are important for subjects with 
learning disabilities, such as those taking part the experiments described in this 
thesis. This includes not only subjects like TD and GT in experiment 1, who 
demonstrated equivalence relations after a fairly simple manipulation of the 
training paradigm, but also subjects like NL, who did not reach criterion for testing 
in either experiment 1 or experiment 2. Given NL’s difficulty in learning the 
baseline relations, it is likely that she in particular would benefit from a really 
effective equivalence teaching procedure, as she is likely to have considerable 
difficulty in spontaneously demonstrating equivalence relations. The results from 
experiments 3 and 4 suggested that even when adults with learning disabilities do 
demonstrate emergent untaught relations, these performances may be less robust 
than those displayed by normally able subjects, and so any procedure which helps 
maintain stable performance on these tasks is likely to be beneficial. In this way the 
stimulus equivalence paradigm may constitute a usefiil tool for developing 
emergent relations with subjects who have difficulty displaying these relations 
spontaneously.
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APPENDIX I
Case Study of Stimulus Equivalence Performance by an Autistic Adult
This experiment was an investigation of stimulus equivalence performance by an 
adult male (AS) diagnosed as autistic. Eikeseth and Smith (1992) had carried out 
an investigation of stimulus equivalence performance with four high-functioning 
autistic children. They suggested that autistic subjects may be an appropriate 
population with which to examine the conditions under which equivalence 
relations develop, as they seem "less likely to display untrained relations (such as 
equivalence relations) than other human populations" (Eikeseth and Smith, 1992, 
p. 124). Subject AS also had a specific educational history that suggested that it 
might be instructive to repeat aspects of experiment 1 with him as a subject.
Experiment 1 examined the role of naming in equivalence performance using upper 
and lower case Greek letters and their printed names as stimuli. Subject AS had 
received teaching in ancient Greek language over a period of several years. Thus, 
he had a unique history of familiarity with the items used as training and test 
stimuli, but some data from clinical tests suggested that AS might have difficulty 
with tasks such as stimulus equivalence.
One of the major debates in equivalence research had been the role of naming and 
language in equivalence class formation (see chapter 5). Having had this extensive 
history of instruction in Greek, it seemed likely that AS would have learned names 
for the stimuli that were used for training and testing in experiment 1. If AS was 
given conditional discrimination training using these stimuli, would he 
spontaneously use these names, and would there be any evidence that they 
facilitated appropriate equivalence performance, or not, as the case may be.
There was no guarantee that AS would recognise the stimuli as Greek letters if he 
was not explicitly told that that was what they were. This seems to relate to the 
relevance of the property of reflexivity in equivalence research. Reflexivity is often 
assumed in equivalence research and not tested, even when the properties of 
syimnetiy and transitivity are assessed. Yet reflexivity is vital as it fixes the identity 
of a stimulus across situations. In the context of equivalence testing this generally 
means that the subject will treat a stimulus as the same stimulus whether it 
functions as a sample or as a comparison. For instance, a subject could not 
demonstrate symmetry of a taught A l-B l relation if that subject treated A1 as a
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different stimulus when it seived as a comparison rather than a sample. Thus, if AS 
did not recognise the stimuli as Gr eek letters unless they appeared in the context of 
a Greek lesson, then there is no reason to assume that there would be any stimulus 
names available to him during testing.
The aim of this experiment then, was to give subject AS conditional discrimination 
training using upper and lower case Greek letters and their printed names as 
stimuli, and then test to see if AS had formed appropriate equivalence classes. In 
conjunction with this, AS was given a number of naming tests to see if he 
spontaneously used any names (Greek or other) for the stimuli, and if  there was any 
evidence that these names influenced his performance on stimulus equivalence 
tests.
Method
Subject
The subject in this experiment was AS, a 25 year old male. It had previously been 
suggested that a diagnosis of autism or Asperger's syndrome would be appropriate 
for AS. AS had received quite a high level of educational input when younger. He 
lived semi-independently in a housing scheme in a town near St. Andrews.
Prior to testing in this experiment, AS had recently been assessed on a number of 
clinical measures by a qualified clinical psychologist; the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), the Wechsler Memory Test-Revised (WMS- 
R), the Rey Osterreith Figure Test-Copy and Recall, the Trail Making Test and the 
Word Fluency Test.
AS's performance on the WAIS-R placed him in the borderline range of 
intelligence, with his verbal score slightly higher than his performance score. He 
performed best on tests of information, vocabulary and similarities, and was 
relatively poor at timed tests requiring manipulation of numbers, figures and 
symbols. He also showed problems with attention and sustained concentration, 
mental calculation, visuo-motor speed and forward planning.
Performance on the WMS-R on tests of verbal memory and learning were much as 
would be predicted from his intellectual level and any problems seemed more 
likely to be due to attentional difficulties rather than specific memory deficits.
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On the Rey Osterreith figure copying and figure recall tasks AS's final performance 
was fairly complete and accurate but he seemed to have trouble with organisation 
of the task. The Trail Making Test assesses visual tracking, attention and mental 
sequencing and AS's performance was poor, suggestmg problems with 
concentration and organisational skills, and impaired mental sequencing and visuo- 
motor speed. Finally, AS showed poor performance on the Word Fluency Test of 
spontaneous word production. This was somewhat surprising given his relatively 
good verbal performance on the WAIS-R, suggesting he has problems with tasks 
which lack structure and involve initiative and spontaneity.
In general AS appeared to be a somewhat anxious individual, and tended to set 
very strict time limits on test sessions, often restricting the amount of testing 
possible following baseline training. He was also easily distracted and showed a 
fairly limited concentration span, which also limited the amount of testing possible.
Stimuli
The stimuli used for training and testing were the Gieek letters Gamma and Delta 
shown in Table A :l. These were presented on photographic cards approx. 13 cm's 
X 9 cm's, covered with clear plastic, one stimulus to each card. The stimuli 
appeared as black forms on a white background.
These stimuli were also used for one of the naming tests given to subject AS during 
the course of the experiment. Two other sets of stimuli were used for two different 
naming tests at different times. One was a set of eight Greek letters - their upper 
and lower case forms and their printed names (see Table A:2). This was the same 
naming test given to the subjects in experiment 1 before and after testing. The third 
test was the upper and lower case forms of all the letters of the Greek alphabet (see 
Table A:3).
Procedure
The basic procedure was that before testing AS would be given one of the thr ee 
naming tests to check for any spontaneous naming of the stimuli. AS would then be 
given match-to-sample training on the conditional relations A l-B l, A2-B2, B l-C l 
and B2-C2. AS was then tested on the A-B and B-C mixes. If AS reached criterion 
on these relations he was then tested for the emergence of C-A equivalence 
relations. The naming test would then be repeated to see if AS had either produced 
more names for the stimuli during the course of testing, or showed any evidence of 
producing names consistently for any of the stimuli.
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Slightly different instructions were given according to which naming test was used:
1. The first naming test consisted of the two classes of A, B and C stimuli used in 
training. In this test AS was shown the stimuli individually and asked if  he thought 
that form had a name, or if  it should be called anything. AS was not explicitly told 
the stimuli were Greek letters.
2. The second naming test consisted of the eight classes of A, B and C stimuli as 
used in experiment 1. Two of these classes were the classes of stimuli used in 
training. Once again AS was not explicitly told that these stimuli were Greek 
letters. Rather, he was again asked if  he thought any of the stimuli had a name or 
should be called anything. The aim of this test was to see if AS would be more 
likely to name the stimuli used in testing, or produce consistent names for these 
stimuli, than for similar stimuli not used in training.
3. The third naming test consisted of the upper and lower case forms of all the 
letters in the Greek alphabet. Before being given this test, AS was explicitly told 
that these stimuli were Greek letters, and he was asked to try and name them. This 
was to see if AS was aware of the names of the stimuli and would be more likely to 
produce names for these stimuli if explicitly told that the stimuli were Greek 
letters.
During conditional discrimination training, a trial and error training procedure was 
used. Initially the sample stimulus was placed in front of AS and he was asked to 
look at it and touch it; this was to establish an observing response. Having touched 
the sample, AS was then shown the two comparison stimuli which were placed 
side by side underneath the sample stimulus. AS was asked to select the 
comparison stimulus that "went with" the sample stimulus. It proved difficult to 
establish a consistent observing response with AS, and so, after the first few 
sessions, this procedure was changed slightly. When the sample stimulus was 
placed in fr ont of AS, it was rotated 90° to the left or right, or was upside down.
AS was required to turn the stimulus back to the correct position to try and ensure 
that he observed the sample properly. The comparison stimuli were presented as 
previously.
On the conditional discrimination training trials, criterion was set at five 
consecutive correct responses. Once criterion had been reached on A l-B l and A2- 
B2, these tasks were combined to form the A-B mix, and similarly, when criterion 
was reached on B l-C l and B2-C2, these tasks were combined to form the B-C 
mix. On these tasks the sample stimulus varied between A1 and A2 or between B1
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and B2, each stimulus appearing five times in a block of ten trials. The left/right 
position of the comparison stimuli varied randomly on all training trials.
During training and testing, the stated experimental procedure was sometimes 
constrained by a tendency on the part of AS to set strict time limits on the test 
sessions. This occasionally meant that the full range of tests could not be given on 
one day, or that it was not possible to complete all of the post test naming test.
Results
AS was given training and testing on eight separate occasions.
On the first session AS reached criterion on both A l-B l and A2-B2 fairly easily, 
although perfoimance on the A-B mix was poor (see Fig A :l). AS also reached 
criterion on the two B-C relations, although this training took longer and 
performance was not as stable. However, performance on the B-C mix was slightly 
better than on the A-B mix. AS was tested on the C-A equivalence test but gave no 
evidence of having derived equivalence relations (C-A equivalence - 40%). Dm ing 
this session all AS's responses were somewhat unclear and no tests for naming 
were given.
In session 2, prior to training, AS was tested for naming of the eight Greek letters 
(upper and lower case figures, and printed names). AS did not give appropriate 
Greek names for any of the upper case letters and of the lower case letters only 
named theta correctly. He did however give names to most of the stimuli, generally 
based on their similarity to standard letters. AS pronounced the names of six of the 
printed words correctly, and also spelled out the letters for xi and mispronounced 
phi. It was not possible to give a post-training naming test as AS terminated the 
session immediately after baseline discrimination training and testing.
Performance on the conditional discriminations varied considerably. Performance 
on A l-B l was poor and did not reach criterion, yet on A2-B2 performance was 
perfect. A l-B l was retrained and performance was again poor, suggesting 
responding was actually based on a preference for stimulus B2. Performance on the 
B-C relations was also poor, never reaching criterion.
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In session 3 AS was given the naming test for the eight Greek letters before and 
after training. AS gave names for most of the stimuli in these tests. AS named all 
the printed names correctly both times,. He was also more likely to give correct 
Greek letter names for the lower case stimuli, and also to use these names 
consistently, than for the upper case stimuli. (See table A:4) On the conditional 
discriminations, AS reached criterion on both A l-B l and A2-B2, although his 
performance took some time to stabilise (see Fig. A:3). When tested on the A-B 
mix his performance was at chance level.
In session 4 AS was given the third naming test, which presented all the upper and 
lower case letters of the Greek alphabet. On this task AS produced names for 20 of 
the upper case stimuli (total 24), 9 of which were correct. AS produced names for 
23 of the lower case stimuli, 15 of which were correct. Performance on the B-C 
conditional discrimination was very good and AS also responded at 100% when 
tested on the B-C mix (see Fig. A:4). After conditional discrimination training AS 
was shown the six stimulus cards for the A, B and C training stimuli. He gave 
appropriate names for the lower case (B) stimuli, and the printed name (C) stimuli. 
However he did not give appropriate names for either of the A stimuli.
hi session 5, AS was given the naming test consisting of the A, B and C parts of the 
eight Gr eek letters. He gave names for six of the upper case stimuli, two of which 
were correct although neither were the test stimuli. He gave names for all eight 
lower case stimuli, six of which were correct, including both test stimuli, and gave 
correct names for all the printed name stimuli. As was given training on the A l-B l 
and A2-B2 conditional discriminations (see Fig. A:5). Performance on these was 
poor and neither discrimination reached criterion. AS was then given training on 
B l-C l to see how far this would compare to the A-B performance, and 
immediately reached criterion.
hi session 6, no naming tests were given. AS was given training on both A-B and 
B-C discriminations (see Fig. A:6). On this occasion AS reached criterion on all 
four discriminations, although his performance took some time to stabilise on A2- 
B2.
In session 7, again no naming tests were given, and AS received training on all four 
conditional discriminations (see Fig. A:7). AS reached criterion on both A-B 
discriminations, although again, performance on A2-B2 was poor. When trained on 
the B-C discriminations, performance reached criterion immediately. The A2-B2 
discrimination was re-trained, and this time reached criterion immediately. AS was
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then tested for B-A symmetry, one of the components of equivalence relations. 
However performance on this test was at chance level.
Training and testing for session 8 took place over two consecutive days to try and 
allow a more thorough examination of AS's performance on the equivalence test. 
Before and after testing, AS was given the third naming test, consisting of the 
upper and lower case letters of the Greek alphabet. In both naming tests AS gave 
names for most of the stimuli. However he was slightly more likely to give names 
for the lower case stimuli, and it was more likely that these would be the 
appropriate Greek letter names. It was also slightly more likely that he would 
produce consistent names for the lower case stimuli (see Table A:5). Of the 
uppercase test stimuli, AS only named the gamma (A l) stimulus, and this naming 
was not consistent from pre- to post- test. AS failed to name the delta (A2) 
stimulus at all. However AS correctly named both the lower case (B1 and B2) 
stimuli in both the naming tests.
AS was trained on both the A l-B l and A2-B2 conditional discriminations (see Fig. 
8:8). He reached criterion on both these tasks, although performance was not 
particularly good. In an attempt to maintain stable performance in preparation for 
equivalence testing, AS was tested on the AB mix, but this time with feedback on 
all trials. This seemed to help maintain performance on a task where the sample 
stimuli changed randomly (A-B mix - 80%). AS was then trained on the B-C 
discriminations, and performance was highly accurate. AS was then tested on both 
the B-C and A-B mixes, without reinforcement. Performance on the B-C mix was 
perfect, while performance on the A-B mix had deteriorated slightly from when all 
trials were reinforced (A-B mix - 62%). AS was given the C-A equivalence test, 
but performance was close enough to chance level to suggest that AS had not 
derived equivalence classes (C-A equivalence - 60%).
Discussion
The tests given on a number of occasions during this sequence of training and 
testing give no evidence that AS had derived any of the relations of stimulus 
equivalence. AS was directly tested on the C-A equivalence test on two occasions, 
following the first training session, and following the eighth (last) training session. 
On both occasions, performance was around chance level. On one occasion AS was 
tested for the emergence of B-A symmetiy, one of the necessary properties of 
stimulus equivalence. Performance on this relation was also at chance level, even
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though AS had just been trained on the A-B relations, and had reached criterion On 
both these discriminations. This suggests that at no time did AS derive any of the 
properties of stimulus equivalence as a result of the conditional discrimination 
training given.
It generally proved much harder to establish stable performance on the A-B 
relations (upper case letter - lower case letter) than on the B-C relations (lower case 
letter - printed name). Given this difficulty in establishing stable baseline 
performance, the failure of AS to demonstrate equivalence relations is 
understandable. It might have been interesting to test AS for the emergence of C-B 
symmetry. Performance on the trained B-C relations was generally highly accurate. 
This may have made it more likely that AS would display the C-B symmetrical 
counterpart of these relations. This might have given some indication of whether 
AS would derive any of the properties of equivalence relations. However, when AS 
was tested on B-A symmetiy, he had just displayed criterion performance on both 
the A-B relations, which would suggest that AS genuinely failed to display any 
equivalence relations, rather than his failure on the symmetry test being due to 
unstable performance on the baseline relations.
One of the reasons for interest in performance by AS on this equivalence task was 
to see whether his experience with Greek letters would influence his performance 
on these tests. There is some evidence to suggest that his performance on the 
conditional discriminations, and familiarity with the stimuli are linked. In all the 
naming tests AS was more likely to give correct names for the lower case stimuli 
than for the upper case stimuli. He was also more likely to give the same names to 
the lower case stimuli both before and after conditional discrimination training, 
suggesting that these names would have been available to him during 
discrimination training. When the upper case stimuli were tested for names AS 
never gave appropriate Greek letter names for the test stimuli. However, he 
generally gave appropriate names for the lower case test stimuli. If AS had derived 
B-A symmetiy, then it is possible that these appropriate lower case names would 
have transferred to the upper case stimuli. The failure of AS to demonstrate B-A 
symmetry is consistent with the failure of these names to transfer to the A stimuli. 
Similarly, AS performed better on the B-C discriminations than on the A-B 
discriminations, which also fits with his superior naming of the lower case (B) 
stimuli. AS was generally able to name the printed name (C) stimuli, although it is 
not clear whether he was reading the word as he was shown it, or whether he was 
already familiar with that name and knew that it was also the name of a Greek 
letter.
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As subject AS was already able to name the B stimuli, and at the very least could 
read the names of the C stimuli, it is possible that in effect, AS "knew" the B-C 
relation prior to the conditional discrimination training. This would be one 
explanation why this relation seemed to be established so much more easily than 
the A-B conditional discrimination.
While there seems to be some connection between performance by AS on the 
conditional discriminations and his ability to name the stimuli, it is not clear that 
this is a causal relationship. If naming does cause equivalence, as several 
researchers have suggested, then it would be likely that AS should have shown 
some improvement in equivalence performance over the course of testing. After 
all, AS could fairly reliably name the B and C test stimuli. AS was explicitly 
taught, on a number of occasions, to link the A stimuli with the B stimuli. If 
naming does cause equivalence, then some improvement in A-B performance over 
the course of testing would be expected. Yet there was no evidence of this, and 
even when the A-B relations were at criterion, naming of the B stimuli did not 
facilitate the development of B-A symmetry.
Of course, while the naming tests were designed to check if AS was able to name 
the stimuli, they cannot check if AS then used these names during conditional 
discrimination training and testing. During training and testing AS very rarely 
overtly labelled the stimuli. While he may have been covertly labelling the stimuli, 
he miglit also not have been using the stimulus names at all. Possibly if  AS had 
named the stimuli during training and testing, this would have resulted in 
equivalence responding. However, the evidence from this experiment would also 
seem to support Sidman's suggestion that naming may result from equivalence 
relations, rather than the other way round.
There is no clear evidence that the context of the naming test caused a difference in 
the way AS named the stimuli. In the test with eight Greek letters where AS was 
not told the stimuli were Greek letters, AS spontaneously produced several Greek 
letter names, although not always appropriately. In the third naming test when AS 
was explicitly asked to give the stimuli their Greek letter names, he was slightly 
more inclined to give Greek names to all the stimuli, but he still occasionally gave 
other stimulus names, e.g. stimulus A2 which was upper case delta (A) was 
labelled "triangle".
It would appear then that AS's previous experience with Greek letters did not 
facilitate the development of equivalence relations.
Table A:1 Training and Test Stimuli
Chapter 8: Experiment 3
Stimulus Class || A B C
1 1r Y gamma
2 1A Ô delta
Table A:2 Stimuli for Second Naming Test
Stimulus
class
A B C
1 r Y gamma
2 A Ô delta
3 © 0 theta
4 A X lambda
5 H xi
6 0 _(|)............. . phi
7 E a sigma
8 Q CO omega
Table A:3 Stimuli for Third Naming test
Chapter 8: Experiment 3
Stimulus Name Upper Case Character Lower Case Character
Alpha A a
Beta B P
Gamma r Y
Delta A Ô
Epsilon E s
Zeta Z c
Eta H nTheta 0 0
Iota I 1
Kappa K K
Lambda A X
Mu M M-
Nu N V
Xi
Omicron 0 o
Pi n n
Rho p PSigma E a
Tau T T
Upsilon Y U
Phi 0 4)
Chi X X
Psi T V
Omega Q CO
Table A:4 Session 3 - Results of Pre- and Post Test Naming Tests
Pre-Test Names Post-Test Names Consistent Names
upper Case Letters 7 names 8 names 3 names
(2 correct, not test) (2 correct, not test) (2 correct)
Lower case Letters 8 names 8 names 6 names
(5 correct, both test) (4 correct, both test) (4 correct, both test)
Printed Names 8 names 8 names 8 names
( all correct) (all correct) (all correct)
The cells give the total number of names given to the stimuli. The figures in 
brackets indicate the number of these names that were appropriate Greek letter 
names, and if these included the test stimuli.
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Table A:5 Session 8 Results of Pre- and Post- Test naming Tests
Pre-Test Names Post-Test Names Consistent Names
Upper Case Letters 19 19 16
(11 correct, not test) (11 correct, not test) (11 correct, not test)
Lower Case 
Letters
23 23 19
(18 correct, both 
test)
(16 correct, both 
test)
(16 correct, both 
test)
The cells give the total number of names given to the stimuli. The figures in 
brackets indicate the number of these names that were appropriate Greek letter 
names, and if these included the test stimuli.
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